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SUMMARY 1 INTRODUCTION 
Engineers  and s c i e n t i s t s  i n  t h e  advanced 
f i g h t e r  technology i n t e g r a t i o n  (AFTI) 
F-16 program i n v e s t i g a t e d  t h e  i n t e g r a -  
t i o n  of emerging t echno log ie s  i n t o  an 
advanced f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t .  AFTI'S t h r e e  
major technologies  inc luded  ( 1  ) f l i g h t -  
c r u c i a l  d i g i t a l  c o n t r o l ,  (2) decoupled 
a i r c r a f t  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  and ( 3 )  i n t e -  
g r a t i o n  of av ion ic s ,  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  and 
p i l o t  d i sp lays .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i n v e s t i -  
g a t i n g  improvements i n  f i g h t e r  perform- 
ance,  r e s e a r c h e r s  s t u d i e d  t h e  g e n e r i c  
problems conf ron t ing  t h e  d e s i g n e r s  of 
h i g h l y  i n t e g r a t e d  f l i g h t - c r u c i a l  d i g i t a l  
c o n t r o l  systems. 
The au tho r  provides  an overview of 
bo th  t h e  advantages and problems of in -  
t e g r a t e d  d i g i t a l  c o n t r o l  systems. An 
examinat ion of t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  de- 
s i g n ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and f l i g h t  t e s t  
l i f e - c y c l e  phase is provided. An over- 
view is  g iven  of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
des ign ,  multimoded decoupled f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  and i n t e g r a t e d  a v i o n i c s  
des ign .  The approach to  q u a l i f y i n g  t h e  
so f tware  and system des igns  is  d i scussed ,  
and t h e  e f f e c t s  of des ign  choices  on 
system q u a l i f i c a t i o n  are h igh l igh ted .  
AFTI F-16 f l i g h t  tes t  r e s u l t s  are 
summarized f o r  t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t ,  de- 
coupled f l i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  hardware, and 
so f tware  requirements .  The effects of 
d e s i g n  choices  and q u a l i f i c a t i o n  proce- 
d u r e s  on f l i g h t  tes t  ope ra t ions  are de- 
t a i l e d ,  based on AFTI f l i g h t  experience.  
Observat ions and recommendations are 
g iven  f o r  each development phase - speci- 
f i c a t i o n ,  des ign ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and 
f l i g h t  test. 
The advanced f i g h t e r  technology i n t e g r a -  
t i o n  (AFT11 F-16 program provided t h e  
oppor tun i ty  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  bene- 
f i t s  and complex i t i e s  of i n t e g r a t i n g  
advanced a i r c r a f t  t echno log ie s  i n t o  a 
f i g h t e r  aircraft. The s tudy  w a s  a 
j o i n t  Nat iona l  Aeronaut ics  and Space 
Adminis t ra t ion  ( N A S A ) ,  U.S. A i r  Force, 
and U.S. Navy program and w a s  managed 
by t h e  A i r  Force F l i g h t  Dynamics Labo- 
r a t o r y .  NASA g o a l s  were to  ensu re  
s a f e t y  du r ing  f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  and to  
p rov ide  an independent  assessment  of 
t h e  advanced technologies .  
The pr imary s u b j e c t  of t h i s  r e p o r t  
i s  the  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system 
(DFCS) and i t s  i n t e g r a t i o n  wi th  t h e  
a v i o n i c s  and p i l o t  d i sp l ays .  A n  i n t r o -  
d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  h i s t o r y ,  r a t i o n a l e ,  and 
nomenclature of d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
systems can be found i n  S z a l a i  (1978) .  
The AFTI F-16 DFCS development objec-  
t i v e s  inc luded  assessment  of a t r i p l e x  
d u a l - f a i l  o p e r a t e  a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  i n t e g r a -  
t i o n  of a v i o n i c s  and p i l o t  d i s p l a y s  with 
t h e  DFCS, and development of mission- 
s p e c i f i c  decoupled f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes. 
Opera t ing  a DFCS wi thou t  miss ion  
impairment a f t e r  any two f a i l u r e s  
r equ i r ed  a minimum of f o u r  channels  of 
redundancy i n  p r e v i o u s l y  designed sys-  
t e m s .  I f  a t r i p l e x  system could cor- 
r e c t l y  choose between t h e  remaining 
two channels  when the second f a i l u r e  
occurred ,  a c q u i s i t i o n  and maintenance 
costs f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system 
could  be reduced. Reducing p i l o t  work- 
load  and i n c r e a s i n g  weapon e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
were t h e  goa l s  of i n t e g r a t i n g  t h e  DFCS 
and i t s  mis s ion - spec i f i c  decoupled con- 
t r o l  modes wi th  the a v i o n i c s  system and 
p i l o t  d i sp l ays .  In  p r e v i o u s l y  des igned  
systems, t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l s  d i d  n o t  
have s p e c i f i c  modes f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
missions.  The p i l o t  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  conf igu re  each a v i o n i c  
system f o r  a mission. 
Th i s  report i n c l u d e s  an h i s t o r i c a l  
review of t h e  development and f l i g h t  
t e s t  of t h i s  i n t e g r a t e d  DFCS program. 
The h i s t o r i c a l  review i s  s t r u c t u r e d  t o  
p rov ide  an adequate background of t h e  
development p rocess  and the r e s u l t i n g  
des ign  needed t o  comprehend t h e  f l i g h t  
t e s t  r e s u l t s .  The a u t h o r  addres ses  each 
of t h e  development phases  - s p e c i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  des ign ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and f l i g h t  
test .  Impor tan t  l e s s o n s  l ea rned  are 
i l l u s t r a t e d  wi th  examples from f l i g h t  
tes t  experience. 
The i n c r e a s i n g  use  of system 
i n t e g r a t i o n  to  i n c r e a s e  a i r c r a f t  
performance, and t h e  f l i g h t  c ruc ia l  
n a t u r e  of t h e s e  systems, d i c t a t e s  a 
thorough assessment of t h i s  i n t e -  
g r a t e d  DFCS program. 
2 NOMENCLATURE 
AAG a i r - t o - a i r  gunnery 
ACK acknowledge 
A-D ana log  to  d i g 1  t a l  
AD I a t  ti tude  d i r e c t i o n a l  
i n d i c a  t o r  
AFT1 advanced f i g h t e r  tech- 
nology i n t e g r a t i o n  
AGL above ground l e v e l ,  f t  
A I U  a c t u a t o r  i n t e r f a c e  u n i t  
ALT alt imeter 
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b u i l t - i n  test  
a n g l e  of s i d e s l i p ,  deg 
c e n t r a l  a i r  d a t a  computer 
c o n t r o l  conf igured  v e h i c l e  
cha rge r ,  b a t t e r y  
computer program component 
computer program development 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
computer program p roduc t  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  ~ 
i c e n t r a l  p r o c e s s i n g  u n i t  
c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y ,  pe rcen tage  
( 
mean aerodynamic chord I 
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d i g i t a l  t o  ana log  
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decoupled a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  
I bombing I 
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and c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
emergency power u n i t  
engineer ing  tes t  s u p p o r t  
equipment 
f i r e  c o n t r o l  computers 
f i r e  c o n t r o l  r a d a r  
f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  i n d e n t i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  and r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer 
f a i l u r e  manager, a software 
component 
f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  
t e s t i n g  
f l i g h t p a t h  maneuver 
enhancement 
f l i g h t  
f e e t  
good channel  average 
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hours  
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leading-edge f l ap  
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l i n e  replaceable u n i t  
pounds 
Mach 




















P S A  
PS 





m i  1 l i o n  h e r t z  
m i l i t a r y  p o w e r  
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pneumatic s enso r  assembly 
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redundance managment 
read  on ly  memory 
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r a d i a n  
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standard air-to-air gunnery 
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bombing 
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selector monitor 
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ser ia l  number i 
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index  
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3 SYSTEM SPECIFICATION 
I n  the system s p e c i f i c a t i o n  phase,  oper- 
a t i o n a l  requi rements  are d e t a i l e d  t o  a 
l e v e l  t h e  d e s i g n e r s  can use. 
The f i rs t  step i n  s p e c i f y i n g  the  
AFTI F-16 ( f i g .  1 )  system des ign  w a s  
t h e  s t a t e m e n t  of work (SOW) released 
on November 16, 1978 by t h e  A i r  Force 
Wright  Aeronau t i ca l  Labora to r i e s ,  Wright 
P a t t e r s o n  A i r  Force Base, Ohio. Th i s  
document s p e c i f i e d  t h e  requi rements  f o r  
decoupled c o n t r o l ,  weapon l i n e  p o i n t i n g ,  
aerodynamic v e h i c l e  mod i f i ca t ions ,  digi-  
t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system, and p i l o t -  
v e h i c l e  i n t e r f a c e .  These g e n e r a l  
requi rements  were then  d e t a i l e d  i n  t h e  
fo l lowing  c a t e g o r i e s :  a i r  v e h i c l e ,  sys-  
tems engineer ing ,  tes t  and e v a l u a t i o n .  
The c o n t r a c t o r ,  General  Dynamics, i n  
F o r t  Worth, Texas, w a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
t h e  second step i n  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  sys-  
t e m .  A f t e r  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  gene ra t ed  t h e  
system s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  an e n t i r e  tree of 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  grew f o r  each system, new 
o r  modified,  t h a t  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  accom- 
p l i s h  AFT1 o b j e c t i v e s .  The fo l lowing  
paragraphs  i n  s e c t i o n  3 w i l l  add res s  t h e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  on ly  as they  apply  to  t h e  
d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system. 
3.1 Con t ro l  Laws and Handling Q u a l i t i e s  
The SOW s p e c i f i e d  the requi rements  f o r  
t h e  unique decoupled c o n t r o l  modes 
( t a b l e  1 1 and t h e  a i r f r a m e  s t a b i l i t y  
and f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements.  
Decoupled c o n t r o l  requi rements  inc luded  
d i r e c t  l i f t  and s i d e f o r c e ,  f u s e l a g e  
p o i n t i n g  independent  of f l i g h t  p a t h ,  ver- 
t i ca l  and la teral  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  and wings 
l e v e l  s t e e r i n g .  The s t a b i l i t y  and f l y -  
i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requi rements  were based on 
MIL-F-8785C (U.S. Department of Defense, 
1980).  From t h e  SOW, t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  pro- 
v ided  t h e  d e t a i l e d  requi rements  f o r  a i r -  
c r a f t  s t a b i l i t y  and f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s .  
Requirements i nc luded  shor t -pe r iod  
damping r a t i o  l i m i t s ,  s ho r t -pe r iod  
f requency  requi rements ,  du tch  r o l l  f r e -  
quency and damping, and f o r c e  g r a d i e n t  
l i m i t s  f o r  c o n t r o l l e r s .  
3.2 R e l i a b i l i t y  and F a u l t  Tolerance  
The r e l i a b i l i t y  and f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e  re- 
qui rements  from t h e  SOW are shown i n  
t a b l e  2. These i n c l u d e  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
f a i l - o p e r a t i o n a l ,  swi t ch ing  and f a i l -  
u r e  t r a n s i e n t s ,  and c o o l i n g  r equ i r e -  
ments. A requi rement  w a s  a 95-percent 
chance of be ing  f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  for  
a second f a i l u r e  of a similar device .  
MIL-F-9490D (U.S.  Department of De-  
f ense ,  1975) provided  t h e  requi rements  
f o r  DFCS development. 
Software requi rements  stated that  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  deve lop ,  v a l i d a t e ,  and 
ma in ta in  the so f tware  i n  accordance w i t h  
a so f tware  development and management 
p l a n  prepared  by t h e  c o n t r a c t o r .  It 
i d e n t i f i e d  the procedures  and methodol- 
o g i e s  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n ,  
documentation, and c o n t r o l  of software.  
The requi rement  f o r  an independent  
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backup u n i t  (IBU) f o r  the DFCS w a s  
i d e n t i f i e d .  The I B U  provided an  ana log  
backup t o  t h e  primary DFCS t h a t  is  inde- 
pendent  of t he  DFCS sof tware .  Level 3 
f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  ( U . S .  Department of 
Defense, 1980) throughout t h e  f l i g h t  
t es t  envelope and l e v e l  2 f l y i n g  qual-  
i t i e s  i n  l and ing  w e r e  s p e c i f i e d  f o r  
t h e  IBU. 
The e lectr ical  system w a s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  provide  power t o  s u p p o r t  DFCS reli- 
a b i l i t y  requirements.  System l e v e l  and 
DFCS s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  from t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  
r e s t a t e d  t h e  requi rements  of t h e  SOW, 
i d e n t i f i e d  q u a l i t y  a s su rance  p r o v i s i o n s ,  
and provided a comprehensive des ign  cri- 
t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  DFCS and i t s  components, 
redundancy l e v e l s ,  and t h e i r  f a i l -  
o p e r a t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  ( t a b l e  3 ) .  
The q u a l i t y  a s su rance  s e c t i o n  of 
t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  p rov ides  a table t h a t  
c ros s - r e fe renced  system requi rements  t o  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  methods ( t a b l e  4 1. The re- 
l i a b i l i t y  aspects are shown t o  be v e r i -  
f i e d  through a n a l y s i s  o n l y  ( i t e m s  3.2.3.1 
and 3.2.3.2 of table 4 ) .  I n  nonredun- 
d a n t  systems t h a t  c o n s i s t  of hardware 
on ly ,  a n a l y s i s  t echn iques ,  such as f a u l t  
trees, are s u f f i c i e n t .  However, i n  re- 
dundant,  sof tware-dr iven  systems, ground 
tes t  and demonst ra t ions  are a l s o  needed 
t o  v e r i f y  r e l i a b i l i t y .  Hence, e x t e n s i v e  
f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  t e s t i n g  were 
developed ( s e c t i o n  5). 
Documents t h a t  s p e c i f y  t h e  so f tware  
development are i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  speci- 
f i c a t i o n s  by t i t l e  only.  A l l  r e l e v a n t  
m i l i t a r y  s t a n d a r d s  are i d e n t i f i e d .  
4 DESIGN 
This  s e c t i o n  c o n t a i n s  the DFCS des ign  
and provides  an  overview of t h e  methods 
used t o  o b t a i n  it. The des ign  i s s u e s  
addressed  are (1 ) system a r c h i t e c t u r e  
and f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e  aspects, ( 2 )  c o n t r o l  
l a w s ,  and ( 3 )  sof tware .  
4.1 System Architecture and Fault  
Tolerance 
System a r c h i t e c t u r e  and f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e  
are c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d .  The multi-  
channel  a r c h i t e c t u r e  is  a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  need f o r  f a u l t  t o l e rance .  
Because a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  of t h e  f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  des ign  is  i n  so f tware ,  the 
so f tware  aspects of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
des ign  are a l s o  covered i n  s e c t i o n  4.3. 
Add i t iona l  in format ion  can be found i n  
Yousey and o t h e r s  (1  984).  
4.1 . 1 
Architecture 
D i g i t a l  F l ight  Control System 
The requi rements  f o r  t h e  DFCS a r c h i -  
t e c t u r e  ( f i g .  2 )  w e r e  de r ived  d i r e c t l y  
from t h e  SOW and s y s t e m  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
This  d e r i v a t i o n  c o n s i s t e d  of i d e n t i f y i n g  
s p e c i f i c  d e s i g n  requi rements  f o r  each  
numbered i t e m  i n  t h e  SOW and system spec- 
i f i c a t i o n .  For each des ign  r equ i r e -  
ment,  hardware and so f tware  r e sources  
w e r e  then  a l l o c a t e d  t o  ensu re  t h a t  t h e  
des ign  requi rements  w e r e  m e t .  
For example, t h e  des ign  requi rement  
f o r  six-degree-of-freedom c o n t r o l  w a s  
ach ieved  us ing  t h e  s t anda rd  F-16 sen- 
s o r s ,  t h e  t r i p l ex  computer set, and t h e  
s t a n d a r d  F-16 c o n t r o l  s u r f  aces p l u s  t h e  
canards .  R e l i a b i l i t y  requi rements  were 
s a t i s f i e d  by having computer mean-time- 
be tween-fa i lure  rates and redundancy 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  those  needed t o  meet 
p r o b a b i l i t y  requi rements .  F igu re  3 
shows t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a s i n g l e -  
channel  des ign  and a t r ip l ex -channe l  
des ign .  The f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
t r i p l ex -channe l  system of 1 x per 
f l i g h t  h r  i n c l u d e s  t h e  IBU. The major 
causes of l o s s  of c o n t r o l  are d i s c u s s e d  
i n  Price and o t h e r s  (1984).  Concerns 
f o r  so f tware  r e l i a b i l i t y  were addres sed  

























shows t h e  IBU and i t s  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  
primary DFCS. The IBU can be engaged 
e i t h e r  manually by t h e  p i l o t  o r  automa- 
t i c a l l y  i f  p roper  o p e r a t i o n  is l o s t  by 
t h e  t h r e e  d i g i t a l  p rocesso r s .  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  a r c h i t e c t u r a l  aspect 
of t h e  DFCS w a s  t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  of 
t he  three computers were n o t  synchro- 
n ized .  T h i s  cho ice  was made by t h e  con- 
tractor because computer s y n c r o n i z a t i o n  
w a s  be l i eved  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a s i n g l e - p o i n t  
f a i l u r e  caused by e l ec t romagne t i c  i n t e r -  
f e r e n c e  (EMI)  and l i g h t n i n g  e f f e c t s .  
To o b t a i n  t h e  d e t a i l e d  DFCS archi- 
t e c t u r e ,  eng inee r ing  s t u d i e s  and reli- 
a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  of hardware components 
were performed; no formal  o r  s t r u c t u r e d  
t o o l  w a s  used. A r c h i t e c t u r a l  des ign  
i s s u e s  inc luded  ( 1  ) t h e  des ign  of t h e  
I B U  and ( 2 )  the ana log  senso r  i n t e r f a c e .  
The I B U  trade s tudy  addressed  ( 1  
how r e l i a b l e  t h e  IBU should be, what re- 
dundancy l e v e l  w a s  needed, and i f  o u t p u t  
command vo t ing  would be r equ i r ed ;  ( 2 )  
what f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  performance w a s  re- 
q u i r e d  of t h e  IBU ( r equ i r emen t s  were f o r  
l e v e l  3 handl ing  q u a l i t i e s  th roughout  
t he  f l i g h t  envelope excep t  f o r  l e v e l  2 
a t  l a n d i n g ) ;  ( 3 )  what t h e  engagement 
method should be f o r  t h e  IBU; and (4) 
how t o  minimize t r a n s i e n t s  on engagement 
and disengagement of t h e  I B U ,  These 
i s s u e s  w e r e  f u r t h e r  complicated by t h e  
d isagreement  between t h e  p rocur ing  and 
f l i g h t  test  agenc ie s  r ega rd ing  f l i g h t  
t e s t  of t h e  IBU. The f l i g h t  t e s t  agen- 
c ies '  p o s i t i o n  t o  f l i g h t  t e s t  t h e  IBU 
p r e v a i l e d  and t h i s  d i r e c t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  
the  performance i s s u e  and the need f o r  
manual I B U  engagement and disengagement 
by t h e  p i l o t .  
A tr iple redundancy l e v e l  w a s  chosen 
f o r  the I B U  wi th  a p o r t i o n  of one f l i g h t  
computer ca rd  i n  each of t h e  three DFCS 
boxes dedicated t o  the  IBU. An o u t p u t  
s e l e c t o r ,  which can select  v a l i d  com- 
mands a f t e r  a s i n g l e  f a i l u r e ,  w a s  
i nc luded  f o r  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l - t a i l  com- 
~ 
mands t o  improve the sys tem's  f a u l t  t o l -  
e r a n c e  i n  t h a t  a x i s .  Space l i m i t a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  computer p r o h i b i t e d  o u t p u t  selec- 
t o r s  f o r  a l l  s u r f a c e  commands. The per- 
formance i s s u e  w a s  of c o n s t a n t  i n t e r e s t ,  
and the mod i f i ca t ions  t o  improve I B U  per- 
formance cont inued  i n t o  f l i g h t  test. 
The des ign  of t h e  I B U  can be found i n  
Price and o t h e r s  (1984) and i n  s e c t i o n  4. 
The I B U  mod i f i ca t ions  inc luded  t u n i n g  
the  p i t c h  rate p a t h  and p rov id ing  d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  h o r i z o n t a l - t a i l  commands when 
i n  manual p i t c h  o v e r r i d e  ( s t a l l s ) .  
The IBU w a s  engaged e i t h e r  manually 
o r  a u t o m a t i c a l l y .  I B U  t r a c k i n g  of t h e  
pr imary  system f o r  engagement purposes  
w a s  rejected owing t o  t h e  need f o r  inde- 
pendence, because a f a i l u r e  i n  the pri- 
mary system could  n o t  be allowed t o  
a f f e c t  t h e  I B U ' s  ope ra t ion .  However, 
t h e  d i g i t a l  system d id  track the IBU t o  
minimize reengagement t r a n s i e n t s  t o  t h e  
d i g i t a l  system. Th i s  w a s  e a s i l y  accom- 
p l i s h e d  s i n c e  t h e  d i g i t a l  system moni- 
t o r e d  t h e  IBU s u r f a c e  commands f o r  in -  
f l i g h t  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  and b u i l t - i n  
tes t  ( B I T )  purposes.  
I s s u e s  addressed  f o r  t h e  s e n s o r  
i n t e r f a c e  inc luded  (1  ) t h e  use  of d i g i -  
t a l  rather than  ana log  c ross - s t r app ing  
of in format ion  ( f i g .  51, and ( 2 )  
r e q u i r e d  s e n s o r  sampling rates t o  min- 
imize  d i f f e r e n c e s  in t roduced  by t h e  
asynchronous computer ope ra t ion .  Analog 
c r o s s - s t r a p p i n g  w a s  f i r s t  thought  t o  be 
r e q u i r e d  t o  meet d a t a  l a t e n c y  and reli- 
a b i l i t y  requirements.  However, as 
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  showed t h i s  w a s  n o t  
t r u e ,  d i g i t a l  c ros s - s t r app ing  w a s  chosen 
because it r e q u i r e d  less wiring. Digi- 
t a l  c r o s s - s t r a p p i n g  w a s  accomplished 
u s i n g  two ded ica t ed  ser ia l  t r ansmiss ion  
l i n e s  f o r  each computer. To minimize 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in t roduced  by asynchronous 
o p e r a t i o n ,  s e n s o r s  w e r e  sampled a t  f o u r  
t i m e s  the  b a s i c  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  rate of 
6 4  Hz. This  w a s  of p a r t i c u l a r  concern 
f o r  p i l o t  i n p u t s  from 
which can have h i g h e r  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  s enso r s .  
t h e  f o r c e  s t i c k ,  
i n p u t  rates 
An assumed 
than  
wors t  
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case i n p u t  t o  maximum command w a s  ana- 
lyzed  a t  100 p e r c e n t  i n  0.1 sec, o r  
1000 pe rcen t / sec  ( f i g .  6 ) .  The 
i n c r e a s e d  sampling rate reduced t h e  
i n t e r c h a n n e l  d i f f e r e n c e s  to  less than 
4 p e r c e n t  f o r  a p r e f i l t e r  break fre- 
quency w of 50 rad/sec. This  a n a l y s i s  
w a s  a l s o  t h e  f i r s t  t o  recognize  t h e  
e f f e c t  of asynchronous sampling e r r o r s .  
The sampling e r r o r s  i n t roduced  d i f f e r -  
ences  between computer channels  f o r  each 
computer-calculated s u r f a c e  command. 
4.1.2 D i g i t a l  F l i g h t  Con t ro l  System 
I Computer H a r d w a r e  
The f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computers (FLCC) 
used were t h e  Bendix (The Bendix Corpor- 
a t i o n ,  Te terboro ,  New J e r s e y )  BDX-930 
computers ( f i g .  7) .  The b a s i c  computer 
inc luded  a c e n t r a l  p rocess ing  u n i t  
(CPU), based on a 16 -b i t ,  b i t - s l i c e d  
microprocessor  and s o l i d - s t a t e  memory 
( 6 K  words of random-access memory (RAM) 
and 24K words of programmable read-only 
memory). The CPU d i d  n o t  have f l o a t i n g -  
p o i n t  c a p a b i l i t y  and w a s  programmed i n  
assembly language. The CPU w a s  supple- 
mented wi th  an input -output  c o n t r o l l e r  
t h a t  performed a l l  i n p u t  and o u t p u t  
data convers ion  wi th  a s i n g l e  command 
from t h e  processor. This  allowed t h e  
p rocesso r  t o  compute f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
a lgo r i thms  wi thou t  be ing  burdened by 
i n p u t t i n g  and o u t p u t t i n g  discrete and 




Addi t iona l  f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  f l i g h t  I 
c o n t r o l  computers i nc luded  a MIL-STD- 
1553B mul t ip l ex  data bus i n t e r f a c e ,  
f a i l u r e  l o g i c ,  the I B U ,  and ser ia l  data 
l i n k s  t o  and from each of the o t h e r  two 
computers. F a i l u r e  l o g i c  w a s  special 
c i r c u i t r y  t h a t  allowed two computers t o  
f a i l  another ;  t h i s  l o g i c  w a s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  provide  t h e  dual-f a i l - o p e r a t e  capa- 
b i l i t y .  A d e s c r i p t i o n  of the ana log  and 
discrete i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  is  provided  
i n  t a b l e  5. The FLCC r e p r e s e n t e d  a 
s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  computer i n  terms of 
technology used, throughput,  and memory. 
4.1.3 Avionics I n t e r f a c e  
The items t h a t  determined t h e  DFCS 
i n t e r f a c e  wi th  t h e  a v i o n i c s  were i n t e -  
g r a t i o n  of the p i l o t  s t a t i o n  wi th  the 
DFCS t o  reduce p i l o t  workload, i n s t r u -  
menta t ion  of t h e  DFCS, and the use  of 
i n fo rma t ion  from o t h e r  a v i o n i c  subsys- 
t e m s .  The pr imary  a v i o n i c s  systems 
( f ig .  8 )  inc luded  a f i r e  c o n t r o l  com- 
p u t e r  (FCC) ,  s t o r e s  management se t  
(sMS), i n e r t i a l  n a v i g a t i o n  u n i t  ( I N U ) ,  
f i r e  c o n t r o l  r a d a r  (FCR) ,  c e n t r a l  a i r  
d a t a  computer (CADC), two mul t ipurpose  
d i s p l a y s  (MPD) , i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  system, 
and a head-up d i s p l a y  ( H U D ) .  The av i -  
o n i c s  w e r e  i n t e r f a c e d  through a MIL-STD- 
1553B d a t a  bus c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  f i r e  
c o n t r o l  computer. 
The types  of a v i o n i c s  in fo rma t ion  
involved  i n  t h e  DFCS i n t e r f a c e  and the 
av ion ics  systems that pass the i n f o r -  
mation are shown i n  table 6 .  P i l o t  mode 
s e l e c t i o n  and s t a t u s  in fo rma t ion  repre- 
s e n t e d  t h e  most s a f e t y  c r i t i ca l  d a t a  of 
the a v i o n i c s  i n t e r f a c e .  D e t a i l s  on t h e  
p i l o t - v e h i c l e  i n t e r f a c e  are g iven  i n  
s u b s e c t i o n  4.1.4. Parameters w e r e  sup- 
p l i e d  to  t h e  DFCS from t h e  I N U ,  inc lud-  
i n g  r o l l  a t t i t u d e ,  p i tch a t t i t u d e ,  and 
v e l o c i t y .  The parameters w e r e  used i n  
t h e  decoupled c o n t r o l  modes t o  assist 
t h e  p i l o t  d u r i n g  r o l l i n g  maneuvers. 
The a b i l i t y  t o  in s t rumen t  and mon- 
i t o r  i n t e r n a l  DFCS parameters w a s  essen-  
t i a l  f o r  thorough t e s t i n g ,  bo th  i n  t h e  
l a b o r a t o r y  and d u r i n g  f l i g h t  test. The 
d e s i g n  approach w a s  t o  have t h e  FCC send 
t h e  DFCS a l i s t  of i n t e r n a l  DFCS memory 
l o c a t i o n s  t o  be s e n t  t o  in s t rumen ta t ion ;  
t h i s  l i s t  w a s  s e n t  fo l lowing  the running  
of a BIT. The DFCS d i d  n o t  s t o r e  i t s  
own l is t  because t h e  FCC used nonvoli- 
t i v e  c o r e  memory and changes t o  t h e  l i s t  
could  be made more e a s i l y .  However, 
t h i s  proved n o t  t o  be t r u e  and d u r i n g  
f l i g h t  test ,  the des ign  w a s  changed t o  
have t h e  DFCS s t o r e  i t s  own parameter 
lists. The DFCS could  o u t p u t  64 param- 
eters a t  a 50-Hz rate. 
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The MIL-STD-1553B d a t a  bus i s  a d u a l  
1 redundant (one a c t i v e  and one backup) 1-MHz serial  bus c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  f i r e  
1 c o n t r o l  computer. The 1553B d a t a  bus 
I performs p a r i t y  checks and p o l l i n g  tests 
l when t r a n s m i t t i n g  to  t h e  o t h e r  a v i o n i c s  
systems. F a i l u r e  of these tests causes  
t h e  bus c o n t r o l l e r  to  r e t r y  the i n f o r -  I mation exchange on the backup bus. If ' t h e  FCC f a i l e d ,  the  s t o r e s  management 
1 set  took over bus c o n t r o l .  I 
I 
4.1.4 P i l o t  I n t e r f a c e  
and f a i l u r e  resets. 
c o n t r o l l e r  commands is  shown i n  f i g -  
u r e  11. N o t e  how the decoupled motion 
ob ta ined  by t h e  rudder  peda l  and t w i s t  
g r i p  command changes f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
modes. D e s c r i p t i o n s  of t h e  decoupled 
c o n t r o l  o p t i o n s  are shown i n  f i g u r e  12 .  
Discrete switches i n  the c o c k p i t  
were k e p t  t o  a minimum. They inc luded  
a i r c r a f t  t r i m ,  decoupled mode selec- 
t i o n ,  a normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  l i m i t  
engagement swi t ch ,  IBU swi tch ,  and 
f a i l u r e  resets. S e v e r a l  switches used 
by o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  systems, b u t  r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system, i n c l u d e  
speed brake swi t ch  and t h r o t t l e  a t  m i l i -  
t a r y  and i d l e  p o s i t i o n s .  
F l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes w e r e  selected 
i n  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  ways. Decoupled 
mode and I B U  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  us ing  
swi t ches  on t h e  right-hand c o n t r o l  
s t i c k .  S e l e c t i o n  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
miss ion  c o n t r o l  modes - a i r  t o  a i r  and 
a i r  t o  ground -were made i n  con junc t ion  
w i t h  a v i o n i c  and weapon system changes 
through the HUD p a n e l  ( f i g .  9 )  or a 
swi t ch  on t h e  t h r o t t l e  ( a i r  t o  a i r  
o n l y ) .  S e l e c t i o n  of miss ion  specific 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes, independent of t h e  
o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  systems, could  be made 
through t h e  MPDs. I n  a l l  cases miss ion  
s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  modes w e r e  selected 
through t h e  SMS. The SMS sends  c o n t r o l  
mode r e q u e s t s  to  t h e  DFCS over  the 1553B 
m u l t i p l e x  bus.  The mode s e l e c t i o n  data 
f low is summarized i n  f i g u r e  13. 
The s t a t u s  of the DFCS w a s  p re sen ted  
t o  t h e  p i l o t  i n  three ways -warn ing  
l i g h t s ,  MPD messages, and HUD d i s p l a y s .  
The d e d i c a t e d  f a i l u r e  l i g h t s  warned t h e  
p i l o t  of f a i l u r e s  d e t e c t e d  by t h e  DFCS; 
t he  p i l o t  would then  use t h e  MPDs to  
de termine  t h e  e x a c t  f a i l u r e s  d e t e c t e d .  
The HUD in fo rma t ion  w a s  p r i m a r i l y  
related to  c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i r c ra f t ,  b u t  
a l s o  provided some in fo rma t ion  on f a i l -  
u r e  aspects of t h e  DFCS. 
The MPDs were des igned  t o  be t h e  
pr imary  i n t e r f a c e  between t h e  p i l o t  and 
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t h e  DFCS. The MPD f u n c t i o n s ,  HUD i n d i -  
c a t i o n s ,  and f a i l u r e  l i g h t s  are l i s t e d  
and b r i e f l y  desc r ibed  i n  table 7. Fig- 
u r e  14 shows the DFCS base page and t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  DFCS test  page. 
There were two major concerns  wi th  
t h e  p i l o t  i n t e r f a c e  t o  t h e  DFCS. The 
f i r s t  concern w a s  t h e  l ack  of redundancy 
i n  t h e  command p a t h  f o r  mis s ion - spec i f i c  
c o n t r o l  mode s e l e c t i o n .  This  concern 
f o r  redundancy i n  t h e  p i l o t ' s  c o n t r o l  
mode s e l e c t i o n  proved t o  be v a l i d ,  as an  
i n - f l i g h t  anomaly showed d u r i n g  f l i g h t  
t es t  (see s e c t i o n  7.2.1). The second 
concern w a s  f o r  t h e  method used t o  d i s -  
p l a y  p i l o t  f a u l t  in format ion .  The f a u l t  
d i s p l a y  complexity is  b e s t  demonstrated 
wi th  t a b l e s  from t h e  p i l o t ' s  manual and 
an  example. A l i s t  of t h e  l e v e l s ,  
t y p e s ,  and classes of f a u l t  nmemonics 
f o r  t h e  DFSC is  given i n  t a b l e  8, and 
t h e  f a u l t  nmemonics for  each of t h e  
t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  are desc r ibed  i n  
t a b l e  9. Armed wi th  t h i s  informa- 
t i o n ,  and t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  decode t h e  
hexidec imal  numbers i n t o  b i n a r y  num- 
b e r s ,  t h e  p i l o t  could  de te rmine  from a 
f a u l t  d i s p l a y  ( f i g .  15 )  what t h e  DFCS 
had d e c l a r e d  f a i l e d .  This  f a u l t  dis- 
p l a y  t e l l s  t h e  p i l o t  t h a t  a 1st f a i l u r e  
has  occurred  t o  an i n p u t  used i n  t h e  
p i t c h  a x i s  c o n t r o l  of  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
Below t h e  Engl i sh  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  
f a u l t ,  i s  a two-dig i t  number and t h r e e  
s i n g l e  d i g i t s  (see f i g .  15 ) .  The f i r s t  
number can be decoded u s i n g  t a b l e  10, 
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  an angle-of -a t tack  sen- 
s o r  had f a i l e d .  Table 10 a l s o  g i v e s  t h e  
f a i l u r e  words d i s p l a y e d  f o r  each  of t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  shown i n  t a b l e  8. The t h r e e  
d i g i t s  ( f i g .  15)  i d e n t i f y  what each com- 
p u t e r  b e l i e v e s  i s  t h e  f a i l e d  channel.  
Each number r e p r e s e n t s  a computer chan- 
n e l  - A, B, and C - l e f t  t o  r i g h t .  A 
two implies t h a t  t h e  channel  repre- 
s e n t e d  i n  tha t  column has  f a i l e d ;  a f o u r  
implies t h a t  t h e  channel  t o  t h e  l e f t  has  
f a i l e d ;  and a one implies t h a t  t h e  chan- 
n e l  t o  t h e  r i g h t  has  f a i l e d .  In  t h i s  
case t h e  1st channel,  termed channel A, 
ha s  t h e  f a i l e d  angle-of -a t tack  sensor .  
Although some of t h i s  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r -  
mation w a s  meant f o r  eng inee r ing  analy- 
sis only ,  p i l o t  attempts to decode t h e  
d i s p l a y s  l e a d  t o  confusion. 
4.1.5 Actuator Interface 
Considerable  p re l imina ry  des ign  work 
w a s  spen t  on r e f i n i n g  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  of 
t h e  t r i p l e x  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system t o  t h e  
s u r f a c e  a c t u a t o r s ,  which were p r e v i o u s l y  
d r i v e n  by t h e  F-16 quadruplex ana log  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system. A system i n t e -  
g r a t i o n  memo i n v e s t i g a t e d  seven p o s s i b l e  
r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  us ing  t h e  t r i p l e x  sys- 
t e m ,  i n  terms of t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
each. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  having a re l i -  
a b l e  actuator i n t e r f a c e ,  t h e  DFCS w a s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  d e t e c t  f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  com- 
mands t o  t h e  a c t u a t o r s  b e f o r e  t h e  ac tu -  
a t o r s  reconf igured  f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  con- 
d i t i o n .  Add i t iona l  t e s t  data on t h e  
a c t u a t o r s ,  which determined f a u l t  
l e v e l s ,  al lowed f o r  a n  i n i t i a l  DFCS 
f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  des ign .  However, t h e  
f a u l t  l e v e l s  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  a c t u a t o r  I 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  were small enough t h a t  I 
asynchronous sampling e r r o r s  would cause  1 
nuisance  f a i l u r e s .  A f t e r  several des ign  
i t e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  a c t u a t o r  i n t e r f a c e  I 
r equi rements  w e r e  f i n a l l y  m e t ,  i l l u s -  
t r a t i n g  t h a t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  d e s i g n s  
can  r e q u i r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  and 
are dependent on dev ice  c h a r a c t e r i s -  




The remainder of s e c t i o n  4.1.5 
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  ISA and t h e  DFCS i n t e r f a c e  
t o  t h e  ISA; f u r t h e r  d e t a i l  can be found 
i n  P r i c e  and o t h e r s  (1984).  Each of 
t h e  seven i n t e g r a t e d  s e r v o a c t u a t o r s  
(ISAS) accepts e lectr ical  commands from 
t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computers i n  t h r e e  
e l e c t r o h y d r a u l i c  s e rvova lves  ( f i g .  16 ) .  
I t  conve r t s  t h e s e  commands i n t o  a power- 
ram p o s i t i o n ,  which then  p o s i t i o n s  t h e  
r e s p e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  su r f ace .  S e v e r a l  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f u n c t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  































1 .  A unique mechanical p o s i t i o n  
and ra te  feedback scheme combines t h e  
feedbacks  i n t o  a s i n g l e  i n p u t  t o  
each  servovalve .  
2 .  Three se rvova lves  ( S V 1 , 2 , 3 )  are 
provided  f o r  redundancy; SV1 and S V 2  
normally s h a r e  c o n t r o l  of a c t u a t o r  pos i -  
t i o n ,  while S V 3  is he ld  i n  standby. 
3 .  Servovalve f a i l u r e  is 
d e t e c t e d  by comparing se rvova lve  
f irst-s t a g e  p r e s s u r e s .  
4.  Sel f -conta ined  hydromechanical 
f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  and c o r r e c t i o n  l o g i c  
i s  inco rpora t ed  f o r  first f a i l u r e s  of 
t he  se rvova lves  o r  f o r  the h y d r a u l i c  
system. A f i r s t  f a i l u r e  of SV1 or S V 2  
w i l l  t r a n s f e r  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  s tandby 
S V 3 .  A f i r s t  f a i l u r e  of S V 3  w i l l  
l ock  t h e  s e r v o a c t u a t o r  on SV1 and 
Sv2 c o n t r o l .  
5 .  Hydraulic system f a i l u r e  co r rec -  
t i o n  is g iven  precedence over  a l l  servo- 
v a l v e  f a i l u r e s .  Servovalves SV1 and S V 2  
o p e r a t e  on one h y d r a u l i c  system, and S V 3  
o p e r a t e s  on t h e  o t h e r  h y d r a u l i c  system. 
6. F a i l - s a f e  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  incor -  
p o r a t e d  t o  a l low the  I S A  to  c e n t e r  
mechanica l ly  upon receipt of an  elec- 
t r i c a l  command t o  t h e  f a i l - s a f e  s o l e -  
n o i d s  from an  e x t e r n a l  e l e c t r o n i c  model 
o r  monitor u n i t .  
Each servovalve  can be d r i v e n  by 
e i ther  i t s  primary o r  secondary c o i l .  
The primary c o i l  of each se rvova lve  i s  
d r i v e n  by a cor responding  FLCC channel.  
I n  t h e  even t  of an FLCC f a i l u r e ,  t h e  
secondary c o i l  is  d r i v e n  through the 
backup amp by one of t h e  remaining good 
computers. A s  d i scussed  earlier,  f a u l t  
d e t e c t i o n  of the  I S A  r equ i r ed  a complex 
set of f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  l o g i c  i n  t h e  DFCS 
computers t o  monitor computer f a i l u r e s ,  
f a i l u r e s  i n  e lec t r ica l  commands t o  t h e  
se rvova lves ,  and t h e  p r e s s u r e  of the 
h y d r a u l i c  systems. The moni tors  allowed 
the  actuator i n t e r f a c e  t o  o p e r a t e  a f t e r  
two f a i l u r e s .  
I n  t h e  case of a d u a l  f a i l u r e ,  a 
model of t h e  a c t u a t o r  w a s  run t o  detect  
any f a i l u r e s .  I f  a f a i l u r e  w a s  de- 
t e c t e d ,  t h e  DFCS would send a s i g n a l  
t o  c e n t e r  t h e  a c t u a t o r ,  p reven t ing  a 
hardover  command and subsequent  loss  
of a i r c r a f t  c o n t r o l .  
The r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  DFCS and of 
i t s  i n t e r f a c e  t o  t h e  a c t u a t o r s  w a s  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t l y  b e t t e r  than  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  and 
a c t u a t i o n  system i t s e l f .  Design of t h e  
i n t e r f a c e  t o  t h e  a c t u a t o r s  r e q u i r e d  
in fo rma t ion  about  t h e  a c t u a t o r s  which, 
a t  the t i m e ,  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  
4.1.6 Electrical System Interface 
Electr ical  p o w e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  for 
a i rc raf t  c o n t r o l ,  s i n c e  t h e  a i rc raf t  has  
a f u l l - a u t h o r i t y  DFCS. R e l i a b i l i t y  re- 
qui rements  of t h e  DFCS w e r e  a l s o  applied 
t o  t h e  e lectr ical  system. Electr ical  
power from f i v e  s o u r c e s  p rov ides  t h e  
redundancy needed t o  ensu re  DFCS opera- 
t i o n .  The p r e l i m i n a r y  d e s i g n  f o r  t h e  
e lec t r ica l  system is  shown i n  f i g u r e  17. 
The DFCS on ly  r e q u i r e d  28 V d c  power f o r  
ope ra t ion .  The f i v e  s o u r c e s  of power 
w e r e  provided by the 40 kVA primary 
g e n e r a t o r  and the  5 kVA emergency 
g e n e r a t o r  through ac to dc c o n v e r t e r s ,  
a 500 VA permanent magnet g e n e r a t o r  
(PMG) on the  emergency generator, and 
two b a t t e r i e s .  
I n  normal o p e r a t i o n  t h e  primary 
g e n e r a t o r  p rov ides  28  V dc power to  t h e  
f l i g h t  computers and ma in ta ins  a charge  
on t h e  two b a t t e r i e s .  L o s s  of the  
eng ine  o r  t h e  primary g e n e r a t o r  w i l l  
s w i t c h  on t h e  emergency gene ra to r .  The 
PMG p rov ides  a l i m i t e d  28 V dc through 
t h e  500 VA t r ans fo rmer  r e c t i f i e r  (TR) 
u n i t  f o r  c e r t a i n  f a i l u r e s  of t h e  emer- 
gency gene ra to r .  The power from t h e  
PMG TR and t h e  b a t t e r i e s  w a s  s u p p l i e d  
through three c u r r e n t  switches t o  t h e  
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DFCS. The purpose of t h e  c u r r e n t  swi t ch  
i s  t o  l i m i t  the o u t p u t  c u r r e n t  so tha t  
s h o r t  c i r c u i t s  i n  one channel  would n o t  
a f f e c t  o t h e r s .  
The major d i f f e r e n c e  between the 
p r e l i m i n a r y  des ign  and t h e  des ign  f o r  
f l i g h t  test  ( f i g .  18)  w a s  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  
of vo l t age  d e t e c t o r s  on any FLCC power 
l i n e  be ing  f e d  by t h e  emergency genera- 
t o r ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  PMG. During this 
t i m e ,  it w a s  found t h a t  emergency power 
f a i l u r e s  on F-16 a i rcraf t  r e s u l t e d  i n  a 
f a i l u r e  mode which caused an ove rvo l t age  
cond i t ion .  The ove rvo l t age  c o n d i t i o n  
i n h i b i t e d  proper f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  sys- 
t e m  ope ra t ion .  
When t h e  AFT1 des ign  d e t e c t e d  an  
ove rvo l t age  c o n d i t i o n ,  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
began o p e r a t i n g  on batteries. B a t -  
t e r y  s i z e  w a s  i nc reased  to  p rov ide  
abou t  30 minutes  of f l i g h t  t i m e .  
A unique o p e r a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n  d u r i n g  
f l i g h t  test  caused t h e  PMG o u t p u t  t o  
overvol tage .  The cause  and implica- 
t i o n s  of this anomaly are d i s c u s s e d  
i n  s e c t i o n  7.2.1. 
4.1.7 Selector-Monitor and Failure 
mnager 
The names se l ec to r -mon i to r  (S/M) and 
f a i l u r e  manager (FM) are d e r i v e d  from 
t h e  two so f tware  components i n  which 
they  are implemented. The S / M  p rov ides  
f o r :  ( 1 )  s i g n a l  s e l e c t i o n ,  ( 2 )  f a u l t  
d e t e c t i o n ,  and ( 3 )  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  f o r  
d i s c r e t e s ,  s enso r s ,  c o n t r o l l e r s ,  o u t p u t  
s u r f a c e  commands, and the a c t u a t o r  
i n t e r f a c e .  The S/M so f tware  component 
works c l o s e l y  wi th  the FM so f tware  f o r  
r eco rd ing  and ana lyz ing  f a i l u r e s .  
The FM records and ana lyzes  informa- 
t i o n  provided by t h e  S/M and p rov ides  
f o r  p i l o t  r e s e t t i n g  of f a i l u r e s .  The 
d e s i g n s  of t h e  S / M  and FM w e r e  dependent 
on system a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  asynchronous 
o p e r a t i o n ,  and t h e  unique c h a r a c t e r i s -  
t i c s  of t h e  hardware ( s e n s o r s ,  c o n t r o l -  
lers ,  a c t u a t o r s )  be ing  monitored. I 
have c a l l e d  t h i s  hardware-software de- 
s i g n  t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign .  Redun- 
dancy management and f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  and r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
( F D I R )  is  a l s o  a common name. A par t  
of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n  - b u i l t - i n  
t e s t -  is  d i scussed  s e p a r a t e l y .  
N o  formal  t o o l s  w e r e  used t o  deve lop  
o r  ana lyze  t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign ,  
a l though  a n a l y t i c a l  s t u d i e s  were per- 
formed t o  e v a l u a t e  d i f f e r e n t  a lgor i thms.  
The S/M provided s e l e c t i o n  and f a u l t  
d e t e c t i o n  for ( 1 )  i n p u t  d i s c r e t e s  ( ta-  
b l e  l l ) ,  ( 2 )  ana log  i n p u t s  ( t a b l e  121, 
( 3 )  d i g i t a l  commands f o r  each c o n t r o l  
s u r f a c e ,  and ( 4 )  the a c t u a t o r  and i t s  
e l e c t r o n i c  i n t e r f a c e .  The i n p u t  d i s -  
cretes f a l l  i n t o  t w o  c a t e g o r i e s  based 
on t h e  amount of swi t ch  bounce. The two 
categories are labeled by the s e t t l i n g  
t i m e  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  d i s c r e t e  i npu t .  
The b a s i c  S/M approach w a s  to  use  
cross-channel i n fo rma t ion  for s i g n a l  se- 
l e c t i o n  and monitoring. A f t e r  a channel  
had sampled i ts  va lues ,  t h e  in fo rma t ion  
w a s  s e n t  i n  d i g i t a l  form to  t h e  o t h e r  
t w o  channels  f o r  comparison ( f i g .  19).  
The m a j o r i t y  of ana log  s i g n a l  va lues  
w a s  ob ta ined  us ing  a good-channel-average 
(GCA) a lgo r i thm wi th  s e l e c t i o n  of dis-  
crete va lues  by a m a j o r i t y  vote.  The GCA 
a lgo r i thm i s  summarized i n  f i g u r e  20. 
Any va lue  which d i f f e r s  from t h e  o t h e r  
two by a preset t h r e s h o l d  is  d e c l a r e d  
f a i l e d .  The f au l t -de  t e c t i o n  a lgo r i thms  
allowed f o r  s e t t i n g  unique f a i l u r e  
t h r e s h o l d s  and p e r s i s t e n c e  t i m e s  f o r  each 
of  t h e  i n p u t s .  I n  c e r t a i n  f a i l u r e  cases, 
such  as d u a l  f a i l u r e s ,  a model w a s  run  t o  
p rov ide  t h e  needed in fo rma t ion  to  r e s o l v e  
f a i l u r e s .  Actua tor  and l e a d i n g  edge f l ap  
(LEF) models were both  used to r e s o l v e  
d u a l  f a i l u r e s .  
The most complex aspect of t h e  S/M 
















d e t e c t i o n  a lgor i thms.  Mul t ip l e  moni- 
tors w e r e  needed t o  provide  proper 
s e l e c t i o n  and f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  of the 
unique hardware. Included are wrap- 
around, o u t p u t  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  l ock ,  and 
c e n t e r i n g  monitors.  
The f a i l u r e  manager component pro- 
v i d e s  much of the i n t e l l i g e n c e  behind 
t h e  d u a l - f a i l - o p e r a t e  des ign  aspects. 
Using a h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  ( ta-  
b l e  13 l ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  manager would 
ana lyze  i n d i v i d u a l  f a i l u r e s  and f a i l  
h i g h e r  o r  lower l e v e l  dev ices  accord- 
i n g l y .  For example, a f a i l i r e  of the 
a n a l o g - t o - d i g i t a l  c o n v e r t e r  would r e s u l t  
i n  l o g i c a l l y  f a i l i n g  a l l  d e v i c e s  below 
it  (see 2.1 through 2.4, t a b l e  1 3 ) .  I n  
a n o t h e r  example, i f  a p i t c h  rate s e n s o r  
f a i l e d  f i r s t  i n  channel  A and a n  in -  
v e r t e r  f a i l e d  second i n  channel  B, t h e  
FM would a t t r i b u t e  a second d e t e c t e d  
f a i l u r e  of a p i t c h  rate senso r  to  t h e  
fa i led  i n v e r t e r  - and n o t  to  a d i sag ree -  
ment between t h e  two senso r s .  There- 
f o r e ,  a l l  t h r e e  computers would use  t h e  
l a s t  p i t c h  rate s e n s o r  from channel  C. 
I f  the second f a i l u r e  of t h e  same type  
s e n s o r  cannot  be r e so lved ,  t h e  c o n t r o l  
l a w s  w i l l  be r econf igu red  so t h a t  t h e  
s e n s o r  in fo rma t ion  is  n o t  needed. 
I 
1 
1 t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  computations) dese rves  
1 special  a t t e n t i o n .  This  so f tware  
i detected pa r t i a l  fa i lures  o f  computers 
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l g iven  s u r f a c e  command. 
1 of  the seven s u r f a c e  commands. 1 o f  three o r  more s u r f a c e  computations 
r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  FM d e c l a r i n g  an e n t i r e  
i channel  f a i l e d ,  i f  n o t  a l r e a d y  d e t e c t e d  
by hardware monitors.  
The S / M  used on t h e  d i g i t a l  commands 
f o r  each c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e  ( t h e  r e s u l t  of 
t h a t  r e s u l t e d  i n  wrong computations of a 
I n d i v i d u a l  com- 
p u t a t i o n  f a i l u r e s  were allowed for each  
F a i l u r e  
I F a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d s  f o r  t h e  s u r f a c e  
commands were o r i g i n a l l y  se t  a t  15 per- 
c e n t  of t h e  f u l l - s c a l e  command. P e r s i s -  
t e n c e  t i m e ,  t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
e r r o r  t o  persist be fo re  d e c l a r i n g  a 
f a i l u r e ,  w a s  f o u r  i t e r a t i o n s  o r  abou t  
62 msec. Owing to  command e r r o r s  i n t r o -  
duced d u r i n g  dynamic maneuvers, the 
f a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d s  had t o  be inc reased .  
A v a r i a b l e  t h r e s h o l d  w a s  used, w i th  the  
rate of change of t h e  s u r f a c e  command 
added t o  t h e  15-percent b a s e l i n e .  If 
t h e  s u r f a c e  moved 5 p e r c e n t  of f u l l -  
scale i n  t h e  p rev ious  i t e r a t i o n ,  t h e  
f a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d  would be 20 pe rcen t .  
F a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d s  w e r e  independent ly  
c a l c u l a t e d  i n  each channel.  Channel 
s i g n a l  s e l e c t i o n  for o u t p u t  s u r f a c e  com- 
mands w a s  a f u n c t i o n  of channel and 
h y d r a u l i c  f a i l u r e s .  In  t h e  n o n f a i l e d  
s ta te  a l l  t h r e e  channels  used channel  
B ' s  value.  This  w a s  r e q u i r e d  to  mini- 
mize t h e  errors between asynchronous 
channel  commands which would o the rwise  
be detected by t h e  a c t u a t o r s .  
The f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n  f o r  
d e t e c t i n g  f a i l u r e s  of i n d i v i d u a l  com- 
p u t e r s  i s  summarized i n  f i g u r e  21. The 
t h r e e  methods f o r  f a i l i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  
computer p rocesso r  and inpu t -ou tpu t  
c o n t r o l l e r  i n c l u d e  watchdog timer, con- 
sensus  of o t h e r  two channels ,  o r  s e l f -  
tes t  f a i l u r e  when it i s  run to  r e s o l v e  
second f a i l u r e s .  I n  t h e  case where 
t h r e e  o r  more s u r f a c e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  f a i l ,  
t h e  computa t iona l  p o r t i o n  is f a i l e d  b u t  
t h e  inpu t -ou tpu t  c o n t r o l l e r  runs  inde- 
pendent ly ,  supp ly ing  s e n s o r  in fo rma t ion  
t o  t h e  remaining two channels.  
Tools to  s t u d y  the effects of d i f -  
f e r e n t  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n s  are lack- 
ing .  D i f f e r e n t  s e l e c t i o n  and f a u l t -  
d e t e c t i o n  a lgo r i thms  were des igned  and 
ana lyzed  us ing  a n a l y t i c a l  s t u d i e s .  
S imula t ion  or emula t ion  of the f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  des ign  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
de t e rmine  t h e  e f f e c t s  on r e l i a b i l i t y  o r  
i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  c o n t r o l  l a w  a lgor i thms.  
The h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  used t o  
improve f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e  by r e s o l v i n g  
second f a i l u r e s  is a novel  des ign .  
F a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  t e s t i n g  
demonstrated t h a t  t h i s  approach is  a 
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v a l i d  method t o  i n c r e a s e  f a u l t  t o l e r -  
ance. The h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  pro- 
v i d e s  designed-in knowledge of t h e  
system. This knowledge p rov ides  t h e  
informat ion  needed t o  r e s o l v e  high- 
and low-level f a i l u r e s .  
Memory p a r i t y  checking w a s  i nc luded  
i n  t h e  computer hardware. A p a r i t y  
e r r o r  i n t e r r u p t  occur red  when bad par- 
i t y  w a s  de t ec t ed .  However, t h e  f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  des ign  d i d  n o t  cons ide r  p a r i t y  
e r r o r s .  The i n t e r r u p t  and memory 
addres s  were saved and p r o c e s s i n g  con- 
t inued .  T h i s  approach of i g n o r i n g  hard- 
ware f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n s ,  u n l e s s  t hey  
r e s u l t e d  i n  o u t p u t  command f a i l u r e s ,  
r a i s e d  concerns abou t  l a t e n t  f a i l u r e s .  
The e f fec t  on system r e l i a b i l i t y  when 
t h i s  type of l a t e n t  f a u l t  i s  allowed 
w a s  n o t  modeled. 
The f a u l t -  t o l e r a n t  des ign  w a s  
impacted h e a v i l y  by t h e  asynchronous 
computer ope ra t ion .  E r r o r s  between 
channe l s  i n  t h e  i n p u t  s e n s o r s  and 
c o n t r o l l e r ,  owing t o  time-skewed 
sampling and dynamic c o n d i t i o n s ,  
caused two main problems: 
1 .  E r r o r s  between channels  fo rced  
t h e  f a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d s  h ighe r .  The 
15 p e r c e n t  of f u l l - s c a l e  p l u s  rate va lue  
allowed l a r g e  f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t s .  Hori- 
z o n t a l  t a i l  t r a n s i e n t s  cor responding  t o  
t h e  15-percent f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t  are 
3.75O. A t  low a l t i t u d e ,  high-speed con- 
d i t i o n s ,  t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  normal accelera- 
t i o n  t r a n s i e n t  would exceed 3 g,  w e l l  
beyond t h a t  c a l l e d  o u t  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a -  
t i o n s  ( t a b l e  27). 
2. Errors between t h e  channel i n -  
p u t s  were passed through t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  ou tpu t s .  In  o r d e r  
f o r  t h e  a c t u a t o r s  to  accept t h e  commands 
wi thou t  having t h e  h y d r a u l i c  system vot- 
i n g ,  an o u t p u t  command s e l e c t i o n  method 
w a s  needed. The method r e q u i r e d  a l l  
t h r e e  channels  t o  choose one va lue  - 
channel  B ' s  va lue  is  used i n  t h e  non- 
f a i l e d  case - t o  d r i v e  t h e  a c t u a t o r s .  
The t r iple  system appeared as a s i n g l e  
system wi th  one channel c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  
a i rcraf t  wi th in  the f a i l u r e  th re sho lds .  
4.1.8 Built-In T e s t  and Memory M o d e  
The b u i l t - i n  t e s t  ( B I T )  i s  run  p r i o r  
t o  each f l i g h t  t o  ensure  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  
of  t h e  DFCS. The B I T  is  a l s o  used i n  
maintenance procedures  t o  i s o l a t e  f a u l t s  
t o  t h e  l i n e  r e p l a c e a b l e  u n i t  (LRU)  
l e v e l .  Memory mode w a s  ano the r  p i l o t  
o p t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  on ly  on t h e  ground. I t  
allowed t h e  p i l o t  t o  g ive  the f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  system a memory address and o b t a i n  
a readout  of t h e  t h r e e  computers'  cor re-  
sponding va lues .  
The B I T  c o n s i s t e d  of f o u r  major test  
c a t e g o r i e s :  ( 1  1 i n p u t ,  ( 2 )  computation, 
( 3 )  o u t p u t ,  and ( 4 )  f a i l u r e  l o g i c .  The 
t h r e e  channels  had t o  be synchronized t o  
ge t  va l id  B I T  r e s u l t s .  
I n p u t  t e s t i n g  ensured  p rope r  opera- 
t i o n  of s enso r  and i n p u t  convers ion  
hardware. Nul l  f a i l u r e s ,  which would 
remain l a t e n t  u n t i l  a i r c r a f t  motion 
a l lowed f o r  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  w e r e  
d e t e c t e d  by BIT.  Hardware i n p u t  s i g n a l  
convers ion  f a i l u r e s  w e r e  separated from 
s e n s o r  f a i l u r e s  by i n j e c t i n g  i n p u t  s i g -  
n a l  b i a s e s  i n t o  t h e  hardware under B I T  
so f tware  c o n t r o l  ( f i g .  2 2 ) .  Pas s ing  
t h i s  test, B I T  would then  to rque  t h e  
s e n s o r s  t o  test  f o r  f a u l t s .  T e s t s  for  
t h e  a v i o n i c s  mul t ip l ex  bus (AMUX) and 
cross -channel  d a t a  l i n k ,  bo th  ser ia l  
d i g i t a l  buses ,  were a lso performed. 
Computational tests i n c l u d e  t h o s e  f o r  
t h e  CPU, RAM, and read-only memory (ROM). 
Output tests are run  by BIT  f o r  t h e  seven 
a c t u a t o r s ,  LEF, and o u t p u t  convers ion  
hardware ( d i g i t a l  t o  ana log ) .  T e s t i n g  
a l s o  inc luded  d e t e c t i n g  n u l l  o r  p a s s i v e  
f a i l u r e s  of components t h a t  are used only 
i n  t h e  even t  of f a i l u r e s .  T e s t i n g  t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  c e n t e r  an a c t u a t o r  is  an 
example, even though it w a s  r e q u i r e d  
o n l y  when m u l t i p l e  f a i l u r e s  occurred. 
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The B I T  requi rements  f o r  t e s t i n g  t h e  
f a i l u r e  l o g i c  is  similar to  t h e  a c t u a t o r  
c e n t e r i n g  example. Although t h e  f a i l u r e  
logic i s  on ly  used when s i n g l e  o r  m u l t i -  
p le  channel f a i l u r e s  occur ,  l a t e n t  f a i l -  
u r e s  i n  t h i s  l o g i c  c i r c u i t r y  could  prove 
c a t a s t r o p h i c .  The B I T  checked f o r  pas- 
s i v e  f a i l u r e s  n o t  d e t e c t a b l e  by t h e  in -  
f l i g h t  f a u l t - d e t e c t i o n  r o u t i n e s .  
The B I T  o p e r a t i o n  suspends a l l  con- 
t r o l  l a w  and f a u l t - d e t e c t i o n  r o u t i n e s  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  f l i g h t .  Therefore ,  t w o  
l ockou t  methods were used to  ensu re  B I T  
and memory mode would n o t  o p e r a t e  i n  
f l i g h t .  The weight on wheels swi t ch  
and l a c k  of main wheel spin-up ( less  
than  28 k n o t s )  were r e q u i r e d  t o  a l low 
a c t i v a t i o n  of t h e  modes. Both lockou t s  
had tr iple s i g n a l  redundancy. 
The B I T  and memory mode were act i -  
va t ed  through the mul t ipurpose  d i s p l a y s  
( f i g .  14 ) .  The DFCS tes t  page d i s p l a y  
provided  BIT  and memory mode i n i t i a t i o n  
and d i s p l a y .  The B I T  r e q u i r e d  two and 
a h a l f  minutes to  complete. The memory 
o p t i o n  allowed f o r  d i s p l a y i n g  memory 
va lues  of a l l  t h r e e  computers and w a s  
used f o r  t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g  B I T  f a i l u r e s .  
Communication to  t h e  DFCS t o  i n i t i a t e  
B I T  w a s  over  t h e  AMUX bus t o  one DFCS 
channel.  The c ross -channel  d a t a  l i n k  
w a s  used to  inform t h e  o t h e r  two chan- 
n e l s .  The t i m e  of B I T  i n i t i a t i o n  v a r i e d  
i n  three channels  owing to  asynchronous 
o p e r a t i o n  and w a s  a f u n c t i o n  of com- 
p u t e r  skew. 
The B I T  des ign  is  a comprehensive, 
s t r u c t u r e d  set  of tests t h a t  ensure 
hardware i n t e g r i t y  p r i o r  to  t akeof f .  
The mechanization document to  t h e  s o f t -  
ware group c o n t a i n s  over 180 pages i n  
t h e  B I T  s e c t i o n .  Memory mode proved to  
be a va luab le  t roub le shoo t ing  t o o l .  
I 
1 4.2 Control Laws 
I i This  s e c t i o n  i n c l u d e s  an overview of t h e  
methods used t o  deve lop  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  




t r o l  mode. The c o n t r o l  l a w s  are de- 
s c r i b e d  t o  provide  t h e  r e a d e r  w i th  a n  
overview of t h e  system. 
The c o n t r o l  l a w  des igns  provide  €o r  
miss ion  s p e c i f i c  f l i g h t  modes and s tand-  
a r d  and decoupled a i r c r a f t  c o n t r o l  
( f i g .  23). Mission s p e c i f i c  modes are 
s t a n d a r d  normal (SNRM is f o r  t a k e o f f ,  
r e f u e l i n g ,  and l a n d i n g ) ,  s t a n d a r d  a i r -  
t o - a i r  guns (SAAG) , s t a n d a r d  a i r - t o -  
s u r f a c e  guns (SASG), and s t a n d a r d  a i r -  
to - su r face  bombs (SASB). A decoupled 
v e r s i o n  of each s t anda rd  mode is  
a v a i l a b l e  through t h e  decoupled mode 
s e l e c t i o n  swi t ch  on t h e  right-hand 
c o n t r o l l e r .  P i l o t  c o n t r o l  is  through 
t h e  s i d e  s t i c k ,  f o r c e  s t i c k ,  and t h e  
rudder  p e d a l s ,  and decoupled p i t c h  a x i s  
c o n t r o l  i s  through a modified t h r o t t l e  
c o n t r o l l e r  t h a t  t w i s t s .  
4.2.1 Control Law Development 
Process 
The c o n t r o l  laws were developed 
u s i n g  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t ,  and p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
more d e t a i l e d ,  methods. The i n i t i a l  
d e s i g n  w a s  ob ta ined  us ing  l i n e a r  con- 
t i nuous  models. The l o n g i t u d i n a l  a x i s  
used l i n e a r  q u a d r a t i c  s y n t h e s i s  f o r  i t s  
i n i t i a l  des ign .  The second des ign  method 
inc luded  d i s c r e t e  sampling e f f e c t s  of t h e  
d i g i t a l  system wi th  t h e  l i n e a r  models. 
Cr i te r ia  f o r  n a t u r a l  f requency ,  damping, 
and phase and g a i n  margins were used t o  
e v a l u a t e  the  des igns .  N o n l i n e a r i t i e s  
were inc luded  i n  t h e  t h i r d  des ign  method 
which used a nonreal-t ime ba tch  simula- 
t i o n .  The f i n a l  des ign  e v a l u a t i o n s  used 
man-in-the-loop real-time s imula t ions .  
Eva lua t ions  were c e n t e r e d  on handling- 
q u a l i t i e s  cr i ter ia ,  t r a c k i n g  t a s k s ,  and 
weapon d e l i v e r y  accuracy. Anderson and 
Frank (1984) p rov ide  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r -  
mation on t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  developments. 
4.2.2 Control Law Design 
The e i g h t  miss ion  s p e c i f i c  s tand-  
a r d  and decour led  c o n t r o l  modes are 
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implemented i n  f i v e  l o n g i t u d i n a l  con- 
t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  and three lateral- 
d i r e c t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s .  An overview 
of  each c o n t r o l  l a w ,  t h e  mission spe- 
c i f i c  modes applicable, and primary 
d e s i g n  f e a t u r e s  is  given. 
Fea tu res  of a l l  t h e  l o n g i t u d i n a l  
c o n t r o l  l a w s  are as fo l lows:  
1. Neut ra l  speed s t a b i l i t y ,  
2.  Drag modulation, 
3 .  Near c o n s t a n t  s t i c k  f o r c e  per g, 
4. Departure p reven t ion ,  
5. Angle of a t t a c k  and lead fac-  
to r  l i m i t i n g ,  
6. Optimal f l a p  schedul ing  on a n g l e  
of  a t t a c k ,  
7. Maneuvering f l a p s ,  and 
a. S t r u c t u r a l  f i l t e r s .  
The f i r s t  l o n g i t u d i n a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  used on ly  i n  t h e  SNRM. The 
SNRM p rov ides  a i r c r a f t  c o n t r o l  f o r  take- 
o f f ,  i n - f l i g h t  r e f u e l i n g ,  format ion  
f l y i n g ,  and landing .  If  SNRM w a s  n o t  
p r e v i o u s l y  s e l e c t e d  f o r  landing ,  i t  i s  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s e l e c t e d  when the land- 
i n g  gea r  handle  i s  lowered. The SNRM 
c o n t r o l  l a w s  implement a p i t c h  ra te  
system gea r  down and a G-command (GCMD) 
system gea r  up. 
The second l o n g i t u d i n a l  c o n t r o l  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  used when senso r  f a i l u r e s  
f o r c e  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  of t h e  c o n t r o l  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  account  f o r  l o s s  of a feed- 
back. Termed the r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  mode, 
i t  allows f o r  o p e r a t i o n  wi th  complete 
loss of p i t c h  rate, normal a c c e l e r a t i o n ,  
a n g l e  of a t t a c k  o r  a i r  d a t a  senso r s .  
Mul t ip l e  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  are n o t  accep- 
t a b l e .  Normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  and angle-  
o f - a t t ack  reconf i g u r a t i o n s  used t h e  SNRM 
p i t c h  rate system with t h e  normal accel- 
e r a t i o n  o r  angle-of -a t tack  va lue  set  
t o  zero.  
Because t h e  a i r p l a n e  is s t a t i c a l l y  
u n s t a b l e ,  p i t c h  rate r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
r e q u i r e d  e s t i m a t i n g  p i t c h  rate based on 
e l e v a t o r  command. The complete f a i l u r e  
of a i r  d a t a  used to  schedule  c o n t r o l  
system g a i n s  r e s u l t e d  i n  s tandby ga ins .  
The s tandby g a i n s  w e r e  a predetermined 
se t  of g a i n  va lues  t h a t  p rovide  adequate  
s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t r o l  th roughout  t h e  
envelope ,  and on ly  change as a f u n c t i o n  
of  t h e  l and ing  gear p o s i t i o n .  
The t h i r d  l o n g i t u d i n a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  
w a s  used i n  t h e  SAAG and SASG modes. 
The major d i f f e r e n c e  from the SNRM mode 
w a s  that  p i t c h  rate is used as t h e  main 
feedback, p rov id ing  f o r  b e t t e r  t r a c k i n g ,  
improved f l i g h t p a t h  c o n t r o l ,  and reduced 
tracking errors i n  tu rbulence .  
The f o u r t h  l o n g i t u d i n a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  
w a s  used i n  t h e  SASB mode. This  mode 
w a s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  SNRM. The SNRM g a i n s  
are changed as a f u n c t i o n  of Mach num- 
ber and a l t i t u d e  t o  g i v e  SASB mode 
( f i g .  2 4 ) .  I n  o r d e r  t o  improve f l i g h t -  
path response ,  the maneuvering f l a p  g a i n  
i s  inc reased .  
The f i n a l  l o n g i t u d i n a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  
w a s  used by a l l  t h e  decoupled modes. 
Three types  of decoupled l o n g i t u d i n a l  
c o n t r o l s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  - p o i n t i n g ,  
t r a n s l a t i o n ,  and d i r e c t  l i f t .  P o i n t i n g  
gene ra t ed  pi tch rate wi thou t  g e n e r a t i n g  
normal a c c e l e r a t i o n ;  t r a n s l a t i o n  gener- 
a t e d  normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  wi thou t  gener- 
a t i n g  p i t c h  rate; d i r e c t  l i f t  gene ra t ed  
a combination of p i t c h  rate and normal 
a c c e l e r a t i o n  wi thou t  changing a n g l e  
of  attack. 
F l i g h t p a t h  maneuver enhancement 
(FPME) and p i t c h  rate maneuver enhance- 
ment (PRME) were two coupled (conven- 
t i o n a l )  c o n t r o l  features commanded wi th  
t h e  s i d e s t i c k .  These w e r e  t h e  o n l y  
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f e a t u r e s  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  r i g h t  side- 
s t i c k ,  and they  operate independent ly  
o r  s imul taneous ly  wi th  t h r o t t l e - t w i s t  
decoupled mode i n p u t s .  The FPME w a s  
t a i l o r e d  for  t h e  c r u i s e  and bombing 
t a s k s  because t h e  mode provided a re- 
spons ive  deadbeat  normal-accelerat ion 
response.  The PRME w a s  ta i lored for  
air-to-air  t r a c k i n g  and air-to-ground 
s t r a f i n g  because t h i s  mode r e q u i r e d  
deadbea t  p i t c h  rate response.  A l l  
l o n g i t u d i n a l  modes operated a t  a 64 Hz 
i t e r a t i o n  rate. 
The f i rs t  l a t e r a l - d i r e c t i o n a l  (LAT- 
D I R )  c o n t r o l  l a w  w a s  used i n  the SNRM 
only .  F e a t u r e s  i n c l u d e  
1 .  R o l l  rate command pref i l ter  
which w a s  q u i c k e r  f o r  s t o p p i n g  r o l l  
ra tes  than  when i n i t i a t i n g  them, 
2. Lateral a c c e l e r a t i o n ,  r o l l  ra te ,  
and yaw rate feedbacks,  
3. An a i le ron- rudder  i n t e r c o n n e c t ,  
4. A roll-rate and angle-of-at tack 
i n t e r c o n n e c t  , 
5. Gun-firing compensation, and 
6. S t r u c t u r a l  filters. 
The second LAT-DIR mode w a s  t h e  
r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  mode, which is based on 
t h e  SNRM. R o l l  rate, la teral  accelera- 
t i o n ,  yaw rate, and a i r  data reconf igur -  
a t i o n s  were included.  
The l a s t  LAT-DIR mode w a s  used by 
SAAG, SASG, SASB, and a l l  t h e  decoupled 
modes. Three decoupled c o n t r o l  o p t i o n s  
were a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h i s  c o n t r o l  l a w  
s t r u c t u r e  - di rec t  s i d e f o r c e ,  p o i n t i n g ,  
and t r a n s l a t i o n .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  s t a n d a r d  
modes, d i r e c t  sideforce w a s  commanded 
v i a  t h e  rudder  peda ls .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  
o f  decoupled modes t o  decoupled c o n t r o l  
o p t i o n s  i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  23. The d i f -  
f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  o p t i o n s  were switched i n  
t h e  one c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e  through the 
u s e  of sof tware.  The s w i t c h e s ,  n e a r l y  
20 i n  this c o n t r o l  l a w  s t r u c t u r e ,  create 
t h e  r e q u i r e d  submode s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  
r e p r e s e n t  each decoupled opt ion.  
The LAT-DIR c o n t r o l  modes opera ted  
a t  t w o  i t e r a t i o n  rates. C o n t r o l  i n p u t s ,  
r o l l  s t i c k ,  and pedals were shaped and 
f i l t e r e d  a t  32 Hz. Feedback p a t h s  and 
i n t e r c o n n e c t s  operated a t  a 64-Hz i tera-  
t i o n  rate. 
The number of c o n t r o l  modes and t h e  
decoupled capabi l i t ies  r e q u i r e d  r e s u l t e d  
i n  a complex set  of c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s .  
I n  t h e  l o n g i t u d i n a l  modes, where t h e  
l i n e a r  q u a d r a t i c  s y n t h e s i s  (LQS) d e s i g n  
methodology w a s  used, g a i n  schedules  
r e q u i r i n g  double  i n t e r p o l a t i o n s  were 
needed ( f i g .  25).  Gain N 1 ,  t h e  s t i c k  
f e e d  forward g a i n ,  r e q u i r e s  i n t e r p o -  
l a t i o n  of a l t i t u d e  and Mach number. 
From a system engineer ing  viewpoint ,  
t h e  complex c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s  were a 
b o i l i n g  pot of i n g r e d i e n t s .  These 
i n g r e d i e n t s  inc luded  o u t p u t s  from t h e  
selector monitor and submode s w i t c h e s  
based on p i l o t  s e l e c t i o n s  and a i r c r a f t  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  Besides t h e s e  i n p u t s  t o  
t h e  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  c o n t r o l  
s t r u c t u r e s  themselves provided s u r f a c e  
commands t o  t h e  o u t p u t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  
r o u t i n e s .  The c o n t r o l  l a w  d e s i g n  pre- 
s e n t e d  a formidable  t a s k  i n  q u a l i f y i n g  
the  system. 
4.3 D i g i t a l  F l i g h t  C o n t r o l  System 
Software 
The process used to  o b t a i n  t h e  software 
d e s i g n  and a n  overview of the software 
d e s i g n  i t s e l f  are p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n .  A d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  tes t  ap- 
proach used for  the  sof tware  is  g iven  
i n  s e c t i o n  5. 
The process used i n  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  
d e s i g n  is  summarized i n  terms of t h e  
s u p p o r t i n g  documents, the c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
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c o n t r o l  p rocess ,  t h e  so f tware  s u p p o r t  
t o o l s  used, and t h e  implementation lan-  
guage f o r  the f l i g h t  computers. The 
method and parameters used t o  t r a c k  t h e  
p r o g r e s s  of so f tware  d e s i g n  are g iven ,  
and a b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  and c o n t e n t  of t h e  so f tware  des ign  
i s  presented .  
4.3.1 Software Development Process 
The p rocess  used t o  deve lop  t h e  DFCS 
so f tware  w a s  based on MIL-STD-483 (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1985a) and MIL- 
STD-490 (U.S. Department of Defense, 
1985b). Documentation inc luded  t h e  com- 
p u t e r  program development s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
(CPDS) ,  computer program p roduc t  speci- 
f i c a t i o n  (CPPS), and an  a s so r tmen t  of 
tes t  p l a n s  and procedures.  
The complexity of t h e  DFCS, coupled 
w i t h  t h e  need t o  s ta te  clear ly  t h e  func- 
t i o n a l  des ign  requi rements ,  c o n t r o l  
l a w s ,  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign ,  and t iming  
c o n s t r a i n t s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  an a d d i t i o n a l  
document. The so f tware  mechanization 
document, n o t  r e q u i r e d  by m i l i t a r y  
s t a n d a r d s ,  provided t h e  i n t e r f a c e  be- 
tween t h e  system d e s i g n e r s  and t h e  s o f t -  
w a r e  development team. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  seven top - l eve l  so f tware  
s t r u c t u r e s  ( f i g .  26 1, t h e  document in -  
c luded  a s e c t i o n  on t h e  so f tware  needed 
t o  t e s t  t h e  DFCS and a d e s c r i p t i o n  of 
t h e  hardware. 
A f e w  examples w i l l  h e l p  one under- 
s t a n d  t h e  r o l e  t h i s  document p layed  i n  
so f tware  development. Table 14 shows 
t h e  de t a i l  provided i n  t h e  mechanization 
document f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  the s e l e c t i o n  
and monitoring of ana log  i n p u t  s i g n a l s  
when a l l  t h r e e  i n p u t s  are v a l i d .  In fo r -  
mation is  provided f o r  a l l  n i n e  f a i l u r e  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  how to  increment  o r  decre- 
ment p e r s i s t e n c e  coun te r s ,  and which 
s i g n a l  s e l e c t i o n  t o  use. F igu re  27 
shows t h e  so f tware  mechanization f o r  
a t y p i c a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  module from over  
50 such modules. Note t h a t  f i l t e rs  
are g iven  i n  Z-transform rep resen ta -  
t i o n .  This  l e v e l  of detailed :infor- 
mation w a s  r e q u i r e d  be fo re  so f  .tware 
d e s i g n  could begin. 
An overview of t h e  so f tware  des ign  
p rocess  is shown i n  f i g u r e  28. I t  shows 
t h e  so f tware  development a c t i v i t y  f r o m  
d e s i g n  t o  release of t h e  so f tware  t o  t h e  
t es t  team. Depending on t h e  type  of 
e r r o r  o r  r edes ign  r equ i r ed ,  t h e  mechani- 
z a t i o n  document ( n o t  shown) would a l s o  
be  updated. 
The FLCC were programmed i n  assembly 
language. The i n s t r u c t i o n  set  w a s  s i m -  
ple,  having  j u s t  over 80 i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
The program w a s  c o n t r o l l e d  us ing  jump 
and s k i p  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  wi th  a l l  
c o n d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  ( f o r  example, less 
than ,  e q u a l  t o  z e r o )  be ing  achieved  by 
t h e  u s e  of the 24 s k i p  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
The i n s t r u c t i o n  set  w a s  unique and d i d  
n o t  r e p r e s e n t  any s t a n d a r d  microproc- 
e s s o r  i n s t r u c t i o n  sets. A l l  c a l c u l a -  
t i o n s  w e r e  done i n  s i n g l e  o r  double  
p r e c i s i o n  f i x e d - p o i n t  formats .  The 
programmer can enab le  a unique hardware 
f u n c t i o n  c a l l e d  s a t u r a t i o n  a r i t h m e t i c .  
T h i s  d i d  n o t  a l low over f lows  t o  occur  
b u t  s a tu ra t ed  t h e  va lue  a t  its maximum 
scaled l i m i t .  
Only three jump 
The f i r s t  mi l e s tone  i n  deve loping  
t h e  so f tware  w a s  the c r i t i c a l  d e s i g n  
review. The purpose of t h i s  d e s i g n  
review w a s  t o  show how t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  
system des ign  f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  and 
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign  w e r e  t o  be imple- 
mented. However, an  i t e r a t i v e  c y c l e  
developed as t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  system 
des ign  w a s  implemented i n t o  t h e  s o f t -  
ware. R e a l - t i m e  and memory c o n s t r a i n t s  
of  t h e  so f tware  implementation fo rced  
changes i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  system des ign .  
Changes of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n  i n  
t h e  areas of t h e  o u t p u t  selector moni- 
t o r  and t h e  I S A  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  were 





























d u l e  s l i p  w a s  i n c u r r e d  be fo re  t h e  c r i t i -  
c a l  des ign  review could  be held.  
A schedule  showing t h e  c r i t i c a l  p a t h  
f o r  t h e  so f tware  development f i r s t  
appeared a t  t he  c r i t i c a l  des ign  review. 
The percentage  completed and t h e  sche- 
du led  date f o r  completion w e r e  g iven  f o r  
( 1 )  so f tware  mechanization, ( 2 )  so f tware  
des ign ,  ( 3 )  so f tware  code, ( 4 )  i n t e g r a -  
t i o n  wi th  hardware, ( 5 )  u n i t  and module 
tes t ,  (6) stand-alone v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  and 
(7) i n t e g r a t e d  system v a l i d a t i o n .  
Software real-time and memory use  w e r e  
a Is0 t racked .  
4.3.2 Software Des ign 
A top-down s t r u c t u r e d  approach w a s  
used f o r  the sof tware .  The h i g h e s t  
so f tware  s t r u c t u r e  w a s  the computer pro- 
gram component, followed by t h e  module 
and t h e  u n i t  ( f i g .  2 9 ) .  The d a t a  base 
w a s  also a s t r u c t u r e d  des ign  ( f i g .  30). 
Most of the so f tware  components - sys- 
t e m  monitor,  s e l e c t o r  monitor,  f a i l u r e  
manager, s t a r t - u p  and restart, and AMUX 
p r o c e s s o r  - p r o v i d e  the  so f tware  por- 
t i o n  of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n  (see 
f i g .  26) .  The remaining two so f tware  
components are t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  and 
t h e  execut ive .  
The d e t a i l e d  software d e s c r i p t i o n  
document r e q u i r e d  by the  U.S. Air Force 
i s  t h e  computer program p roduc t  specifi- 
ca t ion  (CPPS) ,  c o n t a i n i n g  the  software 
des ign .  I t  w a s  used to t ranslate  t h e  
system des ign  i n t o  a format a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  t h e  programming team. The CPPS, 
a l though  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  so f tware  
d e s i g n e r s ,  w a s  of l i t t l e  va lue  to  sys- 
t e m  d e s i g n e r s  and u s e r s .  Even wi th  t h e  
a d d i t i o n  of t h e  so f tware  mechanization 
document, fo l lowing  a des ign  requi rement  
through t h e  mechanization and CPPS docu- 
ments w a s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t e c h n i c a l  mana- 
gers and system u s e r s ,  and on ly  a few 
t a l e n t e d  eng inee r s  could  t r a c k  it. 
Another problem w i t h  t h e  CPPS w a s  i t s  
s i z e  and t h e  arduous manual method 
r e q u i r e d  to  update  it. The f i r s t  com- 
p le te  CPPS w a s  released a t  the  c r i t i c a l  
d e s i g n  review and r e q u i r e d  e i g h t  3-in. 
b inde r s .  The n e x t  complete release 
of t h e  CPPS w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  u n t i l  
2 yea r s  l a te r .  
The so f tware  mechanization document 
w a s  requi red .  I t  helped t h e  d e s i g n e r s  
and u s e r s  t o  understand t h e  des ign .  The 
mechanization document used a combina- 
t i o n  of Engl i sh ,  i f - t h e n - e l s e  psuedo 
language, t a b l e s ,  and graphs. Like 
t h e  CPPS, t h e  requi rements  i n  the  mech- 
a n i z a t i o n  document used no formal  method 
t o  de te rmine  t h e i r  completeness o r  cor- 
r e c t n e s s ;  that  was t h e  j o b  of t h e  
d e s i g n  reviews. 
5 SYSTEM-SOFTWARE QUALIFICATION AND 
DESIGN ITERATIONS 
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  des ign  p resen ted  
i n  s e c t i o n  4 is  d i scussed  i n  t h i s  sec- 
t i o n .  System-software q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
refers to  t h e  t e s t i n g  of t h e  des ign  
fo l lowing  implementation. E r r o r s  o r  
d i s c r e p a n c i e s  found d u r i n g  test  are 
c o r r e c t e d  w i t h  a new des ign  and t h e  
c y c l e  beg ins  aga in .  
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  DFCS as a sys- 
t e m  and t h e  t e s t i n g  and r edes ign  of t h e  
so f tware  are emphasized. Qualification 
of the hardware i n  terms of environ- 
menta l  t e s t i n g  is n o t  covered. The 
methods and problems encountered when 
i n t e g r a t i n g  f u n c t i o n a l  requi rements  
( such  as c o n t r o l  l a w s  and f a u l t  t o l e r -  
ance  1 wi th  t h e  s y s  t e m  a r c h i t e c t u r e  ( such  
as asynchronous computers) are high- 
l i g h t e d .  The t h r e e  areas d i s c u s s e d  i n  
t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  des ign  s e c t i o n  - system 
a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  and f a u l t  
t o l e r a n c e  - a l l  go through t h e  q u a l i f i -  
c a t i o n  and des ign  i t e r a t i o n  p rocess .  
S ince  t h e  major p o i n t s  d e a l  wi th  t h e  
p r o c e s s  as a whole rather than  how it 
applies t o  each of t h e  t h r e e  f u n c t i o n a l  
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areas, t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  i n  
terms of t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .  
An overview of t h e  i t e r a t i v e  proc- 
ess, des ign  documentation updates ,  test- 
i n g  performed, and environment f o r  the 
t e s t i n g  i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  31. The 
f i r s t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  test  is  performed by 
t h e  programming team and ensu res  t h a t  
t h e  so f tware  is implemented per its de- 
s i g n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  Conf igu ra t ion  con- 
t r o l  is  maintained by t h e  so f tware  team 
a t  this des ign  i t e r a t i o n  l e v e l .  The 
second v e r i f i c a t i o n  test is done by a 
group independent of t h e  so f tware  team, 
u s i n g  t h e  mechanization document. This  
i s  t h e  f i r s t  test  wi th  an e n t i r e  s o f t -  
ware package o p e r a t i n g  i n  a tes t  en- 
vironment wi th  t h e  t r i p l e x  f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  hardware. Conf igu ra t ion  c o n t r o l  
w a s  handled by a board t h a t  inc luded  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  eng inee r s  - c o n t r o l  l a w  de- 
s i g n e r s ,  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n e r s ,  and 
hardware and so f tware  des igne r s .  This  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  c o n t r o l  process w a s  a l s o  
used to  r e s o l v e  system v a l i d a t i o n  d i s -  
c r epanc ie s .  The last  i t e r a t i o n  c y c l e  
r e s u l t s  from v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g ,  which 
e n s u r e s  t h a t  the system d e s i g n  i s  cor- 
rect, n o t  i f  t h e  so f tware  fo l lows  t h e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  The system so f tware  i s  
v a l i d a t e d  wi th  a l l  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
hardware o p e r a t i n g  i n  real t i m e ,  w i t h  
a n  aerodynamic s imula t ion .  S p e c i a l  pro- 
v i s i o n s  to  induce  f a i l u r e s  i n t o  t h e  sys- 
t e m ,  such  as s e n s o r  f a i l u r e s ,  are in -  
c luded  f o r  f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  
t e s t i n g  (FMET). A mockup of t h e  c o c k p i t  
w i th  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l l e r s  and d i s p l a y s  is  
used t o  suppor t  f l y i n g - q u a l i t y  evalua- 
t i o n s .  Some v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  requires 
t h e  a c t u a l  a i r f rame.  S t r u c t u r e  coup l ing  
and e l ec t romagne t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  and 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  (EMIC) w e r e  t e s t e d  wi th  
t h e  a i r c r a f t .  Add i t iona l  d e t a i l s  on 
t h e  system-software q u a l i f i c a t i o n  can 
be found i n  Gordoa and o t h e r s  (1984).  
5.1 Schedule 
Before d i s c u s s i n g  the q u a l i f i c a t i o n  proc- 
ess, a review of t h e  schedule  and the 
parameters t r acked  f o r  t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
t a s k  w i l l  be h e l p f u l .  
The schedule  f o r  q u a l i f y i n g  t h e  AFT1 
system i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  32. The re- 
lease of the so f tware  package, a f t e r  
u n i t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  by the so f tware  devel-  
opment team, w a s  scheduled f o r  November 
1980, on ly  2 months a f t e r  the c r i t i ca l  
d e s i g n  review. V e r i f i c a t i o n  by an  inde- 
pendent  test  group w a s  scheduled f o r  
February 1981. System v a l i d a t i o n  w a s  
scheduled  f o r  completion by A p r i l  1981, 
wi th  t h e  f i r s t  f l i g h t  i n  J u l y  1981. 
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n  process r e q u i r e d  an  
a d d i t i o n a l  y e a r  t o  complete beyond t h e  
o r i g i n a l  schedule.  
A h i s to ry ,  taken f r o m  the program's 
s t a t u s  r e p o r t s  f o r  each of t h e  t h r e e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  phases, is shown i n  f i g -  
u r e s  33, 34, 35. 
The pe rcen tage  of completion and t h e  
predicted amount of schedule  s l i p  were 
ob ta ined  from c o n t r a c t o r  s t a t u s  reports, 
Sof tware  coding and u n i t  test were t h e  
o n l y  tes ts  to  show 1 00-percent comple- 
t i o n .  Software v e r i f i c a t i o n  reached 
90-percent and system v a l i d a t i o n  30- 
p e r c e n t  completion i n  t h e  l a s t  s t a t u s  
r e p o r t  which t r acked  them. A l l  t e s t i n g  
d i d  reach 100 p e r c e n t  a t  t h e  a c t u a l  com- 
p l e t i o n  d a t e  shown on t h e  f i g u r e s .  The 
o r i g i n a l  and a c t u a l  completion d a t e  i s  
shown f o r  each test. Once t h e  p r e v i o u s  
t e s t i n g  w a s  completed and i ts  discrepan-  
cies c o r r e c t e d ,  t h e  n e x t  t e s t i n g  phase 
began t o  succeed. 
The primary i s s u e  r e g a r d i n g  the 
schedu le  w a s  i t s  optimism. The main 





















b e l i e f  t h a t  once r e l e a s e d  from t h e  s o f t -  
ware group, v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  
t e s t i n g  of the so f tware  package would be 
completed n e a r l y  e r r o r  f r e e .  The itera- 
t i v e  n a t u r e  of t e s t i n g  and r edes ign  w a s  
n o t  acknowledged. The i t e r a t i v e  n a t u r e  
i s  shown by t h e  number of sof tware  ver- 
s i o n s  r e l e a s e d ,  14, and t h e  number of 
mechanizat ion change n o t i c e s ,  over  600, 
r e q u i r e d  t o  achieve  a sof tware  release 
a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  f i r s t  f l i g h t .  
Es t imat ing  schedules  f o r  sof tware-  
d r i v e n  systems of a r e sea rch  n a t u r e  i s  
d i f f i c u l t .  A few of t h e  parameters t h a t  
a f f e c t  schedules  inc lude  
1 . Sys tern complexi ty ,  
2. Programming language and methods, 
3 .  Development t o o l s ,  
4. Software program s i z e ,  
5. S t a f f  exper ience ,  
6. !Pes t i n g  requirements ,  and 
7. Required documentation. 
A l l  t h e  foregoing  items w i l l  a f f e c t  
t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  the  des ign  and 
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  number of des ign  itera- 
t i o n s .  For f l i g h t  or l i f e  c r i t i c a l  
applications,  t e s t i n g  must be thorough. 
Thorough t e s t i n g  of a des ign  is  t i m e  
consuming, t e s t i n g  m u l t i p l e  des igns  
even more so. Documentation is  a 
l a r g e  e f f o r t  and cannot  be overlooked 
when de termining  schedules .  
5.2 Software V e r i f i c a t i o n  
The methods and t o o l s  used f o r  so f tware  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  af ter  i ts  release by t h e  
so f tware  development team are dis-  
cussed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  V e r i f i c a t i o n  
i s  de f ined  as t h e  t e s t i n g  performed t o  
ensu re  t h e  so f tware  i s  implemented wi th  
respect t o  the  mechanization document. 
The term stand-alone t e s t i n g  w a s  used by 
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  because of t h e  conf igura-  
t i o n  of t h e  DFCS. The DFCS s t a n d s  a lone  
from t h e  a v i o n i c s  systems, c o c k p i t  
i n t e r f a c e ,  and the s imula t ion ,  f o r  
t h i s  t e s t i n g  . 
A g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  v e r i f i -  
c a t i o n  test environment i n c l u d e s  
1 . Complete so f tware  package 
( i n c l u d i n g  unique tes t  s o f t w a r e ) ,  
2. T r i p l e x  f l i g h t  computers, and 
3 .  T e s t  suppor t  equipment. 
5 2 1 V e r i f i c a t i o n  Test Plan 
A pre l imina ry  tes t  p l a n  w a s  r e l e a s e d  
i n  March 1980 f o r  government review. 
A f t e r  s e v e r a l  review c y c l e s  and coor- 
d i n a t i o n  meetings,  t h e  f i n a l  p l a n  w a s  
r e l e a s e d  i n  August 1980. The review 
c y c l e  provided an e x c e l l e n t  i n t e rchange  
where t h e  m a j o r i t y  of government and 
c o n t r a c t o r  concerns were resolved.  
Contents  of the  v e r i f i c a t i o n  test 
p l a n  s e c t i o n  are shown i n  t a b l e  15. 
This  test  p l a n  r ep resen ted  a thorough 
d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  purpose,  t h e  system 
under test ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  requi rements ,  
success  cr i ter ia ,  test  implementat ion,  
and c o n f i g u r a t i o n  c o n t r o l .  
The purpose of v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  
was t o  
1.  Ver i fy  t h e  so f tware  independent  
of  t h e  so f tware  development group, 
2. Detect e r r o r s  i n  the so f tware  
i n t e r f a c e  t o  the  computer hardware, 
3 .  Detect e r r o r s  wi th  t h e  so f tware  
o p e r a t i n g  i n  a t r i p l e x  hardware config-  
u r a t i o n ,  and 
4. Provide a so l id  so f tware  package 
t o  s u p p o r t  system v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
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Although n o t  an o b j e c t i v e  of v e r i f i -  
c a t i o n  t e s t i n g ,  system des ign  e r r o r s  
were found and c o r r e c t e d .  
A separate v e r i f i c a t i o n  document 
conta ined  d e t a i l e d  t e s t i n g  procedures  
used by t h e  testers. This  document w a s  
fo rma l ly  publ i shed  i n  October 1981. 
During t h i s  t i m e ,  s e v e r a l  p r e l i m i n a r y  
so f tware  releases were made. P r e l i m i -  
na ry  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  began i n  March 
1981 and went through October. This  
t e s t i n g  d e t e c t e d  e r r o r s  whi le  a l lowing  
f o r  t h e  development of t h e  test  proce- 
d u r e s  used du r ing  formal  v e r i f i c a t i o n .  
Nearly 150 d i s c r e p a n c i e s  w e r e  found 
and c o r r e c t e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  prelimi- 
n a r y  t e s t i n g .  
5.2.2 Verification Support 
Equipment 
The s u p p o r t  equipment used €o r  veri-  
f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  36. 
The primary equipment i s  t h e  engineer -  
i n g  tes t  s u p p o r t  equipment (ETSE) t es t  
complex f u r n i s h e d  wi th  t h e  f l i g h t  com- 
p u t e r s .  To p rov ide  improved t es t  docu- 
menta t ion  and some automation of t h e  
redundancy management t e s t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  
t es t  f a c i l i t i e s  were upgraded t o  allow 
f o r  an ETSE real-time memory moni tor ing  
of t h e  f l i g h t  computers, and a redun- 
dancy management tes t  s i g n a l  g e n e r a t o r  
w a s  implemented. An on- l ine  c a p a b i l i t y  
f o r  r eco rd ing  MIL-STD-1553 m u l t i p l e x  bus 
data  w a s  a l s o  a v a i l a b l e .  
5.2.3 Verification Tests 
The 13  v e r i f i c a t i o n  tests are l i s t e d  
i n  s e c t i o n  4 of t h e  T e s t  Plan,  t a b l e  15. 
The unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of each test 
are d i scussed  b r i e f l y .  
5.2.3.1 A v i o n i c s  n u l t i p l e x  b u s  d a t a  
interface tes t .  The a v i o n i c s  m u l t i p l e x  
bus (AMUX) d a t a  i n t e r f a c e  tes t  v e r i f i e s  
t h a t  t h e  software performs t h e  follow- 
i n g  func t ions :  
1 .  Provides  two-way communications 
between DFCS and o t h e r  systems f o r  d a t a  
i n p u t  and ou tpu t ;  
2. Provides  c r o s s - l i n k i n g  of data 
from t h e  r e c e i v i n g  FLCC t o  t h e  o t h e r  
two ncc; 
3 .  Allows data t r a n s f e r  over  e i t h e r  
AMUX A bus o r  AMUX B bus w h i l e  r e t a i n i n g  
d a t a  cons i s t ency ;  
4. Maintains informat ion  on c u r r e n t  
d a t a  and l o c a t i o n  of t h e  new d a t a .  
5.2.3.2 Gain s c h e d u l e r  tes t .  The 
g a i n  schedu le r  test v e r i f i e s  t h a t  a l l  
scheduled g a i n s  ( f o r  a l l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
modes) t h a t  are a f u n c t i o n  of slow- 
moving a i r  data are computed 4 t i m e s  
per sec. 
S o m e  g a i n s  are a l s o  a f u n c t i o n  of 
a i r c r a f t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  gear 
down. T e s t i n g  €o r  these c o n d i t i o n s  w a s  
a l s o  included. Unl ike ly ,  b u t  p h y s i c a l l y  
p o s s i b l e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  such as nega t ive  
s t a t i c  p r e s s u r e ,  w e r e  a lso t e s t e d ,  
uncovering some unique errors. 
5.2.3.3 Control law f r e q u e n c y  t es t .  
The c o n t r o l  l a w  f requency  response  t e s t  
v e r i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  open-loop response  
p rov ides  t h e  r e q u i r e d  system g a i n  and 
phase margins. 
Th i s  test  w a s  a c t u a l l y  a v a l i d a t i o n  
t es t  and d i d  n o t  completely v e r i f y  t h e  
c o r r e c t n e s s  of t h e  code. T e s t i n g  of 
limiters, s i g n a l  shape r s ,  and logic 
c o n d i t i o n s  w a s  n o t  covered by t h i s  
approach. Con t ro l  l a w  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
became a test  i s s u e  as a b lack  box 
approach w a s  used r a t h e r  than  a de ta i led  
tes t  of each c o n t r o l  l a w  func t ion .  This  
i s  d i scussed  i n  s e c t i o n  8. 
5.2.3.4 Control mode selection and 
t r a n s i t i o n  r e s p o n s e  test .  This  test  

















and submode swi tch ing  and t r a n s i t i o n  
response characteristics of t h e  DFCS. 
5.2.3.5 Analog input selector and 
monitor t e s t .  This  redundancy manage- 
ment t es t  v e r i f i e s  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  
DFCS to  monitor and select  t h e  c o n t r o l  
l a w  i n p u t  data i n  t h e  presence  of s i n g l e  
and m u l t i p l e  i n p u t  f a i l u r e s .  Verifica- 
t i o n  inc luded  t h a t  f o r  f a u l t  a n a l y s i s ,  
f a u l t  record ing  and r e p o r t i n g ,  and re- 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  and reset f u n c t i o n s  of 
f a i l u r e  management. A l a r g e  p o r t i o n  
of  t h e  S/M t e s t i n g  w a s  automated. 
5.2.3.6 Discrete input selector 
monitor operation. This  redundancy 
management test  ver i f ies  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
of t h e  DFCS to  monitor and select d i s -  
crete i n p u t  data f o r  c o n t r o l  l a w  com- 
p u t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  presence  of s i n g l e  and 
d u a l  i n p u t  f a i l u r e s .  V e r i f i c a t i o n  
i n c l u d e s  handl ing  of discrete i n p u t  
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and t h e  f a u l t  a n a l y s i s ,  
f a u l t  r e c o r d i n g  and r e p o r t i n g ,  and 
r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  and reset f u n c t i o n s  of 
f a i l u r e  management. 
Simultaneous nose up and nose down 
t r i m  c o n d i t i o n s  are types  of incon- 
s i s t e n c i e s  reso lved  by t h e  software. 
5.2.3.7 Integrated servoactuator 
t e s t .  This  redundancy management test  
v e r i f i e s  that  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  servo- 
a c t u a t o r  ( I S A )  subframe and frame c y c l i c  
moni tors  of the  DFCS provide  v a l i d  out- 
p u t  commands t o  each of t h e  pr imary air- 
frame c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e s  i n  t h e  presence  
of computat ional  and e l e c t r o n i c  d r i v e  
f a i l u r e s .  V e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  i n c l u d e s  
t h e  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  f a u l t  record ing  
and r e p o r t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  of f a i l u r e  man- 
agement. T e s t s  also i n c l u d e  v e r i f i c a -  
t i o n  of I S A  c e n t e r i n g  and f a i l u r e  reset 
under a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
5.2.3.8 Leading edge f l a p  t e s t .  
T h i s  redundancy management t e s t  v e r i f i e s  
t h a t  the  l e a d i n g  edge f l a p  (LEF) c y c l i c  
monitor  of t h e  DFCS provides  v a l i d  out- 
p u t  commands to  t h e  d u a l  LEF d r i v e  sys-  
t e m  i n  t h e  presence  of computat ional  and 
e l e c t r o n i c  f a i l u r e s .  V e r i f i c a t i o n  test- 
i n g  i n c l u d e s  the c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  
f a u l t  r e c o r d i n g  and r e p o r t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  
of f a i l u r e  management, and the capabil- 
i t y  to  lock  t h e  LEF d r i v e ( s 1  and f a i l u r e  
reset under appropriate c o n d i t i o n s .  
5.2.3.9 Long power outage t e s t .  
T h i s  t e s t  v e r i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  DFCS 
r e s t o r e s  t h e  FLCC to  normal o p e r a t i o n  
a f t e r  a long p o w e r  outage (>50  msec). 
5.2.3.10 Short power outage t e s t .  
T h i s  t e s t  v e r i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  DFCS OFP 
r e s t o r e s  t h e  FLCC to  normal o p e r a t i o n  
a f t e r  a s h o r t  power outage  ( < 5 0  msec). 
5.2.3.11 Memory and d u t y  cycle 
reserve t e s t .  T h i s  t e s t  v e r i f i e s  t h a t  
t h e  sof tware  provides  30-percent memory 
r e s e r v e  and 25-percent d u t y  c y c l e  
reserve .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t iming  data w e r e  
ob ta ined  wi th  regard  t o  completion of 
c y c l i c  t asks  and I S A  subframe monitor- 
i n g  t o  determine t h e  adequacy of frame 
r e s e r v e  t i m e  and t h e  sof tware  e x e c u t i v e  
schedul ing  of tasks. 
5.2.3.12 Built-in t e s t .  The b u i l t -  
i n  t es t  ( B I T )  v e r i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  DFCS 
p r o v i d e s  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
of  system i n t e g r i t y  (no  hardware f a i l -  
u r e s )  pr ior  to  f l i g h t ,  and f a u l t  isola- 
t i o n  t o  the l i n e  replaceable unit l e v e l  
d u r i n g  maintenance o p e r a t i o n s .  The o r i g -  
i n a l  approach to  i n s e r t  hardware f a i l u r e s  
t o  tes t  t h e  BIT sof tware  w a s  abandoned 
owing to  schedul ing  c o n s t r a i n t s .  B I T  
w a s  tested by p a t c h i n g  t h e  software to  
i n d i c a t e  f a i l ed  condi t ions .  
5.2.3.13 Flyable hardware retest .  
F l y a b l e  hardware r e t e s t i n g  w a s  a major 
i s s u e  d u r i n g  p lanning  b u t  became a moot 
p o i n t .  O r i g i n a l l y ,  t h e  sof tware ,  i n  
f o l l o w i n g  i t s  schedule ,  w a s  w e l l  ahead 
of t h e  hardware development. I t  w a s  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  o n l y  breadboarded com- 
p u t e r s  would be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  test- 
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ing .  However, t h e  DFCS so f tware  release 
s l i p  allowed t i m e  f o r  f l y a b l e  hardware 
d e l i v e r y .  Tes t ing  on t h e  f l y a b l e  hard- 
w a r e  w a s  the best approach and w a s  
p robably  t h e  on ly  good r e s u l t  of t h e  
so f tware  sl ip.  
5.2.4 Rever i fy ing  the Design 
I t e r a t i o n s  
The tough q u e s t i o n  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
i s  how much r e t e s t i n g  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  
v e r i f y  t h a t  t h e  change does on ly  what 
i t  is  supposed t o  do? T e s t i n g  what a 
change i s  supposed t o  do i s  f a i r l y  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  b u t  how much addi- 
t i o n a l  t e s t i n g  of o t h e r  so f tware  com- 
ponents  is needed? 
AS mentioned earlier i n  s e c t i o n  
5.2.1, p r e l i m i n a r y  v e r i f i c a t i o n  began 
i n  March 1981 and formal  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
began i n  November 1981. F r o m  the s t a r t  
t o  end of formal v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  June 1982,  
14  so f tware  releases were made, a rate 
of n e a r l y  2 per mo. Although the last  
releases had cons ide rab le  t e s t i n g ,  no 
s i n g l e  release had every  test run on it. 
The approach f o r  r e t e s t i n g  t h e  f i n a l  
release p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t  t e s t ,  and a l s o  
those  releases d u r i n g  f l i g h t  test ,  w a s  
t o  test  each change made and then  run 
a so f tware  acceptance  tes t  procedure  
(ATP). R e v e r i f i c a t i o n  procedures  con- 
t a i n e d  a v a r i e t y  of tests f o r  each of 
t h e  so f tware  components ( t a b l e  16) .  Two 
o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  are worth not ing:  
( 1 )  s t r u c t u r e d  and c o n t r o l l e d  coding 
t echn iques  h e l p  t o  reduce e r r o r s ,  and 
( 2 )  t h e  follow-on system v a l i d a t i o n  
t e s t i n g  helped t o  d e t e c t  e r r o r s  caused 
by redes ign .  
5.3 System V a l i d a t i o n  
The system v a l i d a t i o n  tes t  demonst ra tes  
t h a t  t h e  system, as a whole, performs as 
expected i n  t h e  u s e r ' s  environment. For 
t h e  most par t  t h e  d e s i r e d  system perform- 
ance i s  u s u a l l y  n o t  s p e c i f i e d  t o  t h e  
d e t a i l  needed. I n  the s t a b i l i t y  and 
c o n t r o l  d i s c i p l i n e ,  t h e  performance i s  
s p e c i f i e d  wi th  more d e t a i l  than  i n  o t h e r  
d i s c i p l i n e s .  For example, f l y i n g - q u a l i t y  
c r i te r ia  e x i s t ,  such a s  t h e  a l lowab le  
t i m e  c o n s t a n t  of t h e  sp i r a l  mode. How- 
e v e r ,  d e t a i l e d  cri teria f o r  o t h e r  areas, 
such  as t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign ,  i s  
a lmos t  nonex i s t en t .  A l l  aspects of t h e  
system v a l i d a t i o n  process, i n c l u d i n g  
p lanning ,  tes t  environment, and va l ida -  
t i o n  t es t  and r e t e s t i n g ,  are d i s c u s s e d  
i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
5.3.1 V a l i d a t i o n  T e s t  P l an  
The types  of v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  w e r e  
s p e l l e d  o u t  i n  seven separate documents. 
Some of t h e  t es t  p l a n s  w e r e  w r i t t e n  by 
t h e  DFCS test  group, o t h e r s  by t h e  simu- 
l a t i o n  group. The tes t  p l a n s  were 
1 .  I n t e g r a t e d  system t e s t i n g  of the 
DFCS so f tware  (DFCS tes t  group), 
2. Con t ro l s  and d i s p l a y s  tes t  p l a n  
( s i m u l a t i o n ) ,  
3 .  F l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  test p l a n  
( s i m u l a t i o n ) ,  
4. F a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  tes t  
p l a n  ( s i m u l a t i o n ) ,  
5. F l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system ground 
t e s t  p l a n  (on  a i r c ra f t  tests) ,  
6. Electr ical  system tes t  p l a n  (on 
a i r c r a f t  tests) , and 
7. E lec t romagnet ic  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
t es t  (on a i r c r a f t  tes t )  . 
The l a s t  t h r e e  i t e m s  are v a l i d a t i o n  
tests performed on t h e  a i r c r a f t  and are 
l i s t ed  f o r  completeness. They w i l l  n o t  
a l l  be addressed  i n  detai l .  F l i g h t  t es t  
i s  t h e  f i n a l  v a l i d a t i o n  test  and is  cov- 















The tes t  p l ann ing  e f f o r t  w a s  u s e f u l .  
I n  many cases t h e  t e s t i n g  and test docu- 
ments r e q u i r e d  by t h e  U . S .  A i r  Force 
w e r e  redundant ,  and owing t o  a gene ra l  
misunderstanding of what v a l i d a t i o n  
t e s t i n g  is, many d u p l i c a t e  tests were 
created. Th i s  d u p l i c a t i o n  occurred  
most o f t e n  i n  areas least  understood,  
such as t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  design.  The 
t es t  p lanning  e f f o r t  he lped  t o  reduce 
t h e  ove r l ap  i n  t e s t i n g .  It  provided  an 
e x c e l l e n t  i n t e rchange  between t h e  gov- 
ernment and c o n t r a c t o r .  
5.3 .2  Support Equipment 
The v a l i d a t i o n  tes t  suppor t  equip- 
ment i n c l u d e s  a l l  t h e  equipment used for 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  Add i t iona l  tes t  
equipment inc luded  the  a i rc raf t  simula- 
t i o n ,  v i s u a l  system, and t h e  a v i o n i c s  
i n t e r f a c e  ( f i g .  37). 
The a i r c r a f t  s imu la to r  w a s  comprised 
of d i g i t a l  models for  t h e  a i rcraf t ' s  
aerodynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  an engine  
model, and models of t h e  a c t u a t o r s .  The 
a c t u a t o r s  were also modeled u s i n g  ana log  
c i r c u i t r y ;  t h e s e  ana log  models w e r e  usu- 
a l l y  used du r ing  t e s t i n g .  
The pr imary v i s u a l  d i s p l a y  w a s  a 4- 
by 4 - f t  p r o j e c t e d  d i s p l a y .  The d i s p l a y  
and mock-up c o c k p i t  were housed i n  an 
18- f t  dome s t r u c t u r e .  V i sua l  d i s p l a y s  
for  a i r  t o  a i r ,  a i r  t o  ground, and take 
o f f  and l and ing  t a s k  were a v a i l a b l e .  
The air-to-air t a r g e t  could  be set  up 
w i t h  s e v e r a l  preplanned maneuvers. The 
a v i o n i c s  equipment inc luded  an FCC, SMS, 
and PDG used to  p rov ide  mul t ipurpose  
d i s p l a y  informat ion  i n  t h e  cockp i t .  
S ince  v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  is designed 
t o  show proper system ope ra t ion ,  t h e  
environment i n  which t h e  system i s  used 
must be modeled i n  detai l .  The aero- 
dynamic model used is based on t h e  F-16 
wind-tunnel d a t a  which w a s  improved w i t h  
c ana rd  and dorsal f a i r i n g  e f f e c t s  from 
wind-tunnel tests and a l s o  wi th  F-16 
f l i g h t - t e s t  d a t a .  
Maximizing use  of t h e  real a v i o n i c s  
subsystems helped t o  provide  t h e  a c t u a l  
environment. Using t h e  a v i o n i c s  hard- 
ware a l s o  provided an  oppor tun i ty  t o  re- 
s o l v e  t h e  subsystem i n t e r f a c i n g  problems 
t h a t  occur  du r ing  v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
5 . 3 . 3 Validation tests 
A d e t a i l e d  look a t  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  
tests performed on t h e  DFCS is  under- 
taken  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  Areas of o v e r l a p  
and secondary b e n e f i t s  from t h e  t e s t i n g  
are d iscussed .  
5.3.3.1 I n t e g r a t e d  s y s t e m  t e s t i n g  
o f  the DFCS s o f t w a r e .  I n t e g r a t e d  system 
t e s t i n g ,  which inc luded  t e s t i n g  of more 
than  j u s t  the sof tware ,  w a s  handled by 
t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system tes t  team. 
The tests are shown i n  table 17. A 
b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the goa l  f o r  each 
test  fo l lows .  
The B I T  v a l i d a t e d  t h a t  t h e  DFCS pro- 
vided t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of 
system i n t e g r i t y  (no  hardware f a i l u r e s )  
p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t  and f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  LRU l e v e l  du r ing  maintenance opera- 
t i o n s .  The v e r i f i c a t i o n  tes t  c o n s i s t e d  
of loading  so f tware  d r i v e r s  t h a t  made 
B I T  th ink  hardware f a i l u r e s  occurred.  
The v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t  f o r  B I T  c o n s i s t e d  
of running i t  pr ior  to  each day ' s  opera- 
t i o n s .  T h i s  on ly  v a l i d a t e d  BIT  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  B I T  d i d  n o t  f a l s e l y  d e t e c t  
errors and c o r r e c t l y  d e t e c t e d  t h e  few 
f a i l u r e s  which d i d  occur .  B I T  i s  d i s -  
cussed f u r t h e r  i n  s e c t i o n  7. 
The mode s e l e c t i o n  and d i s p l a y  tes t  
v a l i d a t e d  t h e  DFCS, FCC, SMS, AMUX and 
MPD i n t e r f a c e s  r equ i r ed  f o r  p i l o t  mode 
s e l e c t i o n  and d i s p l a y .  Add i t iona l ly ,  
t h e  tes t  v a l i d a t e d  t h e  p i l o t ' s  capabi l -  
i t y  t o  communicate wi th  t h e  DFCS through 
t h e  MPD and applicable cockpit swi tches .  
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This  t e s t i n g  addressed c o n t r o l s  and 
d i s p l a y s  i n  d e t a i l -  one area where 
t e s t i n g  overlapped - i n  t h e  simula- 
t i o n  test p lan .  
under a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  and land  
t h e  a i r c ra f t  s a f e l y .  
The c o n t r o l  l a w  f requency response  
tes t  v a l i d a t e d  t h a t  t h e  DFCS provided  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  closed-loop frequency 
response  characteristics. The test pro- 
v ided  v a l i d a t i o n  of c losed-loop phase 
and ga in  margins.  A f requency gene ra to r  
and X-Y p l o t t e r  were used. The phase 
and ga in  margins were read f r o m  t h e  X-Y 
p l o t s  generated.  
The step response tes t  v a l i d a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  DFCS c o n t r o l  l a w s  and execu t ive  
c o n t r o l  of tasks provided  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
multimode t r a n s i e n t  response  charac- 
teristics, owing t o  p i l o t  c o n t r o l l e r  
i n p u t s  a t  1-g and trimmed e leva ted-g  
c o n d i t i o n s  over  t h e  e n t i r e  f l i g h t  enve- 
lope .  The tests inc luded  swi t ch ing  
t r a n s i e n t  tests from s t anda rd  t o  decou- 
p l e d  modes and v i c e  ve r sa .  T e s t  i n p u t s  
f o r  t h e  p i l o t  c o n t r o l l e r s  w e r e  computer 
genera ted  wi th  t h e  a i r c ra f t  response  
compared t o  r e s u l t s  ob ta ined  by t h e  
ba t ch  s imula t ion .  The ba tch  s imula t ion  
used independent ly  modeled c o n t r o l  l a w s .  I 
The f l i g h t  s c e n a r i o  t es t  v a l i d a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  DFCS provided  s a t i s f a c t o r y  con- 
t r o l  l a w  performance du r ing  t a k e o f f ,  
c l imb,  a c c e l e r a t i o n ,  and l and ing  condi- 
t i o n s .  The t e s t  p r o f i l e s  w e r e  performed 
w i t h  and wi thout  s t o r e s ,  d rag  modula- 
t i o n ,  and o p t i m u m  f l a p  schedule .  Th i s  
t y p e  of t e s t i n g  w a s  a l s o  covered i n  t h e  
f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  s imula t ion  tests. 
I The ana log  i n p u t ,  s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  
t o l e r a n c e  tes t  v a l i d a t e d  t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  DFCS t o  main ta in  f u l l  o p e r a t i o n a l  
c a p a b i l i t y  du r ing  t r a n s i e n t  and latched 
s i n g l e  f a i l u r e s  of ana log  i n p u t s .  Th i s  
t es t  a l s o  v a l i d a t e d  t h e  a b i l i t y  of the  
p i l o t  t o  reset f a i l u r e s ,  and t h a t  
t h e  r e s u l t a n t  f a i l u r e  and f a i l u r e  
reset t r a n s i e n t s  w e r e  w i t h i n  
accep tab le  l e v e l s .  
The ana log  dua l - l i ke  f a i l u r e  t o l e r -  
ance t e s t  v a l i d a t e d  t h a t  the DFCS pro- 
vided s a f e  recovery and landing  capab i l -  
i t y  from d u a l - l i k e  analog i n p u t  s enso r  
f a i l u r e s  du r ing  high-performance maneu- 
ve r s .  The tes t  a l s o  v a l i d a t e d  t h e  
c a p a b i l i t y  of t he  p i l o t  t o  reset t r an -  
s i e n t  f a i l u r e s  that d id  n o t  persist be- 
yond seven i t e r a t i o n s  and t h a t  he w a s  
unable  t o  reset permanent f a i l u r e s .  A 
l and ing  i n  the a p p l i c a b l e  reconf igured  
mode w a s  included.  
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performed a t  f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  as c l o s e  
t o  t he  1-9 f l i g h t  envelope boundar ies  as 
p o s s i b l e  ( f i g .  38). Phase 2 c o n s i s t e d  
of per forming  coupled p i tch- ro l l -yaw 
maneuvers w h i l e  f l y i n g  a high- speed 
loop  which encompassed t h e  e n t i r e  Mach- 
a l t i t u d e  range of t h e  v e h i c l e  ( f ig .  3 9 ) .  
I n  phase 3 ,  s e v e r a l  l and ings  and take- 
o f f s  were made under extreme c o n d i t i o n s .  
Phase 4 c o n s i s t e d  of a sequence of HUD 
miss ion  phase switch c l o s u r e s  executed  
i n  a rapid manner a t  one f l i g h t  condi- 
t i o n  wh i l e  the  v e h i c l e  w a s  be ing  ex te r -  
n a l l y  f o r c e d  i n  a l l  t h r e e  axes  by a 
s i n u s o i d  s t i c k  inpu t .  
The power o u t a g e - r e s t a r t  t es t  v a l i -  
dated t h a t  t h e  so f tware  r e s t o r e d  t h e  
FLCCs t o  normal o p e r a t i o n  after a short 
power ou tage  and a long  power outage.  
T h i s  t e s t i n g  is  also addressed i n  FMET. 
The o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  tes t  a l s o  inc luded  
t h e  fo l lowing:  
1. FLCC wi thout  power is  vo ted  
o f f -  l i n e .  
2. I B U  is a u t o m a t i c a l l y  engaged 
when a l l  three FLCCs i n c u r  a simul- 
t aneous  power outage .  
3.  P i l o t  can reset a f a i l e d  FLCC 
a f t e r  power is resumed. 
4.  I n  case of power f a i l u r e s  i n  
t w o  FLCCs, t h e  remaining FLCC c o n t r o l s  
t h e  a i rc raf t .  
5. C o r r e c t  f a u l t  r eco rd ing  i n  non- 
v o l i t i v e  memory and annunc ia t ion  on MPD 
is  achieved. 
6. Manual engagement of IBU 
i s  permitted. 
The c o n t r o l  l a w  ga in  margin t es t  
v a l i d a t e d  t h a t  t h e  DFCS provided  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  ga in  margin wi th  t he  f lap ,  ele- 
v a t o r ,  and rudder  loops  i n d i v i d u a l l y  
open a t  t h e  a c t u a t o r  and t h e  o t h e r  sur -  
faces c losed  loop. This  t e s t  w a s  run  
f o r  each c o n t r o l  mode a t  a f l i g h t  con- 
d i t i o n  of Mach 0.9 and sea l e v e l .  
P a s s - f a i l  c r i t e r i a  were based on those  
ob ta ined  from l i n e a r  a n a l y s i s .  Gain 
i n c r e a s e s  were made by i n c r e a s i n g  sur -  
f a c e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  the s imula t ion .  
5.3.3.2 Controls and d i s p l a y s  
v a l i d a t i o n .  The c o n t r o l s  and d i s p l a y s  
t es t  is  a s i m u l a t i o n  t e s t  developed i n  
pa r t  by t h e  human f a c t o r s  eng inee r s .  
Four tes ts  w e r e  performed wi th  p r o j e c t  
p i l o t s  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  c o c k p i t  c o n t r o l -  
lers  and d i s p l a y s .  
The i n t e r i o r  l i g h t i n g  e v a l u a t i o n  
t es t  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  test conducted as 
par t  of t h e  c o n t r o l s  and d i s p l a y s  t es t .  
The o b j e c t i v e  of t h i s  tes t  w a s  t o  d e t e r -  
mine how w e l l  t h e  MPDs, HUD, and m i s -  
s i o n  phase l i g h t s  meet o p e r a t i o n a l  
requi rements  under va r ious  l e v e l s  of 
ambient i l l u m i n a t i o n .  
A q u a l i t a t i v e  assessment  of t h e  
u t i l i t y  of t h e  MPDs ,  HUD, and m i s -  
s i o n  phase l i g h t s  w a s  made by t h e  
p i l o t s  f o r  h igh  and low l e v e l s  of 
ambient i l l u m i n a t i o n .  
The c o n t r o l s  tes t  had t h e  p i l o t s  
perform a s i n g l e - a x i s  t r a c k i n g  task  of 
a n  a i r - t o - a i r  t a r g e t  wi th  a f i x e d  pipper 
u s i n g  a s i n g l e  c o n t r o l l e r ,  e i t h e r  t h e  
t w i s t  t h r o t t l e ,  rudder  pedals, o r  s i d e  
s t ick  controller.  They w e r e  required to  
f l y  t h e  f i x e d  reticle on t h e  head-up 
d i s p l a y  t o  the t a r g e t  r ep resen ted  by the  
t a r g e t  d e s i g n a t o r  box, a l s o  on t h e  head- 
up  d i s p l a y .  The d u r a t i o n  of each t r i a l  
w a s  30 seconds,  and f i v e  t r a i l s  were run  
f o r  each of t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes. 
Th i s  tes t  concen t r a t ed  on t h e  human fac-  
t o r s  aspects of t h e  c o c k p i t  c o n t r o l l e r s  
r a t h e r  than  t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  f l y i n g  q u a l i -  
ties d a t a  d i scussed  ear l ier .  
The head-up d i s p l a y  (HUD) is the 
p i l o t ' s  primary f l i g h t  ins t rument .  The 
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AFTI ' s  HUD is an improved ve r s ion  over  
t h e  F-16 f l e e t .  The f i e l d  of view (dis- 
p l a y  s i z e )  w a s  l a r g e r  and inc luded  sys- 
t e m  s t a t u s  informat ion  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
a i r c r a f t  s ta te  d i s p l a y s  ( a l t i t u d e ,  
heading,  and airspeed). The HUD sym- 
bology d i sp layed  changes as a f u n c t i o n  
of  a i r c r a f t  mission and subsystem modes. 
The HUD symbology w a s  eva lua ted  by 
each  of t h e  program p i lo t s  by f l y i n g  
seven d i f f e r e n t  f l i gh t -mis s ion  phases 
i n  both  coupled and decoupled modes. 
The d i f f e r e n t  f l i gh t -mis s ion  phases  
and f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes provided  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  u s i n g  or viewing t h e  
va r ious  HUD symbologies. 
The o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  
c o c k p i t  test  w a s  t o  v a l i d a t e  t h e  cock- 
p i t  des ign  i n  a dynamic s i t u a t i o n .  
Th i s  t a s k  w a s  s t r u c t u r e d  t o  ana lyze  
t h e  p i lo t ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  spe- 
c i f i c  f l i g h t  parameters and complete 
v a r i o u s  miss ion  related tasks. The 
fo l lowing  aspects of t h e  p i l o t - v e h i c l e  
i n t e r f a c e  were examined: 
I 
1. Logic, l e g i b i l i t y  and o p e r a t i o n  
of t h e  MPDs,  
1 2 .  P i l o t  manual and v i s u a l  access 
t o  cockp i t  c o n t r o l s  and d i s p l a y s ,  
3 .  Side  s t i c k  as a c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  
coupled and decoupled f l i g h t ,  
4. L inear  t h r o t t l e  as a t h r u s t  
I c o n t r o l l e r ,  
5. T h r o t t l e  movement f o r  cross 
coupl ing  wi th  t h e  decoupled f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  system, 
6. Switches on the  s t i c k  and 
t h ro t t l e  f o r  cross coup l ing  w i t h  t h e  
f l i g h t  modes, 
7. T r i m  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  pane l ,  
8. Mission phase s e l e c t i o n  
and s t a t u s ,  
9. Warnings, 
10. Threa t  warning enunc ia t ion  
and d i s p l a y ,  
1 1 .  P i t c h  l i m i t  ope ra t ion ,  con- 
t r o l ,  and d i s p l a y ,  
12. CCV engagement, disengage- 
ment, and d i s p l a y ,  
13. Manual p i t c h  o v e r r i d e  opera- 
t i o n  procedure,  and 
14. I B U  s t a t u s ,  manual and au tomat ic  
engagement, and manual disengagement. 
5.3.3.3 F l y i n g  qualities. Before 
d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  va l ida-  
t i o n  test ,  it is worth reviewing the  
h i s t o r y  of t h i s  t e s t i n g  as used i n  the  
A F T 1  development. Note, t h a t  t h i s  v a l i -  
d a t i o n  test w a s  used n o t  on ly  a t  t h e  end 
of the  development, b u t  throughout  t h e  
development, a l l owing  e a r l y  d e t e c t i o n  of 
d e s i g n  errors as shown by poor f l y i n g  
q u a l i t i e s .  The f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  va l ida -  
t i o n  test  i s  documented i n  more de t a i l  
i n  Anderson and Frank ( 1  984) .  
Three f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  demonstra- 
t i o n s  were he ld  b e f o r e  the f i n a l  va l ida -  
t i o n  test. These demonst ra t ions  w e r e  
reques ted  by t h e  f l i g h t  test  team be fo re  
each major program review. The c o n t r o l  
l a w s  eva lua ted  were modeled i n  FORTRAN 
and run wi th  t h e  d i g i t a l l y  modeled air- 
c r a f t  dynamics. V i sua l  d i s p l a y s  and a 
mock-up c o c k p i t  were par t  of t h e  simula- 
t i o n .  An example of t h e  type  of t a s k s  
and t h e  modes eva lua ted  i s  shown i n  
table  18. 
The f i r s t  two p r e v a l i d a t i o n  tests 
al lowed f o r  t h e  e a r l y  d e t e c t i o n  of de- 
s i g n  e r r o r s .  S ince  t h e  test environ-  
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ment d id  not  i nc lude  DFCS hardware and 
so f tware ,  t h e  tests cannot  be classi- 
f i e d  as t r u e  system v a l i d a t i o n  tests. 
However, t h e  fo l lowing  b e n e f i t s  must 
be recognized:  
1. E a r l y  d e t e c t i o n  of des ign  e r r o r s  
p rov ides  an improved product ,  perhaps a t  
a lower c o s t ;  
2. Provides  c r i t i c a l  u s e r  and 
f l i g h t  tes t  p i l o t  feedback t o  
des igne r s ;  and 
3. Provides  v i s i b i l i t y  i n t o  c o n t r o l  
l a w  des ign  f o r  a l l  program p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
Also,  because of t h e  tes t  environment 
and t h e  i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  of f l i g h t  
s i m u l a t i o n s ,  some p i t f a l l s  must be 
recognized  and avoided,  i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  fol lowing:  
1. Modeling e r r o r s  can g i v e  ind i -  
c a t i o n s  of des ign  errors which do no t  
a c t u a l l y  e x i s t .  Cont ro l  l a w  modifica- 
t i o n s  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e s e  phantom e r r o r s  
can adve r se ly  a f f e c t  f l i g h t  test. Exam- 
ples inc lude  t i m e  de l ays ,  bo th  real sys- 
t e m  d i s p l a y s  and t h o s e  pe rce ived  by t h e  
p i l o t  because of d i s p l a y  cues,  and t h e  
lack of n o n l i n e a r i t i e s ,  such as t h o s e  
i n  t h e  a c t u a t i o n  system. 
2. A s  a p i l o t  e v a l u a t i o n  wi thout  
t h e  s a f e t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  and stress sit- 
u a t i o n s  of a c t u a l  f l i g h t ,  c e r t a i n  t a s k s ,  
such  as landing ,  may n o t  provide  cre- 
dible r e s u l t s .  
The t h i r d  f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  va l ida -  
t i o n  tes t  w a s  he ld  be fo re  t h e  f l i g h t  
r e a d i n e s s  review. T h i s  f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  
t e s t  used f l i g h t  hardware and completely 
v e r i f i e d  sof tware .  The f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  
test  i s  summarized as fo l lows:  
1. Evalua tes  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  
SNRM mode, 
2. Demonstrates s a t i s f a c t o r y  -y- 
i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  t a s k  tailored modes 
(SAAG, SASG, S A S B ) ,  
3 .  Demonstrates s a t i s f a c t o r y  f l y -  
i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  decoupled modes 
(DNRM, DAAG, DASG, DASB), 
4. Determines tha t  no d e f i c i e n c i e s  
i n  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  or handl ing  q u a l i -  
t ies  l i m i t  f l i g h t  s a f e t y  o r  t h e  capab i l -  
i t y  t o  perform t h e  in tended  miss ions ,  
5. Develops f l i g h t  tes t  predic-  
t i o n  d a t a ,  
6. Examines DFCS modes and f l i g h t  
c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  n o t  be f l i g h t  
tested b u t  could be e n t e r e d  by improper 
p i l o t  mode s e l e c t i o n ,  
7. Determines t h e  l e v e l  of 
r e s i s t a n c e  to  d e p a r t u r e s  from con- 
t r o l l e d  f l i g h t ,  
8. Demonstrates proper  o p e r a t i o n  
of ang le  of a t t a c k  and g - l i m i t e r ,  
9. Determines maneuver l i m i t  bound- 
aries i f  r equ i r ed  t o  p reven t  unwanted 
d e p a r t u r e s  from c o n t r o l l e d  f l i g h t ,  
10. Demonstrates s a t i s f a c t o r y  f l y -  
i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
modes, and 
1 1 .  Demonstrates s a t i s f a c t o r y  f l y -  
i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  IBU mode. 
The specific i t e m s  eva lua ted  w e r e  
de r ived  from t h e  system s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
and inc lude  s ta t ic  s t a b i l i t y ,  s t i c k  
f o r c e s ,  t u r n  coord ina t ion ,  c o n t r o l  
harmony, and s t a l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
A t o t a l  of 40 f l y i n g - q u a l i t y  r equ i r e -  
ments w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  
S i x  g e n e r a l  test types  were used t o  
e v a l u a t e  the f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  : 
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1. Pre l imina ry  mode checkout 
c o n s i s t i n g  of doub le t ,  r o l l s ,  and 
a windup t u r n .  
2. S t a b i l i t y  and c o n t r o l  tests, 
i n c l u d i n g  maneuvers mentioned above 
i n  i t e m  ( l ) ,  w e r e  done a t  trimmed f o r  
l e v e l  f l i g h t  and e l e v a t e d  load  f a c t o r ;  
decoupled c o n t r o l  i n p u t s  w e r e  inc luded .  
O t h e r  tests are mode swi t ch ing ,  decou- 
pled c o n t r o l  l i m i t s ,  splits, and han- 
d l i n g  q u a l i t i e s  du r ing  t r a c k i n g .  Two 
miss ion  tasks of a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  gun 
t r a c k i n g  and a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  bombing 
w e r e  performed. 
3 .  High angle-of -a t tack  t e s t i n g  
v a l i d a t e d  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system 
a t  h igh  a n g l e s  of a t t a c k ,  l o o  t o  30°. 
Doublets,  r o l l s ,  and mode swi t ch ing  
are some of t h e  maneuvers. 
4. A special s e c t i o n  w a s  dedicated 
t o  t e s t i n g  t h e  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  of t h e  
a n a l o g  b a c k u p  u n i t .  
5. The approach of hand l ing  d u a l  
(complete) l o s s  of a n  a i rcraf t  feed- 
back senso r  such as pi tch rate, by 
u s e  of r e c o n f i g u r i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  
w a s  eva lua ted .  
6. The f i n a l  set of t es t s  eva lua ted  
t h e  c o n t r o l  system o u t s i d e  the des ign  
envelope of a given mode. T h i s  tes t  
w a s  performed because c e r t a i n  modes, 
mainly t h e  decoupled modes, had oper- 
a t i o n a l  envelopes which w e r e  smaller 
t h a n  o t h e r  modes. I n a d v e r t e n t  p i lo t  
a c t i o n  cou ld  r e s u l t  i n  o p e r a t i o n  out- 
side a des ign  envelope. 
T h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  f l y i n g - q u a l i t i e s  
t es t  are summarized as fo l lows:  
1. The f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  of  a l l  the 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes w e r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
excep t  f o r  t h e  fo l lowing  i t e m s .  Because 
of problems i n  the  advanced m o d e s ,  on ly  
t h e  SNRM w a s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  f irst  
f l i g h t .  Any f l i g h t  t e s t e d  i n  o t h e r  
modes would have r e q u i r e d  retest  a f t e r  
t h e  problems w e r e  co r rec t ed .  
2. F l a t  t u r n  performance was 
s l i g h t l y  impure, i n  o t h e r  words t h e  
s i d e s l i p s  were n o t  zero.  
3 .  P i t c h  maneuvering response  
w a s  s l u g g i s h .  
4.  Eleva to r  rate-limit c y c l i n g  
occurred  i n  decoupled normal mode. 
5. The IBU and a l l  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
modes excep t  p i t c h  rate r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
mode were accepted  f o r  f l i g h t  test. The 
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign  w a s  s e n s i t i v e  to  
t h e  p i t c h  rate reconf i g u r a t i o n  t r a n s i -  
t i o n .  On occas ion ,  depending on compu- 
ter  skews and a i r c r a f t  s tate,  t h e  d i g i -  
t a l  system would f a i l  t o  the IBU d u r i n g  
the  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  p i t c h  rate reconf igu-  
r a t i o n  mode. As t h e  I B U  needs pi tch 
rate  feedback t o  c o n t r o l  the a i r c r a f t ,  
t h i s  f a i l u r e  sequence would r e s u l t  i n  
l o s s  of t h e  a i rc raf t .  Th i s  w a s  t h e  on ly  
problem c o r r e c t e d  be fo re  f l i g h t  test. 
5.3.3.4 F a i l u r e  modes and effects 
t e s t i n g  ( F M E T ) .  FMET v a l i d a t e s  t h e  
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign  to  a l e v e l  d e f i n e d  
by t h e  type  of f a i l u r e s  induced and t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  which the system response  is  
measured. To d e f i n e  an optimum set  of 
tes t  cases, FMET r e q u i r e s  a f u n c t i o n a l  
breakdown of t h e  DFCS and of t h e  s o f t -  
ware f a u l t - d e t e c t i o n  system. FMET is  
performed on t h e  s i m u l a t o r  t o  p rov ide  
t h e  environment that  b e s t  approximates 
f l i g h t .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  p rov id ing  essen- 
t i a l  eng inee r ing  knowledge, FMET f u r -  
n i s h e s  in fo rma t ion  on f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  
and i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t s ,  
and f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  of degraded modes, 
as w e l l  as p rov id ing  p i l o t  expe r i ence  
i n  f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  and t h e  use  of emer- 
gency procedures.  
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Because a major o b j e c t i v e  of the 
AFTI program w a s  t o  p rov ide  a d u a l - f a i l  
o p e r a t e  c a p a b i l i t y ,  FMET r e q u i r e d  a 
m a t r i x  of s i n g l e  and d u a l  f a i l u r e s .  The 
m a t r i x  is  composed of f irst  and second 
f a i l u r e s  of t h e  components l i s t ed  i n  
t a b l e  19. A l ist of each f a i l u r e  type ,  
t h e  f a i l u r e  mode, and i t s  e f fec t  is 
shown i n  t a b l e  20. A ma t r ix  of n e a r l y  
1000 f a i l u r e  combinations would be nec- 
e s s a r y  t o  tes t  every  dua l  f a i l u r e .  Fo r  
t h i s  t y p e  of t e s t i n g ,  a r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  
f a i l u r e  m a t r i x  r e q u i r e d  c a r e f u l  consid- 
e r a t i o n  of the o b j e c t i v e s .  A primary 
purpose  of FMET w a s  t o  show t h a t  t h e  
expec ted  r e s u l t s  of a f a i l u r e  are cor- 
rect; hence any compromise i n  the f a i l -  
u r e  m a t r i x  compromises t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
e n s u r e  safe and p rope r  o p e r a t i o n  fol- 
lowing f a i l u r e s .  
FMET w a s  performed i n  t w o  s t a g e s  - 
( 1 )  e v a l u a t i o n  test and ( 2 )  demonstra- 
t i o n  test .  Eva lua t ion  tes t  covered a l l  
t h e  tests i d e n t i f i e d  by an  "X" i n  t he  
d u a l  f a i l u r e  m a t r i x  ( f ig .  40). The 
three a d d i t i o n a l  tests i d e n t i f i e d  i n  
t a b l e  19 were added a t  a la ter  d a t e .  
An e v a l u a t i o n  tes t  w a s  performed by 
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ,  and t e s t i n g  d id  n o t  
i n c l u d e  government p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
The demonst ra t ion  test w a s  accom- 
p l i s h e d  u s i n g  government p i lo t s  and 
e n g i n e e r i n g  suppor t .  
Unlike f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  t h e  de ta i l  
requi rements  for  the  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
des ign  were n o t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  e a r l y  docu- 
ments. Though 40 specific f l y i n g -  
q u a l i t i e s  requi rements  were g iven  i n  t h e  
system s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  on ly  one f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  des ign  requirement w a s  given. 
I t  w a s  expressed  as ( 1 )  dua l  f a i l  oper- 
a t e  and (2) loss of c o n t r o l  p r o b a b i l i t y  
of  1 x lom7 i n  a 1-hr f l i g h t .  
Completing the  FMET demonst ra t ion  
r e q u i r e d  two attempts. The  f i rs t  
attempt a t  t h e  FMET demonst ra t ion  w a s  
n o t  s u c c e s s f u l  because the DFCS'S 
response  t o  f a i l u r e s  w a s  i n c o r r e c t .  
P a r t  of t he  problem w a s  de te rmining  what 
t h e  c o r r e c t  system response  should  be. 
Th i s  w a s  p a r t i a l l y  owing t o  the  l a c k  of 
d e t a i l e d  v a l i d a t i o n  requirements.  How- 
e v e r ,  t h e  major problem r e s u l t s  from t h e  
n a t u r e  of i n t e g r a t e d  v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
This  is t h e  f i rs t  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  t h e  
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign ,  t h e  system archi- 
t e c t u r e  (asynchronous computers ) ,  and 
t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  des ign  to  o p e r a t e  as 
one system. This  i n t e g r a t i o n  t e s t i n g  
detected numerous d e s i g n  e r r o r s  as t h e  
s e p a r a t e l y  developed components were 
r e q u i r e d  t o  o p e r a t e  toge the r .  
A f e w  of the major d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d  d u r i n g  t h e  AFTI 
F-16 FMET and r e s u l t e d  i n  mod i f i ca t ions  
t o  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system inc luded  
t h e  fo l lowing:  
1 .  Power f a i l u r e s  of a s i n g l e  com- 
p u t e r  channel  r e s u l t e d  i n  a complete 
loss  of t h e  t r i p l e x  d i g i t a l  system and 
t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  ana log  backup; 
2. A d u a l  f a i l u r e  of p i tch  rate 
in fo rma t ion  whi le  i n  power approach 
r e s u l t e d  i n  an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  pitch- 
down motion; 
3.  S i n g l e  f a i l u r e s  of an  analog-to- 
d i g i t a l  c o n v e r t e r  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  loss 
of t h e  t r i p l e x  d i g i t a l  system and r eve r -  
s i o n  t o  t h e  ana log  backup system. 
A l l  t o t a l e d ,  over  40 d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
were i d e n t i f i e d  d u r i n g  t h e  5-mo p e r i o d  
i n  which FMET took place. A s  can be 
seen ,  f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  a n a l y s i s  
i s  no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  f a i l u r e  modes and 
e f f e c t s  t e s t i n g .  The complex i n t e r a c -  
t i o n s  c r e a t e d  between hardware e lements  
because of so f tware  a c t i o n s  could  on ly  
be  found wi th  t h e  a c t u a l  hardware and 
so f tware  systems. 
5.3.3.5 On-aircraf t  t e s t ing .  
S e v e r a l  on -a i r c ra f  t tests w e r e  per- 
formed t o  v a l i d a t e  t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  system ope ra t ed  p rope r ly .  
31 
Besides t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  and 
f u n c t i o n a l  tests, three special 
tests inc luded  
1. S t r u c t u r a l  coupl ing ,  
2. E lec t romagnet ic  i n t e r f e r e n c e -  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y ,  and 
3 .  Gunf i r e  tests. 
A l l  tests were performed u s i n g  t h e  
airframe w i t h  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  and 
a v i o n i c s  systems ope ra t ing .  A brief 
d e s c r i p t i o n  and t h e  r e s u l t s  of each 
tes t  fo l low.  
5.3.3.6 Structural coupling. The 
s t r u c t u r a l  coup l ing  test w a s  -performed 
t o  show t h a t  t h e  response  of t h e  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  s e n s o r s  t o  s t r u c t u r a l  v ibra-  
t i o n  does n o t  form a s u s t a i n e d  c losed-  
loop  osci l la t ion.  
A diagram of t h e  tes t  s e t u p  i s  
shown i n  f i g u r e  41. Both open-loop 
and closed-loop tests w e r e  performed. 
The open-loop t es t  w a s  a f requency  
response  t es t  wi th  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
system command to  t h e  a c t u a t o r  discon- 
nec ted .  The a c t u a t o r  w a s  d r i v e n  wi th  
a n  e x t e r n a l  frequency s w e e p  and the 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  a c t u a t o r  command w a s  t h e n  
recorded. The i n p u t  and o u t p u t  com- 
mands were t h e n  compared and plotted 
as a f u n c t i o n  of frequency. A mini- 
mum 6-dB ga in  margin was requ i r ed .  
The closed-loop c o n f i g u r a t i o n  w a s  
tested by i n s e r t i n g  a v a r i a b l e  g a i n  be- 
tween t h e  DFCS and the  a c t u a t o r s .  The 
g a i n  w a s  s lowly  i n c r e a s e d ,  w i t h  s tep 
impulses given t o  each a c t u a t o r .  The 
response  t o  each impulse w a s  measured 
t o  determine frequency and damping. A 
100-percent i n c r e a s e  i n  ga in  w a s  made 
for  each a x i s  t o  v e r i f y  ga in  margins. 
Once a complete DFCS software 
release w a s  a v a i l a b l e ,  a p r e l i m i n a r y  
s t r u c t u r a l  mode tes t  w a s  performed t o  
uncover any f l i g h t  c o n t r o l - s t r u c t u r a l  
coupling. The t es t  i d e n t i f i e d  a p i t c h  
a x i s  resonance i n  t h e  100 rad/sec range. 
A c o r r e c t i o n  t o  t h e  so f tware  ( c o n t r o l  
l a w  d e s i g n )  so lved  t h e  problem u s i n g  a 
complex double notch f i l t e r .  Subsequent 
t e s t i n g  j u s t  prior t o  f i r s t  f l i g h t  found 
no d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
5.3.3.7 Electromagnetic interf e r  
ence and compatibility (EMIC). The EMIC 
t es t  w a s  performed j u s t  p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t  
test. The test  w a s  e x t e n s i v e ,  r e q u i r i n g  
s e v e r a l  weeks t o  complete. A l l  elec- 
t r o n i c  d e v i c e s  were i n s t a l l e d  and opera- 
t i o n a l  f o r  the test. The test  ensured  
t h a t  a g iven  e l e c t r o n i c  component's 
o p e r a t i o n  d i d  n o t  adve r se ly  a f f e c t  ano- 
t h e r ' s  ope ra t ion .  Both i n t e r f e r e n c e  
o f ,  and c o m p a t i b i l i t y  between, compo- 
n e n t s  were t e s t e d .  Tests were run  
u s i n g  ground p o w e r ,  main g e n e r a t o r s ,  
and t h e  emergency power u n i t .  
A l l  tests w e r e  completed success-  
f u l l y .  N o  changes w e r e  r e q u i r e d  be fo re  
f l i g h t  ope ra t ions .  
5.3.3.8 Gunfire test A requi rement  
t o  f i r e  t h e  gun d u r i n g  f l i g h t  t es t  l e d  
t o  a ground g u n f i r e  w i th  t h e  f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  system o p e r a t i o n a l .  There w a s  a 
concern t h a t  t h e  v i b r a t i o n  environment 
gene ra t ed  by t h e  g u n f i r e ,  coupled wi th  
asynchronous sampling and high-feedback 
g a i n s ,  would r e s u l t  i n  f a i l u r e  d e c l a r a -  
t i o n s .  To test  t h e  h i g h e s t  g a i n  condi- 
t i o n s  r e q u i r e d  an  e x t e n s i v e  t es t  s e t u p  
t o  g e t  t h e  c o r r e c t  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  mode 
and a i r  d a t a  c o n d i t i o n s  (Mach number 
and a l t i t u d e ) .  
The t es t  r e s u l t s  confirmed t h e  f e a r s  
of t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  d e s c r i b e d  i n t e r a c t i o n s  
between the gun f i r i n g  and f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  system. The l a t e ra l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  
feedback p a t h  t o  t h e  rudder  command w a s  
t h e  c u l p r i t  caus ing  a computer f a i l u r e  
i n d i c a t i o n  a f t e r  s e v e r a l  s u c c e s s f u l  gun- 
f i r e  b u r s t s .  The h igh  f requency ,  large- 
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scale motions of t h e  rudder  command d i f -  
fered i n  t h e  t h r e e  computers. T h i s  d i f -  
f e r e n c e  w a s  owing t o  e r r o r s  i n t roduced  
i n  t he  asynchronous sampling of t h e  la t -  
eral  acce lerometers .  The t h r e e  la teral  
accelerometers and rudder  commands, be- 
f o r e  and after t h e  software f i x ,  are 
shown i n  f i g u r e  42. A r educ t ion  i n  
feedback ga in  c o r r e c t e d  t h e  problem 
w i t h  no effect on f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s .  
5.3.4 Reva l ida t ion  of Designs 
The t y p e s  of v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  are 
wide ranging  and t h e  r e t e s t i n g  must be 
des igned  t o  cover  as many of t h e  speci- 
f i c  areas as p o s s i b l e  i n  each test .  
V a l i d a t i o n  r e t e s t i n g  must show t h a t  
c o r r e c t i o n s  t o  d e f i c i e n c i e s  do n o t  
adve r se ly  a f f e c t  other ope ra t ions .  
The seven s p e c i f i c  tests performed 
t o  r e v a l i d a t e  t h e  system are shown 
i n  t ab le  21. T e s t  number s i x  is a 
good example where f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  
f a i l u r e  modes, and p i l o t - v e h i c l e  
i n t e r f a c e  are combined i n  one test. 
The r e v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  w a s  done 
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  tests which s p e c i f i c a l l y  
v a l i d a t e  a given change. The r eva l ida -  
t i o n  tests were termed acceptance  t es t  
procedures .  The tests w e r e  performed 
prior t o  f i r s t  f l i g h t  and a f t e r  each new 
so f tware  release dur ing  f l i g h t  test .  
5.4 Qualification Issues 
The i s s u e s  involved w i t h  system va l ida -  
t i o n  are similar t o  those of v e r i f i c a -  
t i o n .  T h i s  i s n ' t  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  t h a t  
bo th  are t e s t i n g  t h e  implementation of 
a des ign ,  one f o r  t h e  sof tware  and one 
f o r  t he  system, and both  are for  an  air- 
craft .  The t w o  main i s s u e s  f o r  system 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  are com- 
p l e t e n e s s  and cost. 
Completeness is t h e  pr imary i s s u e  of 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  because it 
has  a direct e f f e c t  on s a f e t y  and cost. 
Cur ren t ly  t h e r e  is a s e r i o u s  l ack  of 
s t anda rds  and t o o l s  f o r  ach iev ing  and 
measuring completeness.  
I n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  t h e  va l ida -  
t i o n  s e c t i o n ,  v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g  w a s  
desc r ibed  as t e s t i n g  t o  see t h a t  t h e  
system as a whole performs as expected.  
The completeness i s s u e  can be viewed i n  
terms of the  completeness  of t h e  sys-  
t e m  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and how w e l l  t e s t i n g  
ensu res  proper  o p e r a t i o n  t o  t h a t  speci- 
f i c a t i o n .  This  i s s u e  a p p l i e s  to  both  
t h e  sof tware  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and t h e  
system f o r  v a l i d a t i o n .  
The c o s t  associated w i t h  v e r i f i c a -  
t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  is  t h e  cost of bo th  
people  and t o o l s  t o  perform t h e  job. 
The t o o l s  needed t o  perform t h e  tes t  and 
model t he  f l i g h t  environment are c o s t l y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  v a l i d a t i o n .  The simula- 
t i o n  i s  a pr imary c o s t .  Secondly,  t h e  
people  cost i s  h igh  because a l l  t h e  pre-  
v ious  a c t i v i t i e s  r equ i r ed  t o  des ign  and 
implement a change are needed t o  correct 
d i sc repanc ie s .  All l i f e - c y c l e  opera- 
t i o n s  must be r epea ted  (see f i g .  3 1 ) ,  
i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t .  This  is  a r a t h e r  w e l l -  
known and publ i shed  f a c t  (Brooks,  1979).  
Two sugges t ions  t o  reduce t h e  cost of 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  are 
1 .  To improve t h e  requirement ,  
des ign ,  and tes t  methodology t o  i d e n t i f y  
and c o r r e c t  e r r o r s  as e a r l y  as p o s s i b l e  
i n  the des ign  phase,  and 
2. To provide  an  informat ion  t o o l  
t o  t h e  d e s i g n e r s  and testers which can 
improve t h e  unders tanding  of t h e  des ign .  
See s e c t i o n  8 f o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n s  on 
t h i s  t op ic .  
6 CONFIGURATION CONTROL 
The des ign  of any l i f e - c r i t i c a l  system 
r e q u i r e s  a method f o r  r e s o l v i n g  d i sc rep -  
a n c i e s  and c o n t r o l l i n g  system configu-  
r a t i o n .  Conf igura t ion  c o n t r o l  can be 
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d e f i n e d  as knowing what you have and 
when you have it. A good c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  process f o r  e n s u r i n g  s a f e t y  
should  c o n t a i n  
1. V i s i b i l i t y  of changes across a l l  
involved  eng inee r ing  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  
2. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  impacts of 
a change on r e q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  
designed-in t e s t a b i l i t y  needed f o r  
t h e  changes, 
3. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
a change on system performance and l i m i -  
t a t i o n s ,  and 
4. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  e f f e c t s  of  
a change on o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
and procedures .  
The g e n e r a l  f low of t h e  conf igura-  
t i o n  c o n t r o l  process is  shown i n  f i g -  
u r e  43.  Discrepancy r e p o r t s ,  which 
c o n t r i b u t e  most s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  changes, are w r i t t e n  any t i m e  
t h e  system does n o t  perform as expec ted  
o r  f a i l s  t o  m e e t  a s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  The 
cause  of t h e  d iscrepancy  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  
as hardware, so f tware ,  o r  system f a i l -  
u r e  (hardware and so f tware  combination).  
The r e p o r t  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  d iscrepancy ,  
g i v e s  t h e  cause  and any p o s s i b l e  methods 
of working around t h e  problem, and de- 
t a i l s  any system l i m i t s  or o p e r a t i o n a l  
impacts. The d iscrepancy  r e p o r t  can 
only  be r e so lved  when a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
f i x  i s  implemented, documented, 
and r e t e s t e d .  
Changes are c o n t r o l l e d  through t h e  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  c o n t r o l  board,  which pro- 
v i d e s  t h e  forum f o r  d i s c i p l i n a r y  and 
f l i g h t  test  eng inee r s  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  
changes and t h e i r  impacts, i d e n t i f y  
retest  requi rements ,  and determine 
t h e  e f f e c t  on o p e r a t i o n a l  procedures .  
Aside from discrepancy  r e p o r t s ,  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  changes arise from new s o f t -  
ware, hardware, or system requi rements .  
New requi rements  e n t e r  t h e  change proc- 
ess i n  much the  same manner as d i s c r e p -  
a n c i e s  and f o l l o w  the same conf igura-  
t i o n  c o n t r o l  process .  Most of t h e  new 
requi rements  on t h e  AFT1 F-16 system 
were c l a s s i f i e d  as improvements. These 
improvements came i n  t h e  l a t te r  s t a g e s  
of  system development and were in t ended  
t o  reduce  requi rements  € o r  computer mem- 
o r y  and real  t i m e .  
7 FLIGHT TEST 
F l i g h t  test  a s ses sed  t h e  decoupled 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  i n t e g r a t e d  p i l o t  vehi- 
c le  i n t e r f a c e ,  and t o  a lesser e x t e n t  
t h e  d u a l - f a i l - o p e r a t e  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  
t r i p l e x  system. I t  a l s o  provided an 
assessment  of the method and tools used 
t o  deve lop  and q u a l i f y  t h e  DFCS design.  
For example, t h e  yaw d e p a r t u r e  of 
f l i g h t  36 and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  d a t a  iden- 
t i f y i n g  a s i n g l e  f a i l u r e ,  which could  
r e s u l t  i n  t h e  t r i p l e x  system f a i l i n g  t o  
t h e  ana log  backup, are both  i n s t a n c e s  
where t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  methods f o r  t h e  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  l a w  and f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
d e s i g n  f a i l e d .  
I t  i s  n a t u r a l  t o  expec t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
when pushing t h e  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  i n  a 
f l i g h t  r e s e a r c h  program. However, i t  
i s  a l s o  necessa ry  t o  unders tand  how 
t h e  methods can be improved so t h a t  t h e  
r i s k s  involved  i n  f u t u r e  f l i g h t  r e s e a r c h  
can  be minimized. 
The r e s u l t s  are broken i n t o  f i v e  
s e c t i o n s  - General,  Fau l t -To le ran t  De- 
s i g n ,  Con t ro l  L a w s ,  Software,  and Hard- 
w a r e .  The r e s u l t s  of f l i g h t  t e s t  wi th  
r ega rd  t o  t h e  program's g o a l s  are sum- 
marized i n  t h e  General s e c t i o n  t h a t  
fo l lows .  Cons iderable  pub l i shed  d a t a  
can be found on t h i s  and i s  inc luded  
i n  Ford and o t h e r s  ( 1  9841, Ishmael and 
o t h e r s  ( 1 984 1, Joyner  ( 1 983 1, and 





















Both ground and f l i g h t  operations 
are d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Faul t -Toleran t  De-  
s i g n  section. Lessons l e a r n e d  and a 
unique f l i g h t  t e s t  d iscrepancy  are sum- 
marized i n  t h e  Cont ro l  Laws  s e c t i o n .  
5. P i l o t  v e h i c l e  i n t e r f a c e  improve- 
ment of mult ipurpose d i s p l a y s ,  head-up 
The hardware and sof tware  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  medium i n  which t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
d e s i g n  and c o n t r o l  l a w s  are implemented. 
The Hardware and Software s e c t i o n s  w i l l  
a d d r e s s  t h e  f a i l u r e s  and errors which 
occurred  i n  bo th  areas and t h e  implica- 
t i o n s  t o  system r e l i a b i l i t y .  
a t t a c k ,  f l i g h t  a t  Mach numbers up to  
1.2, combat mission e v a l u a t i o n s  of de- 
coupled cont ro l ,  and s t r u c t u r a l  load 
1 7.1 General 
1 
1 F l i g h t  tes t  r e s u l t s  wi th  regard  t o  t h e  
program's g o a l s  are summarized i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n .  Program g o a l s  were to  demon- 1 st rate  and e v a l u a t e  t h e  fol lowing:  
1 .  A dua l - fa i l -opera te ,  t r i p l e x  i d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system, 
f 2. Task- ta i lored  nhltimode c o n t r o l ,  
i 
I 3 .  Decoupled c o n t r o l ,  
I 4.  I n t e g r a t i o n  of f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
and a v i o n i c s ,  and 
system d u r i n g  f l i g h t  test. Software 
changes w e r e  made to  correct discrep- 
ancies and to  provide  improvements i n  
f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  opera- 
t i o n ,  and s t r u c t u r a l - l o a d - l i m i t  items. 
An e f f i c i e n t  sof tware  change p r o c e s s  w a s  
r e q u i r e d  to  provide  s a f e ,  t i m e l y  changes 
needed t o  meet f l i g h t  t es t  o b j e c t i v e s  . 
The s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  probabi l -  
i t y  of loss of c o n t r o l  f o r  t h e  AFTI F-16 
w a s  1 x per f l i g h t  hr .  This  spec- 
i f i c a t i o n  addressed o n l y  hardware 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  n o t  sof tware  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
and assumed accurate d e t e c t i o n  of f a i l -  
u r e s .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  no con- 
f i rmed f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer hardware 
f a i l u r e s  i n d i c a t e d  a n  e x c e l l e n t  reli- 
a b i l i t y  ra te  based on t h e  number of 
f l i g h t s  completed. 
Avionics and t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
system w e r e  i n t e g r a t e d  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .  
However, one f a i l u r e  occurred  t o  a cr i t -  
i c a l  nonredundant a v i o n i c s  system which 
a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  DFCS o p e r a t i o n  (see 
sec t ion  7.2). 
B u i l t - i n  t e s t  i s  a h i g h l y  automated 
t es t  sequence t h a t  e n s u r e s  t h e  d i g i t a l  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system is  f r e e  of hard- 
ware f a i l u r e s  prior to  t a k e o f f .  The BIT 
i s  run  pr ior  t o  each  f l i g h t  and t a k e s  
approximately 2.5 min. 
t h e  hardware were d e t e c t e d  by BIT d u r i n g  
p r e f l i g h t  t e s t i n g .  The f i rs t  w a s  a 
f a i l u r e  of a s u r f a c e  a c t u a t o r ,  and t h e  
second involved memory c h i p s  which 
d i d n ' t  meet t iming  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  a t  
c o o l e r  temperatures .  Nuisance f a i l u r e s  
of  BIT occurred  a number of  times. The 
cause  w a s  b e l i e v e d  to  be due t o  e l e c t r o -  
magnetic i n t e r f e r e n c e .  
Two f a i l u r e s  of 
F a u l t s  were d e t e c t e d  i n - f l i g h t  by 
comparing t h e  t h r e e  channels '  va lues  
f o r  t r a c k i n g  across t h e  d i f f e r e n t  chan- 
n e l s .  The o n l y  rea l  f a i l u r e  w a s  an i n -  
p u t  s i g n a l  which w a s  t r a c e d  to  a pushed- 
back p i n  i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  wiring. F i f -  
t e e n  f a l s e  f a i l u r e s  occurred  owing t o  
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des ign  d e f i c i e n c i e s  r a t h e r  than  a c t u a l  
hardware f a i l u r e s  ( t a b l e  22). The de- 
s i g n  d e f i c i e n c i e s  caused both temporary 
( r e s e t t a b l e )  and permanent loss of 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  redundancy. These des ign  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  coup l ing  
of unique computer skews wi th  character- 
i s t ics  of t h e  f l i g h t  environment, such 
as senso r  noise .  Undetected d u r i n g  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e s e  i n - f l i g h t  f a i l u r e s  
r e s u l t e d  i n  envelope and f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
mode l i m i t a t i o n s  u n t i l  t hey  were cor- 
rected by sof tware  changes. 
The asynchronous computer a r c h i t e c -  
t u r e  a f f e c t e d  a wide range of develop- 
mental  a c t i v i t i e s  i n c l u d i n g  des ign ,  
software-system q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and 
f l i g h t  tes t  ope ra t ions .  The DFCS qual-  
i f i c a t i o n  w a s  complicated by t h e  depen- 
dence of f a i l u r e  modes on computer skew. 
T e s t i n g  a t  predetermined wors t  case com- 
p u t e r  skew improved t e s t i n g  r e s u l t s ;  
however, some d e f i c i e n c i e s  s t i l l  escaped 
d e t e c t i o n .  Ground o p e r a t i o n s  d u r i n g  
a i r c r a f t  p r e f l i g h t  were a l s o  impacted by 
t h e  asynchronous computer a r c h i t e c t u r e .  
The most common problem w a s  DFCS f a i l -  
u r e ,  r e q u i r i n g  reset by the p i l o t  o r  
c y c l i n g  of a i r c r a f t  e lectr ical  power. 
The 13 f l i g h t  test  so f tware  re- 
leases, i n  which des ign ,  coding, and 
t es t  were performed a t  General Dynamics, 
F o r t  worth, suppor ted  t h e  needed changes 
of f l i g h t  test. The f i r s t  f o u r  releases 
provided  f u l l  envelope c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  AFTI v e h i c l e  i n  a l l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
modes. The remaining n ine  releases mod- 
i f i e d  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  t o  improve f l y i n g  
q u a l i t i e s  and provided c o r r e c t i o n s  to  
t h e  f a u l t - d e t e c t i o n  des ign  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
Although the IBU w a s  never engaged 
as a r e s u l t  of a d i g i t a l  system f a i l u r e ,  
f l i g h t  tes t  exper ience  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
I B U s  are needed. The complexity of the 
I B U  became a primary i s s u e ;  a simple I B U  
could  n o t  provide  p r o t e c t i o n  a t  envelope 
extremes which are p o s s i b l e  t o  reach  
w i t h  t h e  primary d i g i t a l  system. Fur- 
thermore, the r e l axed  s t a t i c  s t a b i l i t y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r e q u i r e s  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  
o f  augmentation. The s i m p l i f i e d  r eve r -  
s i o n  mode used on AFTI provided get-home 
c a p a b i l i t y  and l e v e l  t w o  f l y i n g  q u a l i -  
t i e s  f o r  l and ing  as s p e c i f i e d .  However, 
s i m u l a t i o n  and f l i g h t  test i n d i c a t e d  a 
more capable  I B U  is  needed t o  cover  
t r a n s i t i o n s  a t  t h e  envelope extremes 
p o s s i b l e  t o  r each  wi th  t h e  d i g i t a l  con- 
t r o l  system ( Ishmael  and o t h e r s ,  1984).  
The f l i g h t  test  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  con- 
t r o l  l a w s  and f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are sum- 
marized i n  t h e  fo l lowing  paragraphs  wi th  
a d d i t i o n a l  i n fo rma t ion  a v a i l a b l e  i n  Ford 
and o t h e r s  (1  984).  
A primary o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  AFTI F-16 
program w a s  the e v a l u a t i o n  of a mul t i -  
mode, t a s k - t a i l o r e d  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  system wi th  decoupled a i rc raf t  
control.  The s i x  d i f f e r e n t  decoupled 
o p t i o n s  and right-hand c o n t r o l  o p t i o n s  
w e r e  eva lua ted  with’ t h e  decoupled f ea -  
t u r e  b e s t  s u i t e d  f o r  a g iven  t a s k  be ing  
i d e n t i f i e d .  The t a s k - t a i l o r e d  approach 
provided  improved hand l ing  q u a l i t i e s  f o r  
t h e  t a sks  eva lua ted .  
The AFTI F-16 c o n t r o l  l a w s  t h a t  
showed t h e  most improvement r e l a t i v e  t o  
t h e  p roduc t ion  F-16 were a l l  p i t c h  rate 
command systems. I n  a l l  cases t h i s  
c o n t r o l  l a w  s t r u c t u r e  w a s  demonstrated 
t o  have good open-loop s t a b i l i t y  charac- 
ter is t ics ,  good dynamic response  charac- 
ter is t ics ,  and an a t t i t u d e  hold  f e a t u r e  
( au to - t r im)  t h a t  reduced p i l o t  workload. 
The a d a p t i v e  c o n t r o l  l a w ,  which used 
p i t c h  rate e r r o r  t o  op t imize  performance 
f o r  g r o s s  a c q u i s i t i o n  and f i n e  t r a c k i n g ,  
w a s  shown t o  be t h e  b e s t  o p t i o n  f o r  t h e  
a i r - t o - a i r  combat t a sk .  The a d a p t i v e  
g a i n  c o n t r o l  l a w  w a s  implemented u s i n g  
t h e  right-hand c o n t r o l l e r ;  decoupled 
p o i n t i n g  wi th  t h e  p e d a l s  and t w i s t  g r i p  
showed no s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement f o r  





























The b e s t  f e a t u r e s  f o r  t h e  air-to- 
ground t a s k  were improved f l i g h t  p a t h  
s t a b i l i t y  and r i d e  smoothness i n  tu r -  
bulence i n  t h e  p i t c h  a x i s .  Direct s ide -  
force o r  f l a t  t u r n ,  which is commanded 
through the rudder  peda ls ,  improved t h e  
t a s k  and reduced p i l o t  workload f o r  
o b t a i n i n g  la teral  a x i s  s o l u t i o n s .  
Problems wi th  r o l l  r a t c h e t i n g  
a f f e c t e d  a l l  t h e  modes excep t  s tand-  
a r d  normal. P r e f i l t e r  t un ing  w a s  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  r e s o l v e  completely t h e  
r a t c h e t i n g  problem. 
The s t anda rd  normal mode improved 
t h e  p i l o t ' s  workload f o r  t h e  p o w e r  
approach t a sk .  Using more of a p i t c h  
rate command system r a t h e r  than  t h e  
normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  command system on 
t h e  product ion  F-16s, improvements i n  
f l i g h t  p a t h  and angle-of-at tack s tabi l -  
i t y  were made. 
7.2 Faul t -Toleran t  Design 
The i n - f l i g h t ,  p r e f l i g h t  BIT ,  and ground 
test  anomalies  of t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
d e s i g n  are d i scussed  i n  this s e c t i o n .  
7 . 2.1 In -F l igh t  Experience 
The f l i g h t  t es t  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  aspects of the DFCS are 
summarized i n  table 22. The cause "sys- 
t e m  i n t e g r a t i o n "  i n d i c a t e s  that the 
f a i l u r e  w a s  caused by a des ign  o v e r s i g h t  
which was d iscovered  when s e p a r a t e l y  
des igned  systems were requ i r ed  t o  work 
toge the r .  For example, i n  most of t h e  
cases where t h e  correction w a s  t o  vo te  
so f tware  swi t ches ,  t h e  cause w a s  owing 
t o  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of asynchronous com- 
p u t e r s ,  c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  and the f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  design.  
The most c r i t i ca l  anomalies occurred  
on f l i g h t s  15 and 44 and are summarized 
below. The anomaly invo lv ing  a ro l l  
a x i s  sof tware  swi tch  is also d i s -  
cussed.  A des ign  o v e r s i t e  i n  t h e  
electrical system r e s u l t i n g  i n  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  o p e r a t i o n  on b a t t e r i e s  con- 
c l u d e s  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
7.2.1.1 Anomaly of f l i g h t  15. The 
s t o r e s  management system (SMS) sends  
p i l o t  r e q u e s t s  f o r  mode changes to  t h e  
DFCS v i a  t h e  a v i o n i c s  mul t ip l ex  bus 
( f i g .  13). A f a i l u r e  of t h e  SMS - it 
is  n o t  known whether i n  the hardware o r  
so f tware  - r e s u l t e d  i n  DFCS mode change 
r e q u e s t s  a t  50 times per sec. The DFCS 
responded a t  a rate of 5 mode changes 
per sec. The p i l o t  w a s  n o t  maneuvering 
a t  t h e  t i m e  of t h e  f a i l u r e .  
The r a p i d  mode changes w e r e  iden- 
t i f i e d  i n  t h e  ground c o n t r o l  room and 
t h e  SMS w a s  powered o f f  by t h e  p i l o t ,  
s topp ing  t h e  mode changes. The p i l o t  
commented t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  f e l t  l i k e  
i t  w a s  i n  rough a i r ,  owing to  t h e  d i f -  
f e r e n t  s u r f a c e  t r i m  p o s i t i o n s  co r re -  
sponding t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
modes. The f l i g h t  w a s  abo r t ed  and t h e  
a i r c r a f t  landed s a f e l y .  
Analys is  of t h e  anomaly w a s  con- 
duc ted  us ing  t h e  DFCS hardware i n  t h e  
loop  s imula t ion .  R e s u l t s  of t h e  i n -  
v e s t i g a t i o n  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  
p i l o t  had been manuvering, a com- 
plete  f a i l u r e  of t h e  DFCS to  t h e  
ana log  back-up would have occurred.  
Maneuvering would increase the d i f -  
ference between surface pos i t ions  for 
t h e  c o n t r o l  modes. The d i f f e r e n c e  
would be i n t e r p r e t e d  as a f a i l u r e .  
F l i g h t  t es t  cont inued a f te r  a 
software mod i f i ca t ion  w a s  made t o  
improve t h e  DFCS's  immunity to  t h i s  
f a i l u r e  mode. 
7.2.1.2 Anomaly of f l i g h t  44.  
P r i o r  t o  f l i g h t  44, t h r e e  occurrences  of 
f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  f o r  a s i n g l e  branch 
had occurred  ( f l i g h t s  23 and 28 of t a b l e  
22). Concerns t h a t  random computer skew 
between t h e  t h r e e  computers would l ead  
t o  mul t ip l e  channel  f a i l u r e s  had been 
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accepted  as an a l lowab le  r i s k .  On 
f l i g h t  44, a c o n t r o l  l a w  so f tware  
swi t ch ing  mechanization coupled wi th  
unique f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  produce a 
d ivergence  of o u t p u t  commands i n  t h e  
t h r e e  computer channels.  The d i v e r -  
gence r e s u l t e d  i n  what appeared t o  be 
d u a l ,  simultaneous computer f a i l u r e s .  
The f a i l u r e s  w e r e  caused by s l i g h t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  a i r  d a t a  va lves  i n  t h e  t h r e e  
channels  i n i t i a l i z i n g  i n t e g r a t o r s  w i th  
d i f f e r e n t  values.  This  caused o u t p u t  
command d ivergence  between channels.  
The f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  l o g i c  w a s  such t h a t  
each  channel of t h e  DFCS d e c l a r e d  t h e  
o t h e r  two channels as f a i l e d .  I n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  t h e  des ign  w a s  supposed t o  
r e s u l t  i n  t h e  ana log  back-up mode, how- 
e v e r  t h i s  d i d  n o t  occur.  Another des ign  
o v e r s i g h t  i n  t h e  redundancy management 
so f tware  k e p t  t h e  ana log  back-up from 
be ing  s e l e c t e d  au tomat i ca l ly .  Dual 
s imul taneous  f a i l u r e s  had been r u l e d  
o u t  as n o t  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  
d e s i g n  d i d  n o t  account  f o r  them. The 
system could  n o t  be reset by t h e  p i l o t ,  
even though no a c t u a l  hardware f a i l u r e  
had occurred. The a i r c r a f t  w a s  s a f e l y  
landed wi th  on ly  one of t h e  DFCS chan- 
n e l s  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
I ward i n t e g r a t o r  used f o r  s t e a d y  s t a t e  
7.2.1.3 Anomaly of the roll a x i s  
so€tware switch. Another example from 
f l i g h t  t e s t  i l l u s t r a t e s  how t h e  asyn- 
chronous system des ign  and t h e  l a c k  of 
modeling senso r  n o i s e  du r ing  t h e  test- 
i n g  phase can a f f e c t  f l i g h t  t e s t  opera- 
t i o n s .  A f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  i n  f l i g h t  
w a s  t r a c e d  t o  a so f tware  swi t ch  i n  t h e  
r o l l  a x i s  command path. The s o f t w a r e  
swi t ches  c o n t r o l l e d  the p a t h s  through 
t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s .  I f  a swi t ch  w a s  t o  
change c o n d i t i o n  i n  one channel  and n o t  
t h e  o t h e r s ,  an o u t p u t  miscompare would 
be d e t e c t e d  and pe rce ived  as a hardware 
f a i l u r e .  A schematic of t h e  so f tware  
swi t ch ,  a func t ion  of no te  N ,  is  shown 
i n  f i g u r e  45. The no te  N l o g i c  con- 
d i t i o n s  are f a i r l y  complex and are n o t  
shown. Note N l o g i c  c o n t r o l l e d  a f o r -  
decoupl ing  and w a s  based on t h e  s i z e  of 
r o l l  s t i c k  and rudder  p e d a l  commands. 
To c o r r e c t  t h e  problem, a so f tware  
change w a s  made. The so f tware  swi t ch  
a c t i o n  w a s  voted t o  ensu re  t h a t  a l l  
channe l s  had t h e  same swi t ch  p o s i t i o n  
and c o n t r o l  pa ths .  Extens ive  simula- 
t i o n  t e s t i n g  w a s  performed t o  show t h a t  
t h e  vo t ing  of t h e  swi t ch  k e p t  t h e  con- 
t r o l  p a t h s  t h e  same i n  a l l  channels.  
A l l  so f tware  coding and s imula t ion  
t e s t i n g  w a s  passed s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  i n d i -  
c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  vo t ing  of t h e  swi t ch  
a c t i o n  w a s  c o r r e c t .  
The f i r s t  f l i g h t  test  attempt t o  
repeat t h e  test  p o i n t ,  which had induced 
t h i s  f a i l u r e ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  ano the r  f a i l -  
u r e  i n d i c a t i o n .  Analys is  of t h e  repeat 
anomaly found t h a t  a l though t h e  swi t ch  
a c t i o n  w a s  voted, t h e  o l d ,  unvoted va lue  
w a s  s t i l l  be ing  used t o  c o n t r o l  switch 
p o s i t i o n .  An e r r o r  i n  t h e  so f tware  
coding had occurred  and passed  through 
t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
Th i s  w a s  t h e  on ly  case of a so f tware  
e r r o r  be ing  found i n  f l i g h t .  
When t h e  e x a c t  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  des ign  o v e r s i g h t  w e r e  
known, t h e  random n a t u r e  of asynchronous 
o p e r a t i o n ,  coupled wi th  l ack  of modeling 
f o r  s e n s o r  n o i s e ,  allowed t h e  error t o  
pass t e s t i n g  undetec ted .  Th i s  example 
g r a p h i c a l l y  shows why the f a i l u r e  i n d i -  
c a t i o n s  of t a b l e  22 occurred. I t  i s  
e a s y  t o  see why some des ign  e r r o r s  
passed  through t e s t i n g  and w e r e  on ly  
found d u r i n g  f l i g h t  test. P r i o r  t o  a 
f a i l u r e ,  t h e  exact f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  and 
a i r c r a f t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  which uncover a 
des ign  f l a w  are n o t  known. 
7.2.1.4 The electrical system anom- 
aly. This  i n - f l i g h t  anomaly g i v e s  an  
example of a des ign  o v e r s i g h t  which sur-  
f a c e d  i n  t h e  e lectr ical  system. The 
i n - f l i g h t  anomaly caused t h e  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  system t o  o p e r a t e  o f f  b a t t e r y  















system f a i l u r e  had occurred. The m i s -  
s i o n  w a s  abo r t ed  wi th  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
l a n d i n g  s a f e l y .  
A s  d i scussed  i n  s e c t i o n  4.1.6, t h e  
AFT1 e lectr ical  system inc luded  over- 
v o l t a g e  d e t e c t i o n  r e l a y s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system from ove rvo l t age  
f a i l u r e s  of t h e  emergency gene ra to r .  
F igu re  18 shows the electrical  system 
schematic.  The ove rvo l t age  d e t e c t o r s  
monitor bo th  e s s e n t i a l  dc  busses  and t h e  
o u t p u t  of t h e  emergency conve r t e r .  The 
emergency c o n v e r t e r  p rov ides  power t o  
t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system i n  case of 
power l o s s  from ( 1 )  the main gene ra to r ,  
( 2 )  t h e  emergency g e n e r a t o r ,  and ( 3 )  
b o t h  b a t t e r i e s .  The emergency conve r t e r  
d e r i v e s  i ts  p o w e r  from t h e  permanent 
magnet g e n e r a t o r  ( P M G ) ,  a p o r t i o n  of t h e  
emergency gene ra to r .  The PMG w i l l  pro- 
v i d e  a small amount of power f o r  c e r t a i n  
classes of emergency gene ra to r  f a i l u r e s .  
The PMG-emergency c o n v e r t e r  would on ly  
be needed i n  t h e  rare case when a l l  
o t h e r  power s o u r c e s  had f a i l e d .  
I n - f l i g h t  t h e  p i l o t  w a s  p r a c t i c i n g  
a s imula t ed  engine  flame-out maneuver 
which ca l l s  f o r  t u r n i n g  on t h e  emergency 
power u n i t  (EPU) tha t  d r i v e s  t h e  emer- 
gency g e n e r a t o r  and PMG ( f i g .  46) .  when 
t h e  EPU w a s  energ ized  wi th  t h e  h igh  
eng ine  r p m ,  t h e  energy su rge  caused t h e  
PMG v o l t a g e  through t h e  emergency con- 
v e r t e r  t o  peak a t  36 V. Prev ious  ground 
tes t  had been performed a t  lower engine  
rpm. The ove rvo l t age  d e t e c t o r s ,  set a t  
35 V, disconnected  the emergency con- 
v e r t e r  and t h e  e s s e n t i a l  dc  busses  from 
t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system. With t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  r e l a y s  open, t h e  unloaded 
PMG v o l t a g e  through t h e  emergency con- 
v e r t e r  went t o  40 V, keeping t h e  r e l a y s  
l a t ched .  The f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system w a s  
be ing  powered by t h e  a i r c ra f t  batteries. 
Ground tes t  wi th  engine rpm that  
matched t h e  f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n  confirmed 
t h e  cause of t h e  anomaly. The i n t e r a c -  
t i o n s  of t h e  EPU, emergency g e n e r a t o r ' s  
PMG, and t h e  ove rvo l t age  p r o t e c t i o n  
r e l a y s  caused primary e lectr ical  system 
d i sconnec t .  Although a l l  t h e  components 
w e r e  operating wi th in  t h e i r  specifica- 
t i o n s ,  it r e q u i r e d  the unique c o n d i t i o n  
of EPU.operation a t  h igh  engine  rpm t o  
r e v e a l  t h e  des ign  o v e r s i g h t .  
7.2.2 Ground Experience 
Problems encountered d u r i n g  ground 
o p e r a t i o n s  were a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  two 
separate o p e r a t i n g  modes. F i r s t  i s  
t h e  B I T  o p e r a t i o n ,  and second is  t h e  
memory mode ope ra t ion .  The B I T  and 
memory mode o p e r a t i o n s  are d e s c r i b e d  
i n  s e c t i o n  4.1.8, 
7.2.2.1 B u i l t - i n  tests .  The B I T  
o p e r a t i o n a l  expe r i ences  are summarized 
i n  tables 23, 24, and 25. 
The B I T  d e t e c t e d  f o u r  a c t u a l  hardware 
f a u l t s  - two where s o l i d - s t a t e  compon- 
e n t s ,  one a r e l a y ,  and one a c t u a t o r  
f a i l u r e .  The most e l u s i v e  f a i l u r e  w a s  
t h e  s o l i d - s t a t e  random-access memory 
(RAM), which f a i l e d  a t  tempera tures  be- 
low 40'F. Once the problem w a s  i d e n t i -  
f i e d ,  a l l  memory c h i p s  were sc reened  and 
s e v e r a l  rep laced .  
One so f tware  error w a s  d e t e c t e d  by 
BIT.  The e r r o r  w a s  i n  the B I T  so f tware  
i t s e l f .  The B I T  would n o t  pass on t h e  
a i r c r a f t  and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  so f tware  
release w a s  never flown. The error w a s  
t h e  r e s u l t  of simple o v e r s i g h t .  An 
improvement of B I T  t o  t es t  f o r  p a r i t y  
e r r o r s  as a f i n a l  check d e t e c t e d  t h e  
p a r i t y  e r r o r  i t  had purpose ly  set i n  a 
p rev ious  test. 
Numerous b i t  f a i l u r e s  occurred  f o r  
which t h e  reason  w a s  never r e so lved  
( tab le  24) .  The m a j o r i t y  of the 
f a i l u r e s  were be l i eved  due t o  EMIC, 
however this w a s  never confirmed. 
The BIT  f a i l u r e s  owing t o  system 
i n t e g r a t i o n  w e L e  the  most i n t e r e s t i n g  
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( t a b l e  25).  I n  t h e s e  cases a l a c k  of 
unders tanding  of t h e  system o p e r a t i o n ,  
a t  t i m e s  combined wi th  i n c o r r e c t  proce- 
d u r e s ,  induced BIT  f a i l u r e s .  
I t e m  number 2 ( t a b l e  25) p rov ides  a 
good example of how t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
systems caused problems wi th  BIT. I n  
t h i s  case BIT  f a i l e d  a test  of t h e  av i -  
o n i c s  mul t ip l ex  bus,  and the communica- 
t i o n  from t h e  multipurpose d i s p l a y s  t o  
t h e  DFCS w a s  l o s t .  This  caused a lockup 
of  t h e  system which r e q u i r e d  c y c l i n g  of 
DFCS power t o  c o r r e c t .  The problem w a s  
caused by one s i d e  of the d u a l  SMS f a i l -  
i n g  to  pass in fo rma t ion  between t h e  DFCS 
and t h e  MPDs. The BIT d e s i g n  d i d  n o t  
allow f o r  swi t ch ing  t o  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  
of  t h e  communication bus f o r  t h i s  f a i l -  
u r e  as t h e  i n - f l i g h t  so f tware  does. 
It  can  be seen  by comparing t h e  num- 
ber of a c t u a l  f a u l t s  detected, f i v e ,  t o  
the  number of nonrepea tab le  and system 
i n t e g r a t i o n  f a u l t s  t h a t  EMI, system 
complexity,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  l a c k  of 
d e t a i l e d  i n s i g h t  caused as many prob- 
lems as the hardware i t s e l f .  
7.2.2.2 Memory Mode. The memory 
mode o p t i o n  w a s  an e x c e l l e n t  test  t o o l  
f o r  de te rmining  DFCS state. It  w a s  ve ry  
v a l u a b l e  when t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g  system 
f a i l u r e s .  when i n  memory mode, on ly  
a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  ground, a l l  normal 
DFCS f l i g h t  computations are h a l t e d .  
Two unique anomalies occurred  wi th  
memory mode o p e r a t i o n s  ( t a b l e  26) .  Both 
cases are examples of system i n t e g r a t i o n  
problems. The f i r s t  was a f a i l u r e  of a 
DFCS channel when e n t e r i n g  memory mode 
wi th  rudder  p e d a l  i n p u t .  
d u r i n g  t a x i  when t h e  p i l o t  w a s  u s i n g  the 
rudder  peda l s  f o r  nose wheel s t e e r i n g .  
The asynchronous o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  com- 
p u t e r s  r e s u l t e d  i n  e n t e r i n g  and e x i t i n g  
t h e  memory mode a t  d i f f e r e n t  times i n  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  computers. With dynamic 
p i l o t  i n p u t s ,  memory mode s e l e c t i o n  
would cause  DFCS channels  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h e y  had f a i l e d .  
It  occurred  
The second memory mode anomaly 
occurred  when t h e  engine  w a s  s t a r t e d  
wi th  t h e  c o n t r o l  system i n  t h e  memory 
mode, which does n o t  have t h e  power-up 
and restart r o u t i n e  of the i n - f l i g h t  
sof tware .  The p o w e r  t r a n s f e r  , caused 
by t h e  a i r c r a f t  gene ra to r  coming on a t  
eng ine  s t a r t ,  f a i l e d  t h e  DFCS computers. 
Unfo r tuna te ly  t h e  f a i l u r e  mode r e s u l t e d  
i n  a canard hardover,  damaging t h e  nose  
g e a r  door. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The c r i t i c a l i t y  and number of anoma- 
l ies  d i scove red  i n  f l i g h t  and ground 
tests owing t o  des ign  o v e r s i g h t s  are more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  than  those  anomalies caused 
by ac tua l  hardware f a i l u r e s  o r  so f tware  
e r r o r s .  The two des ign  o v e r s i g h t s  d i s -  
cussed  above, and i d e n t i f i e d  as be ing  
caused by a l a c k  of unders tanding  of t h e  
s y s t e m  or a s y s t e m  i n t e g r a t i o n  problem, 
can  on ly  be avoided i n  the  system q u a l i -  
f i c a t i o n  and des ign  l i f e  c y c l e  phases. 
Although t h e  f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  
were of computer hardware, t e s t i n g  of 
t h e  hardware a l o n e  w i l l  n o t  f i n d  the 
e r r o r  because the  f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  i s  
d e c l a r e d  by the sof tware .  T e s t i n g  of 
t h e  so f tware  a l o n e  would n o t  d e t e c t  t h e  
e r r o r  because t h e  s o f t w a r e  w a s  imple- 
mented c o r r e c t l y ,  per i t s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
Only d u r i n g  system q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
when t h e  hardware and so f tware  system 
are o p e r a t i n g  i n  an  environment which i s  
n e a r l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  environ- 
ment can des ign  f l aws  such as t h e s e  be 
found and c o r r e c t e d .  
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of such a complex sys- 
t e m  as t h i s ,  t o  some g iven  l e v e l  of re- 
l i a b i l i t y ,  is  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t w o  reasons .  
F i r s t ,  there is no e s t a b l i s h e d  method of 
i d e n t i f i n g  system l e v e l  requi rements  and 
r e l a t i n g  them t o  t h e  needed system l e v e l  
t e s t i n g .  Secondly, as d i s c u s s e d  i n  sec- 
t i o n  5.3.3.4 on system q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  
t h e  number of tes t  c o n d i t i o n s  becomes so 
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large t h a t  convent iona l  t e s t i n g  meth d s  
would r e q u i r e  a decade f o r  completion. 
The f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign  can a l s o  
a f f e c t  o v e r a l l  system r e l i a b i l i t y  by 
be ing  made t o o  complex and by adding 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which are random i n  
n a t u r e ,  c r e a t i n g  an u n t e s t a b l e  design.  
As t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  requirements  of 
a v i o n i c s  systems i n c r e a s e ,  complexity 
i n c r e a s e s .  Reducing complexi ty  appears  
t o  be more of an a r t  than  a s c i e n c e  and 
r e q u i r e s  an exper ience  base n o t  y e t  
a v a i l a b l e .  I f  t h e  complexity i s  
requ i r ed ,  a method to  make system 
d e s i g n s  more unders tandable ,  more 
v i s i b l e ,  i s  needed. 
The asynchronous des ign  of t h e  tri- 
p l e x  DFCS in t roduced  a random, unpre- 
d i c t a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i n t o  t h e  system. 
The system became u n t e s t a b l e  i n  t h a t  
t e s t i n g  f o r  each of t h e  p o s s i b l e  t i m e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  computers w a s  
impossible .  This  random t i m e  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  w a s  a major c o n t r i b u t o r  to  t h e  
f l i g h t  t es t  anomalies.  Adversely 
a f f e c t i n g  t e s t a b i l i t y  and having only  
p o s t u l a t e d  b e n e f i t s ,  asynchronous opera- 
t i o n  of the DFCS demonstrated t h e  need 
t o  avoid  random, unpred ic t ab le ,  and 
uncompensated des ign  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
7.3 Control Laws 
As desc r ibed  p rev ious ly ,  t h e  task-  
t a i l o r e d  c o n t r o l  mode o p t i o n s  p rov ide  
a uniquely  tuned c o n t r o l  l a w  f o r  a g iven  
task. Designing t h e  c o n t r o l  mode f o r  a 
s p e c i f i c  t a s k  i n s t e a d  of one g e n e r a l  
c o n t r o l  mode f o r  a l l  tasks improved t h e  
a i r c r a f t ' s  performance. The fo l lowing  
d i s c u s s i o n s  w i l l  add res s  t h e  most 
i n t e r e s t i n g  anomaly invo lv ing  t h e  
c o n t r o l  l a w s .  
The yaw depa r tu re  on f l i g h t  36 w a s  
t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r o l  l a w  anom- 
a l y .  A review w i l l  p rovide  i n s i g h t  i n t o  
i t s  cause.  The yaw d e p a r t u r e  occurred  
i n  t h e  SNRM mode dur ing  a maximum rud- 
de  step and hold  inpu t .  M i  s i o n  r u l e s  
l i m i t e d  t h e  maximum s i d e s l i p  to  10'. 
P r a c t i c i n g  t h i s  s i d e s l i p  maneuver on 
t h e  s imula t ion  showed t h a t  t he  10' 
l i m i t  would n o t  be exceeded. 
I n  f l i g h t  tes t ,  t h e  maneuver r e s u l t e d  
i n  a temporary s i d e s l i p  excur s ion  t o  
14'; from t h e r e  a r a p i d  d e p a r t u r e  from 
c o n t r o l l e d  f l i g h t  occurred.  The air- 
c r a f t  d e p a r t u r e  w a s  of a s h o r t  d u r a t i o n ,  
approximately 3 sec, b u t  r e s u l t e d  i n  
some extreme c o n d i t i o n s  and f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n s .  
During t h e  d e p a r t u r e  t h e  s i d e s l i p  
exceeded 20' and normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  
exceeded -4 g,  then +7 g ( f i g .  47) .  
The a i r c r a f t  r o l l e d  360°, a n g l e  of 
a t t a c k  went t o  -10' then t o  +20°,  and 
a l l  c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e s  were o p e r a t i n g  a t  
rate l i m i t s .  The d e p a r t u r e  w a s  q u i t e  
s e v e r e  aerodynamical ly ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  
v e r t i c a l  t a i l  exceeding i t s  des ign  load  
l i m i t s .  F l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  
i n d i c a t i o n s  inc luded  h y d r a u l i c  system 
f a i l u r e  f o r  bo th  canard a c t u a t o r s  and 
a n  a i r  d a t a  f a i l u r e .  The f a i l u r e s  were 
t r a n s i e n t  and were reset a f t e r  c o n t r o l  
w a s  rega ined  by t h e  p i l o t .  
A f t e r  ana lyz ing  t h e  problem wi th  t h e  
s imula t ion ,  t h e  fo l lowing  reason  f o r  t h e  
d e p a r t u r e  and i t s  subsequent  f a i l u r e  
i n d i c a t i o n s  w a s  found. The aerodynamic 
model used t o  deve lop  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  
and used i n  the r e a l - t i m e  s i m u l a t o r  w a s  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of t h e  
d iscrepancy .  The la teral  d i r e c t i o n a l  
d e r i v a t i v e s  were a f u n c t i o n  of s i d e s l i p ,  
b u t  on ly  modeled to  lt10'. Secondly,  t h e  
n o n l i n e a r  n a t u r e  of t h e  d e r i v a t i v e s  as 
a f u n c t i o n  of s idesl ip  w a s  n o t  modeled. 
The wind t u n n e l  d a t a  were modeled as 
a s t r a i g h t - l i n e  f u n c t i o n ,  g i v i n g  t h e  
s i m u l a t i o n  more r e s t o r i n g  f o r c e  than  
t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
The problem w a s  c o r r e c t e d  by remov- 
i n g  t h e  canards  from t h e  command p a t h  so 
t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  could n o t  o b t a i n  10' 
41 
of  s i d e s l i p .  The h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  s t r u c -  
t u r e  w a s  examined and found t o  be undam- 
aged, and a s t r u c t u r a l  mod i f i ca t ion  w a s  
made t o  t h e  v e r t i c a l  t a i l  t o  i n c r e a s e  
i t s  load  l i m i t  f o r  f u t u r e  f l i g h t s .  
The h y d r a u l i c  v o t e  i n  t h e  canard 
a c t u a t o r s  w a s  owing t o  a d rop  i n  hydrau- 
l i c  p r e s s u r e  as a r e s u l t  of a l l  c o n t r o l  
s u r f a c e s  be ing  a t  t h e  command rate l i m -  
i t s .  The a i r  d a t a  f a i l u r e ,  a l though 
appear ing  t o  be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  proved 
t o  be q u i t e  i n t e r e s t i n g .  The a i r  d a t a  
f a i l u r e  w a s  a t r a n s i e n t  f a i l u r e  caused 
by t h e  side-mounted probe which w a s  
blanked by t h e  f u s e l a g e  a t  t h e  high- 
s i d e s l i p  angles .  A d e t a i l e d  review of 
t h e  t h r e e  computers'  s u r f a c e  commands 
showed a mis t r ack ing  d u r i n g  t h i s  f a i l -  
ure .  Analysis showed t h e  S / M  t echnique  
passed  t h e  s i d e  probes e r r o r  through 
u n t i l  t h e  f a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d  w a s  reached 
( f i g .  4 8 ) .  The a i r  data in fo rma t ion  i s  
used t o  determine f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  l a w  
g a i n s  asynchronously a t  4 t i m e s  per sec. 
The a i r  d a t a  f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t ,  shown i n  
f i g u r e  49, caused changes t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  
l a w  g a i n s ,  g i v i n g  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  s u r -  
f ace commands i n  t h e  t h r e e  channels.  
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  a t  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n  
of  t h e  d e p a r t u r e ,  t h e  g a i n  changes d i d  
n o t  produce d i f f e r e n c e s  which would 
cause  f a i l u r e  d e c l a r a t i o n s  of t h e  com- 
puters.  For several areas of t h e  f l i g h t  
envelope, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  h igh  ang le s  of 
a t t a c k ,  t h i s  s i n g l e  a i r  d a t a  f a i l u r e  
would r e s u l t  i n  f a i l u r e  of t h e  DFCS 
t o  t h e  ana log  backup. This  i n c r e a s e d  
r i s k  w a s  accepted  u n t i l  t h e  so f tware  
w a s  modified. 
S e v e r a l  p o i n t s  should be noted from 
t h i s  f l i g h t  i n c i d e n t :  
1 .  Any s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  model- 
i n g  of t h e  aerodynamics must ensu re  t h a t  
i t  i s  conse rva t ive  wi th  respect t o  i t s  
e f f e c t s  on t h e  a i r c r a f t  as a whole. 
2. The a i r c r a f t  must be cons idered  
a system c o n s i s t i n g  of h igh ly  r e l a t e d  
d i s c i p l i n e s  and func t ions .  The c o n t r o l  
l a w  des ign  e r r o r  caused by t h e  modeling 
e r r o r  r evea led  des ign  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  hy- 
d r a u l i c  system and DFCS f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  
l o g i c .  The a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  became 
involved  due t o  c o n t r o l  l a w  des ign  e r r o r .  
3 .  To thoroughly q u a l i f y  an a i r c r a f t  
w i th  t h e s e  types  of systems, one must 
A. model d i s s i m i l a r  s e n s o r s  com- 
p l e t e l y ,  i n c l u d i n g  s i d e s l i p  e f f e c t s ;  
B. tes t  wi th  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i n  t h e  
loop  wi th  t h e  s imula t ion ,  t he reby  in -  
c l u d i n g  t h e  a c t u a t i o n  system; 
C. tes t  f a i l u r e  modes o t h e r  t han  
hardover f a i l u r e s ;  and 
D. have a complete under- 
s t a n d i n g  of t h e  DFCS des ign  and 
i t s  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
7.4 Hardware 
The DFCS hardware i n c l u d e s  t h e  F-16 
b a s e l i n e  s e n s o r s  and c o n t r o l l e r s  and 
t h e  AFT1 f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computers and 
a c t u a t o r  i n t e r f a c e  u n i t .  Based on 
r e p e a t a b l e ,  i s o l a t e d  f a i l u r e s ,  t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  hardware w a s  exce l -  
l e n t .  In t h e  175 h r  of i n - f l i g h t  t e s t ,  
a n  e lec t r ica l  connec tor  w a s  t h e  on ly  
hardware f a i l u r e .  In  t h e  6200 h r  of 
ground t i m e ,  i n c l u d i n g  t i m e  p r i o r  t o  
f l i g h t  t e s t ,  on ly  t h r e e  f a i l u r e s  were 
documented i n  t h e  computers. To d e t e r -  
mine computer r e l i a b i l i t y ,  t h e  t i m e  mus t  
be m u l t i p l i e d  by t h r e e ,  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  
computers used i n  t h e  system. This  
g i v e s  a 6200-hr mean-time-between f a i l -  
u r e s  compared t o  a p r e d i c t e d  1200 h r .  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  problem t o  
a d d r e s s  l i e s  i n  t h e  number of nonre- 
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p e a t a b l e  f a i l u r e s  and f a i l u r e  ind ica -  
t i o n s  l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  22 and d i scussed  
i n  s e c t i o n  7.2. Depending on one ' s  
o p e r a t i n g  r u l e s ,  these f a i l u r e s  can 
r e s u l t  i n  cons ide rab le  equipment changes 
and loss of a i r c r a f t  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  
7.5 Software 
The use  of a DFCS enab le s  changes t o  t h e  
sys tems '  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  such as f l y i n g  
q u a l i t i e s ,  by reprogramming t h e  s o f t -  
ware. E f f i c i e n t  and s a f e  f l i g h t  t e s t  
r e q u i r e s  a thorough method f o r  eva l -  
u a t i n g ,  implementing, and t e s t i n g  
s o f t w a r e  .changes. 
I n  t h e  1 y r  of f l i g h t  t e s t i n g ,  129 
so f tware  changes w e r e  made i n  13 sepa- 
rate releases ( f ig .  50). A so f tware  
release is  a package of changes pro- 
v ided  i n  one update. 
The p rocess  of changing t h e  so f tware  
i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  s e c t i o n  6. The m a j o r i t y  
o f  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n ,  implementation, and 
t e s t i n g  occurred  a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  
f a c i l i t y .  The J o i n t  T e s t  Force, cons is -  
t i n g  of t h e  A i r  Force F l i g h t  T e s t  Center  
and NASA, p layed  two major r o l e s  i n  t h e  
s o f t w a r e  process .  F i r s t ,  it i d e n t i f i e d  
changes t h a t  were needed and t h e i r  t i m -  
i n g  f o r  release, and second it provided 
a n  independent a u d i t  of t h e  changes. 
The a u d i t  inc luded  independent va l ida-  
t i o n  t e s t i n g  a t  the c o n t r a c t o r ' s  facil-  
i t y  and review of suppor t ing  so f tware  
p roduc t s ,  s u c h  as the  documentation. 
Three e r r o r s  w e r e  found i n  the  
s o f t w a r e  releases a f t e r  t hey  had been 
approved f o r  f l i g h t  test. All r e s u l t e d  
from changes, and none w e r e  l a t e n t  er- 
r o r s  which e x i s t e d  f o r  s e v e r a l  releases. 
Two of t h e  e r r o r s  w e r e  found i n  ground 
p r e f l i g h t  tests, and one w a s  d e t e c t e d  
d u r i n g  f l i g h t .  
A so f tware  e r r o r  i s  de f ined  as t h e  
software n o t  o p e r a t i n g  i n  accordance 
w i t h  i t s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
The f i r s t  e r r o r  i n  t h e  so f tware  re- 
s u l t e d  from a change to  t h e  B I T  s o f t -  
ware. The change w a s  t o  cause  B I T  t o  
f a i l  i f  it d e t e c t e d  a p a r i t y  error i n  
t h e  hardware. One f u n c t i o n  of B I T  w a s  
t o  read  a memory l o c a t i o n  wi th  known 
bad p a r i t y  and t o  check f o r  p a r i t y  e r r o r  
d e t e c t i o n  by the hardware. The so f tware  
used t o  d e t e c t  u n i n t e n t i o n a l  p a r i t y  
e r r o r s  also d e t e c t e d  t h e  pu rpose fu l  one,  
caus ing  the B I T  t o  f a i l  e r roneous ly .  
The second so f tware  error involved  
t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t  f o r  t h e  v e r t i c a l  
t a i l .  The s t r u c t u r a l  load  w a s  l i m i t e d  
by r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  rudder  command as a 
f u n c t i o n  of impact p r e s s u r e  and f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  mode ( f i g .  51) .  During f l i g h t  
tes t ,  it w a s  found t h a t  t h e  v e r t i c a l  
t a i l  l o a d s  were exceeding t h o s e  d e s i r e d  
w i t h  t h e  rudder  l i m i t  implemented. Sev- 
e ra l  o p t i o n s  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  problem w e r e  
engineered  and eva lua ted  wi th  t h e  
hardware-in-the-loop s imula t ion .  The 
b e s t  o p t i o n  w a s  i d e n t i f i e d  and inc luded  
i n  t h e  n e x t  f l i g h t  release. Unfortu- 
n a t e l y ,  one of t h e  o t h e r  o p t i o n s  be ing  
eva lua ted  w a s  a c c i d e n t a l l y  l e f t  i n  t h e  
sof tware .  The error w a s  found d u r i n g  
ground t e s t i n g  which checked t h e  i n s t a l -  
l a t i o n  of t h e  new so f tware  i n t o  t h e  air-  
c r a f t .  T e s t s  showed t h a t  t h e  rudde r  w a s  
be ing  l i m i t e d  to  smaller d e f l e c t i o n s  
than  those  expected. The so f tware  error 
gave a c o n s e r v a t i v e  l i m i t  f o r  v e r t i c a l  
t a i l  l oads ,  b u t  r e s u l t e d  i n  unnecessary  
o p e r a t i o n a l  l i m i t s .  A d e c i s i o n  w a s  made 
to use  the so f tware  release u n t i l  i t  
cou ld  be c o r r e c t e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  update.  
The l a s t  so f tware  e r r o r  w a s  d i s -  
cussed  i n  s e c t i o n  7.2. I t  involved  a 
change to  t h e  so f tware ,  v o t i n g  a s o f t -  
ware swi t ch ,  caus ing  a l l  t h r e e  computers 
s imul t aneous ly  t o  use  the same c o n t r o l  
l a w  pa ths .  Although e x t e n s i v e l y  t e s t e d  
p r i o r  to  f l i g h t  with software u n i t  tests 
and hardware-in-the-loop tests, t h e  
anomaly w a s  n o t  d e t e c t e d  u n t i l  f l i g h t  
t es t .  The so f tware  error w a s  one of 
c o r r e c t l y  v o t i n g  t h e  t h r e e  computers'  
43 
de te rmina t ion  t o  togg le  a so f tware  
swi t ch ,  b u t  then  n o t  u s i n g  t h a t  voted 
va lue  f o r  t h e  a c t u a l  swi t ch ing  a c t i o n .  
The p rev ious  method w a s  s t i l l  i n  e f f e c t ,  
t h a t  i s ,  each computer channel d e t e r -  
mined i t s  own swi tch ing .  F l i g h t  tests 
under t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  would a l low 
t h i s  e r r o r  to  occur ,  which w e r e  a func- 
t i o n  of c o n t r o l  mode, w e r e  p r o h i b i t e d  
u n t i l  t h e  nex t  so f tware  release. 
8 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Each of the f o u r  l i f e - c y c l e  phases  
are p u l l e d  t o g e t h e r  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  to  
examine how they  a f f e c t  one ano the r .  
The approach i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  
f i r s t  g i v e  a d e t a i l e d  case s tudy ,  then  
t o  summarize each of t h e  development 
phases.  Emphasis w i l l  be on how t h e  
f l i g h t  tes t  phase was affected by the 
p rev ious  t h r e e  phases  - s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  
des ign ,  and test. Comments are a l s o  
g iven  which on ly  r e f e r  t o  a s i n g l e  l i f e -  
c y c l e  phase, such as recommendations 
t h a t  would provide  f o r  a more e f f i c i e n t  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  A f t e r  completing the 
case s tudy ,  a review of t h e  p rev ious  
t h r e e  development phases  g i v e s  t h r e e  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  on h o w  anomalies can be 
avoided and how t o  maximize t h e  bene- 
f i t s  of f l i g h t  t e s t i n g .  Looking a t  
system-sof tware q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  w e  see 
t h a t  more complete and e f f i c i e n t  test- 
i n g  i s  needed. Looking a t  des ign ,  w e  
see that o p e r a t i o n a l  b e n e f i t s  can be 
achieved  by improving system a r c h i t e c -  
t u r e .  F i n a l l y ,  when c o n s i d e r i n g  the 
system s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  we see t h a t  i f  
s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l  e x i s t s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
e x a c t l y  what is d e s i r e d ,  then  a cor- 
rect d e s i g n  i s  more l i k e l y .  The case 
s t u d y  from f l i g h t  tes t  w i l l  h e l p  t o  
c l a r i f y  each of these concepts.  Fol- 
lowing t h e  case s tudy ,  recommendations 
f o r  each l i f e  c y c l e  are summarized. 
8.1 Anomaly of F l i g h t  44, A C a s e  Study 
The anomaly of f l i g h t  44, d i s c u s s e d  i n  
s e c t i o n  7,  p rov ides  a good example t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  how a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  pre- 
v ious  l i f e - c y c l e  phases  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  
a f l i g h t - t e s t  anomaly. The anomaly w a s  
owing t o  a des ign  o v e r s i g h t  and r e q u i r e d  
s e v e r a l  unique c o n d i t i o n s ,  which are 
o u t l i n e d  as fo l lows  ( f i g .  5 2 ) :  
1 .  Standard  combat o r  a decoupled 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  mode had t o  be a c t i v e .  
2. The p i l o t  had to  have f u l l  rud- 
d e r  peda l s ,  f l y i n g  a t  170 k n o t s  cali-  
b r a t e d  airspeed (KCAS).  
3 .  Sensor n o i s e  coupled wi th  com- 
p u t e r  skew had t o  g ive  a 3-knot d i f -  
f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  impact pressure va lues  
i n  t h e  t h r e e  computer channels.  
I n  the f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  modes i d e n t i -  
f i e d ,  a rudder  f a d e r ,  s chedu le  D 6 9 ,  
removes p i l o t  commands below 170 KCAS, 
f o r  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  reasons.  The d i f -  
f e r e n c e  i n  the pe rce ived  airspeed f o r  
the  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  channe l s  allowed 
d i f f e r e n t  amounts of t h e  fu l l - rudde r -  
pedal commands t o  pass through schedu le  
D 6 9 .  The t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  pedal commands 
i n i t i a l i z e d  each c h a n n e l ' s  i n t e g r a t o r ,  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  a d ive rgence  of t h e  o u t p u t  
commands t o  t h e  canard  s u r f a c e s .  Each 
of t h e  t h r e e  computer channe l s  d e c l a r e d  
t h e  o t h e r  two as f a i l e d .  The a i r c r a f t  
w a s  landed e f f e c t i v e l y  wi th  a s i n g l e  
s t r i n g  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system. 
8 . 1 . 1 S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
C l e a r l y ,  it is  n o t  d e s i r a b l e  t o  
have a system d e s i g n  t h a t  can  cause  
loss of system redundancy when no 
f a i l u r e  e x i s t s .  However, t h e r e  i s  
no th ing  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  which 
addresses i n c o r r e c t  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n .  
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R e l i a b i l i t y  requirements  simply addres s  
component f a i l u r e s .  Once you s p e c i f y  
t h a t  i n c o r r e c t  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  is  n o t  
acceptable, cr i ter ia  are needed t o  en- 
s u r e  it. This  has  been a matter of 
eng inee r ing  judgment t o  da t e .  
Recommenda ti on 
I n c o r r e c t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  l o s s  of system redun- 
dancy, is  unacceptable .  The cri teria 
f o r  ensu r ing  proper  o p e r a t i o n  should 
b e  t o  tes t  voted-compared va lues  wi th  
i n p u t s  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p h y s i c a l  
l i m i t s  of t h e  device-system i n  ques t ion .  
The p h y s i c a l  l i m i t s  t o  cons ide r  i nc lude  
rate of change, minimum and maximum 
va lues ,  maximum frequency response,  
and no i se ,  as examples. 
8.1.2 Design 
The des ign  change needed t o  avoid 
t h i s  anomaly is one ensu r ing  t h a t  t h e  
same va lue  of a senso r  is used i n  a l l  
redundant  channels .  Simultaneous sen- 
sor sampling and proper senso r  selec- 
t i o n  r o u t i n e s  would ensu re  congruent  
sensor va lues .  
Recommenda t i o n  
Redundant system des igns  which use  
v o t i n g  and cross-channel  comparisons t o  
d e t e c t  f a u l t s  must o p e r a t e  on congruent  
i n p u t  data sets to avoid  incorrect 
f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n .  
8 . 1 . 3 Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
For t h e  system-software q u a l i f i -  
c a t i o n  a c t i v i t y ,  s e v e r a l  gene ra l i zed  
techniques  should be used t o  d e t e c t  t h e  
anomaly of f l i g h t  44 prior to f l i g h t  
test .  Tes t ing  t h e  c o n t r o l  mode con- 
d i t i o n  for  t h e  anomaly is  e a s i l y  done, 
i n  fact  t h e s e  c o n t r o l  modes were t e s t e d  
for  months us ing  t h e  ho t  bench simula- 
t i o n .  The rudder  f a d e r ,  l i kewise ,  w a s  
tested numerous t i m e s .  
However, t h e  amount of impact pres- 
s u r e  error i n  the d i f f e r e n t  channels  w a s  
never  enough to  cause  t h e  problem t o  
appear dur ing  ground t e s t i n g .  Sensor  
n o i s e  and computer skew w e r e  two param- 
eters which w e r e  n o t  c o n t r o l l e d ,  nor  
were t h e  e x a c t  t r i p l e x  va lues  known 
dur ing  t h e  ground t e s t i n g .  
Recommendations 
1 .  F a u l t - t o l e r a n t  system des ign  
must be eva lua ted  f o r  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
senso r  noise .  
2. A computerized d e s c r i p t i o n  of 
t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system i s  needed to  . 
i d e n t i f y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o n t r o l  modes, and 
f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  doing s e n s o r  n o i s e  
s e n s i t i v i t y  tests. The computerized 
system d e s c r i p t i o n  would accept u s e r  
i n p u t s ,  such as f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  and 
c o n t r o l  modes, and r e t u r n  a c t i v e  com- 
mand p a t h s  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  s enso r  sen- 
s i t i v i t y  tests. 
3.  Random unmeasured system param- 
eters such as computer skew must be 
l i m i t e d .  I f  t hey  c a n ' t  be l i m i t e d ,  
a d d i t i o n a l  t e s t i n g  is  needed to  g e t  a 
s ta t i s t ica l  base f o r  p r e d i c t i n g  i t s  
e f f e c t  on system ope ra t ions .  
8.2 Observa t ions  and Recommendations by 
Development Phase 
To minimize t h e  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n s  
needed t o  review eve ry  f l i g h t  anomaly 
and t h e  a n a l y s i s  used to  a r r i v e  a t  each 
recommendation, we w i l l  b r i e f l y  describe 
t h e  obse rva t ions  and recommendations as 
they  apply  t o  each development phase.  
8.2.1. S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
The pr imary obse rva t ion  concern- 
i n g  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i s  t h e  l a c k  of 
d e t a i l e d  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  
and f a u l t  t o l e rance .  "he m a j o r i t y  of 
t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  is  concerned wi th  
s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t r o l  requi rements  f o r  
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convent iona l ,  nondecoupled c o n t r o l  
system des igns .  
Recommendations 
1 .  In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  l o s s  of con- 
t r o l  and a b o r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  f a i l u r e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  should be g iven  f o r  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  mission phases  and t h e  func- 
t i o n s  performed by t h e  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
system. By s p e c i f y i n g  a b o r t  p robab i l -  
i t i e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  miss ions ,  such as 
a i r - t o - a i r  i n t e r c e p t  and a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  
bombing, t h e  d e s i g n e r  can avoid  e i t h e r  
over- o r  underdesigning t h e  system. The 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of f u n c t i o n s ,  such as p i l o t  
d i s p l a y s  and c o n t r o l s ,  should l i k e w i s e  
be g iven  r e l i a b i l i t y  va lues .  
2. R e l i a b i l i t y  requi rements  need t o  
a d d r e s s  t h e  so f tware  by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  
t e s t i n g  methods and t o o l s  t o  be used and 
by c l e a r l y  s t a t i n g  t h e  requi rements  of 
any  independent  backup, whether hardware 
o r  so f tware  i n  na tu re .  The key t o  s o f t -  
w a r e  r e l i a b i l i t y  is n o t  found i n  a f a i l -  
u r e  rate, b u t  i n  t h e  examination of t h e  
method and t o o l s  used t o  ensu re  p rope r  
f u n c t i o n a l i t y .  The s o f t w a r e ' s  l i f e  
c y c l e  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  des ign ,  and tes t  
must be s p e c i f i e d  so t h a t  t e s t i n g  i s  
traceable t o  t h e  requi rements ,  and 
p rope r  f u n c t i o n a l i t y  i s  shown. The ap- 
pendix  p rov ides  some de ta i led  t e s t i n g  
examples f o r  c o n t r o l  l a w  f u n c t i o n s .  
Requirements f o r  an independent  
backup should i n c l u d e  ( 1 )  method f o r  
d e t e c t i n g  t h e  need f o r  a t r a n s i t i o n  t o  
t h e  backup, whether manual or au tomat ic ,  
( 2 )  a l lowab le  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r i o d s  and 
t r a n s i e n t s ,  and ( 3 )  f u n c t i o n a l  r equ i r e -  
ments of backup, such as o p e r a t i n g  enve- 
l o p e  and r e l i a b i l i t y .  I f  t h e  backup is 
going t o  be f l i g h t  tested, reengagement 
of t h e  primary system must be addressed. 
3 .  F a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t s  should  be 
s p e c i f i e d  i n  terms of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
aerodynamic and s t r u c t u r a l  e f f e c t s .  
Table 27 i s  an example of maximum aero- 
dynamic f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t  requi rements ,  
which vary  wi th  mission. A t  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  such as high-impact pres- 
s u r e s ,  a s u r f a c e  t r a n s i e n t  can r e s u l t  
i n  s t r u c t u r a l  damage wi th  l i t t l e  aero-  
dynamic t r a n s i e n t .  Table 28  shows a 
p o s s i b l e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  s t r u c t u r a l  
t r a n s i e n t s  by g i v i n g  f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n  
and s u r f a c e  t r a n s i e n t  a l lowab le ,  t he reby  
implying f l i g h t  loads .  The c o n d i t i o n s  
would be de r ived  from c a l c u l a t i o n s  which 
de termine  excess  s t r u c t u r a l  l oads .  
8.2 .2 .  Design 
Some obse rva t ions  and g e n e r i c  recom- 
mendations f o r  des ign ing  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
c o n t r o l  systems are p resen ted  i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n .  The major theme of t h e  recom- 
mendations i s  based on t h e  l i f e  c r i t i -  
c a l i t y  of the c o n t r o l  system and han- 
d l i n g  t h e  complexity imposed by 
redundant s y s  t e m s  . 
Reviewing t h e  methods used t o  
deve lop  t h e  system a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  s o f t -  
ware, and c o n t r o l  l a w  d e s i g n s  shows t h a t  
bo th  the  method used t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  con- 
t r o l  l a w s  and t h e  t o o l s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
deve lop  them are more mature than  f o r  
t h e  o t h e r  two. Whereas, some so f tware  
t o o l s  are a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the so f tware  
development p rocess ,  t o o l s  to  assist 
i n  s p e c i f y i n g  and performing t r a d e o f f  
s t u d i e s  are needed. Tools do  n o t  e x i s t  
f o r  t h e  system a r c h i t e c t u r e  and f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  d e s i g n  t a s k .  
There i s  no i n t e g r a t i o n  of t o o l s  f o r  
t h e  t h r e e  d i s c i p l i n e s .  For example, 
D I G I K O N ,  used t o  deve lop  the c o n t r o l  
l a w s ,  ha s  a d a t a  base  which d e s c r i b e s  
t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s .  D I G I K O N  i s  n o t  t i e d  
t o  any of t h e  so f tware  development 
tools. A l a b o r i o u s  handmade descrip- 
t i o n  of t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  des ign  had t o  
be w r i t t e n  f o r  the  so f tware  mechaniza- 
t i o n  document. 
I f  a system made of t h e s e  t h r e e  







opment and i n t e g r a t i o n  of des ign  and 
development t o o l s  are needed. 
Recommendations 
1 .  An i n t e g r a t e d  des ign  t o o l ,  which 
a d d r e s s e s  c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e ,  
hardware, and so f tware ,  is needed f o r  
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  c o n t r o l  systems. A few 
of t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  needed i n  such a 
t o o l  i n c l u d e  t h e  fo l lowing:  
A. Documentation of the system 
d e s i g n  i n  a computer d a t a  base  which 
relates the d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n a l  
areas. The d a t a  base  would be quer- 
i e d  t o  f i n d  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  
such  as s e n s o r  n o i s e ,  a f f e c t i n g  com- 
mand p a t h s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s .  
B. Eva lua t ion  of t h e  system 
d e s i g n  f o r  f a u l t  t o l e r a n c e ,  c o n t r o l  
l a w s ,  and so f tware  execu t ion  p r i o r  
t o  a c t u a l  system bu i ld .  The a b i l i t y  
t o  ana lyze  t h e  des ign  and make cor- 
r e c t i o n s  p r i o r  to  b u i l d i n g  hardware 
and so f tware  code would reduce rede- 
s i g n  d u r i n g  q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  
2. When des ign ing  i n t e r f a c e s  t o  a 
redundant f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system, one 
must c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  
of  the in fo rma t ion  be ing  passed and t h e  
f a i l u r e  modes t h a t  are p o s s i b l e .  This  
r e q u i r e s  a detai led unders tanding  of t h e  
items be ing  i n t e r f a c e d .  A case i n  p o i n t  
w a s  the I S A  and f l ight  control system 
i n t e r f a c e .  Add i t iona l  t e s t i n g  of t h e  
I S A  w a s  needed to  des ign  i t s  i n t e r f a c e .  
3 .  The a v i o n i c s  i n t e r f a c e  is  an 
example where no redundancy e x i s t e d  f o r  
many of t h e  f a i l u r e  modes possible. The 
in fo rma t ion  passed from the a v i o n i c s  w a s  
c r i t i ca l  enough t o  have caused a f a i l u r e  
o f  t h e  DFCS. The redundancy r equ i r ed  i n  
a n  i n t e r f a c e  must be based on t h e  c r i t i -  
c a l i t y  of t h e  in fo rma t ion  and t h e  pos- 
s i b l e  f a i l u r e  modes. 
4. A f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  system, which 
u s e s  c ross -channel  v o t i n g  t o  d e t e c t  
f a i l u r e s  , should avoid  random, unmeas- 
u r a b l e  des ign  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  such as 
asynchronous channel  ope ra t ion .  Th i s  
h e l p s  t o  keep f a i l u r e  t h r e s h o l d s  a t  low 
l e v e l s  and minimizes unexpected i n t e r a c -  
t i o n s  t h a t  can r e s u l t  from incongruen t  
d a t a  sets. 
The f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  des ign  should  
a l s o  be t r a n s p a r e n t  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  
f u n c t i o n s .  The c o n t r o l  l a w s  should n o t  
have t o  be t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  sys tem's  
redundancy l e v e  1. 
8.2.3 Qualification 
The l e a d i n g  i s s u e  i n  q u a l i f y i n g  o r  
t e s t i n g  complex DFCSs are completeness 
and c o s t .  T e s t  completeness is  an i s s u e  
wi th  any sof tware-dr iven  system, b u t  
becomes a major i t e m  when t h e  system has  
f u l l  a u t h o r i t y  c o n t r o l  of a p i l o t e d  air- 
craft .  Determining some l e v e l  of  tes t  
completeness is a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  because 
o f  t h e  complexity - number of dependent 
i n p u t s  and number of o p e r a t i n g  modes. 
The appendix p rov ides  some sugges t ions  
f o r  complete t e s t i n g  of c o n t r o l  l a w s .  
Cos t ,  t h e  o t h e r  l e a d i n g  i s s u e ,  re- 
s u l t s  d i r e c t l y  from the e f f o r t  needed 
t o  completely t e s t  complex s y s  t e m s  t o  
a reasonable  l e v e l .  Rather  than  achiev-  
i n g  a measurable l e v e l  of tes t  complete- 
ness or by meeting established criteria,  
t h e  amount of t e s t i n g  performed o f t e n  
becomes l i m i t e d  by c o s t .  
Recommendations 
1 .  System-software q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
t e s t i n g  must be performed t o  e n s u r e  i m -  
p l emen ta t ion  of the requi rements ,  and 
t h a t  each requi rement  is  tested t o  meet 
a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  c r i t e r i o n .  For example, 
a system requirement f o r  decoupled con- 
t r o l  would r e s u l t  i n  a cor responding  
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so f tware  requirement,  i d e n t i f y i n g  spe- 
c i f i c  c o n t r o l  l a w  components, such  as 
those  g iven  i n  t h e  appendix. 
T e s t i n g  must be i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  both 
t h e  system and t h e  de t a i l ed  so f tware  
requirements.  The t e s t i n g  must be com- 
plete  enough t o  v e r i f y  t h e  requi rements  
are  m e t  a t  both  l e v e l s .  A t o o l  o r  
method i s  needed t o  ensu re  tes t  cov- 
e r a g e  of a l l  so f tware  components. 
2. Tools t h a t  s u p p o r t  automation of 
t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  task should  be used. 
Automated tes t  s t i m u l u s ,  data reco rd ing ,  
and a n a l y s i s  can p rov ide  f o r  more thor -  
ough tests, b e t t e r  tes t  documentation, 
and more e f f i c i e n t  use  of personnel .  
The use  of q u a l i t a t i v e  pass-fail cri- 
teria,  such as r easonab le  t r a n s i e n t s  
and a c c e p t a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  should 
be  avoided. 
T e s t  automation w i l l  r e q u i r e  real- 
time i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  of i n t e r n a l  s o f t -  
ware c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The system d e s i g n  
w i l l  need t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  special test 
requi rements  f o r  p rov id ing  v i s i b i l i t y  
i n t o  t h e  system. 
3 .  A computerized on - l ine  d e s c r i p -  
t i o n  of t h e  system (see recommendation 
1 ,  s e c t i o n  8 . 2 . 2 )  should  be a v a i l a b l e  
t o  tes t  eng inee r s .  This  d a t a  base of 
d e s i g n  in fo rma t ion  w i l l  a s s i s t  t h e  
tester i n  de te rmining  t es t  c o n d i t i o n s  , 
f u n c t i o n a l  i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  and param- 
eters t o  r eco rd  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  proper 
tes t  r e s u l t s .  The d a t a  base would a l s o  
be  va luab le  f o r  de te rmining  t h e  cause  
of  d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
4. System t e s t i n g  must c o n s i d e r  t h e  
o p e r a t i n g  environment i n  which i t  i s  
going  t o  be used. v i b r a t i o n  and t e m -  
p e r a t u r e  e f f e c t s  on senso r  va lues  used 
by t h e  c o n t r o l  system must be modeled. 
These e f f e c t s  can e a s i l y  be implemented 
by imposing b i a s e s  and n o i s e  on t h e  s i m -  
u l a t e d  senso r  values.  
8.2.4 Fl ight  Test 
By f a r ,  t h e  b e s t  t h i n g  t h a t  can h a p  
pen t o  a f l i g h t  test  program is t o  have 
thorough s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  a good d e s i g n ,  
and a complete and e f f i c i e n t  q u a l i f i c a -  
t i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  more anomalies and 
f l i g h t  test  t i m e  were l o s t  owing to  
d e s i g n  o v e r s i g h t s  than  a c t u a l  compo- 
n e n t  f a i l u r e s  at tests to  t h e  need f o r  
improving the development cyc le s .  
Some s p e c i f i c  recommendations from 
f l i g h t  tes t  fo l low.  
Recommenda t i o n s  
1 .  To ensu re  t h e  b e s t  system con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  f o r  r e t e s t i n g  of changes and 
c o r r e c t i o n s  d u r i n g  f l i g h t  tes t  and t o  
minimize downtime t o  r e s o l v e  f l i g h t  
anomal ies ,  it i s  recommended t h a t  t h e  
a i rc raf t  des ign  i n c l u d e  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
of c l o s i n g  the  aerodynamic loop around 
t h e  a i r c r a f t  wi th  t h e  f l i g h t  a v i o n i c s  
i n s t a l l e d .  T h i s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  minimizes 
t h e  number of unknowns involved  when 
t e s t i n g .  Unexpected i n t e r a c t i o n s  which 
have n o t  been modeled can be d e t e c t e d .  
2.  A computerized d a t a  base  de- 
s c r i b i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  f l i g h t  system 
would g r e a t l y  h e l p  f l i g h t  test. Used as 
a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  t o o l  € o r  new e n g i n e e r s ,  
i t  could reduce t h e  l e a r n i n g  curve.  As 
d u r i n g  the system q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  
would be v a l u a b l e  f o r  t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g  
f l i g h t  test  d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
3 .  Inc reased  v i s i b i l i t y  i n t o  t h e  
d i g i t a l  system r e q u i r e s  i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  
of  i n t e r m e d i a t e  so f tware  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
To e f f e c t i v e l y  ana lyze  system perform- 
ance  and r e s o l v e  anomalies,  data from 
i n t e r n a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  are r e q u i r e d  a t  
t h e  frame ra te  they  are be ing  c a l c u l a t e d .  
The a i r c r a f t  f l i g h t  i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  sys- 
t e m  and p o s t f l i g h t  a n a l y s i s  systems w i l l  
need t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  d a t a  f low 1 
imposed by t h i s  requirement.  I 
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9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The f l i g h t  test  program on the AFTI F-16 
v a l i d a t e d  t h e  concepts  of decoupled 
f l i g h t  control and t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
a v i o n i c s  func t ions  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t  to  
reduce p i l o t  workload. J u s t  as impor- 
t a n t ,  it provided a chance to  e v a l u a t e  
t h e  t o o l s  and methods used i n  i t s  devel- 
opment. The performance c a p a b i l i t i e s  
demonstrated by t h e  AFTI F-16 r equ i r ed  
a new, h igher  l e v e l  of a v i o n i c s  com- 
p l e x i t y .  F l i g h t  t e s t i n g  provided t h e  
environment and c o n d i t i o n s  to uncover 
t h e  des ign  advantages and ove r s igh t s .  
To minimize the o v e r s i g h t s  t h a t  came 
from working a t  t h e  l ead ing  edge of 
technology,  recommendations are g iven  
t o  improve a l l  t h e  development phases.  
For t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  phase,  a l lowable  
f a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t s  are p resen ted  which 
s p e c i f y  t h e  a i r c r a f t  motion and s t r u c -  
t u r a l  loads  pe rmi t t ed  owing t o  a f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e .  
The asynchronous d i g i t a l  c o n t r o l  
system des ign  i s  reviewed and t h e  prob- 
l e m s  of us ing  t h i s  approach examined. 
Crea t ing  a computerized d e s c r i p t i o n  of 
t h e  system des ign  i s  proposed t o  h e l p  
e v a l u a t e  des igns  p r i o r  to  committing 
t o  b u i  Id.  
For t h e  t e s t i n g  phase,  s e v e r a l  
recommendations are g iven  t o  h e l p  
reduce cost and f l i g h t  t es t  r i s k .  
Automated sof tware  t e s t i n g  is  one 
approach proposed. 
The b e n e f i t s  shown dur ing  f l i g h t  
test  of t h e  decoupled c o n t r o l  modes are 
p resen ted ,  showing t h e  advantages of 
commanding d i r e c t  s i d e f o r c e .  The anoma- 
l i es  d iscovered  i n  f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  are 
expla ined  i n  d e t a i l ,  w i th  r e f l e c t i o n s  
on how they  might have been avoided. 
Overa l l ,  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  d i g i t a l  con- 
t r o l  system provided many o p e r a t i o n a l  
b e n e f i t s .  The hardware r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  complex system w a s  e x c e l l e n t .  How- 
e v e r ,  t h e  complexity of t h e  system, cou- 
p l ed  with the wide range of d i s c i p l i n a r y  
eng inee r s  involved,  caused numerous 
des ign  ove r s igh t s .  
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Ames Research Center 
Dryden Flight Research Facility 
Edwards, California, January 13, 1986 
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APPENDIX - VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
CONTROL LAW 
One r e q u i r e d  l e v e l  which f l i g h t - c r i t i c a l  
control  l a w s  must be t e s t e d  t o  i s  spec- 
i f i e d  i n  t h i s  appendix. This  t e s t i n g  
i s  performed i n  t h e  a c t u a l  hardware 
environment wi th  a l l  sof tware  operat-  
i n g  t o  show #a t  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  oper- 
a t e  p r o p e r l y  wi th ,  and i n  t h e  presence  
o f ,  a l l  o t h e r  sof tware  r o u t i n e s .  T h i s  
method f o r  t e s t i n g  complex c o n t r o l  l a w  
s o f t w a r e  i s  based on a d i v i d e  and con- 
quer  philosophy. 
The c o n t r o l  l a w s  are broken down 
i n t o  i n d i v i d u a l  b locks  for  which t h e r e  
i s  one i n p u t  and one output .  These 
i n d i v i d u a l  blocks are t e s t e d ,  and i n t e r -  
connec t ions  between t h e  b locks  are 
checked. S t a t i c  checks should be done 
f i r s t ,  fol lowed by t h e  r e q u i r e d  dynamic 
tests. A f t e r  t h e  l o w e r  l e v e l s  are 
t e s t e d ,  end-to-end checks f o r  compar- 
i s o n  t o  e q u i v a l e n t  FORTRAN-implemented 
control  l a w s  are done. The fo l lowing  
w i l l  address  t h e  method i n  which lower 
l e v e l s  can be t e s t e d  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  
hardware environment wi th  a l l  s o f t -  
ware p r e s e n t .  
Step 1 
Break down t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s  i n t o  
i n d i v i d u a l  blocks.  F igures  53 and 54 
are l a t e r a l - d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  l a w  
diagrams. One s e c t i o n  of t h i s  diagram 
h a s  been broken down i n t o  modules and 
i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  55. This  breakdown 
needs t o  be r e f i n e d  t o  provide  f u n c t i o n s  
w i t h  one i n p u t  and one output .  Fig- 
u r e  56 shows t h e  breakdown to  i n d i v i d -  
u a l  blocks.  Blocks can be combined f o r  
t e s t i n g  provided proper implementation 
can  s t i l l  be shown. 
qui red .  A list of  dynamic and special 
tests which need to  be performed fo r  
each  f u n c t i o n  follows. 
Variable Gains Scheduled on Air Data 
and Other Parameters 
Sweep through t h e  f u l l  range of t h e  
s c h e d u l i n g  parameters whi le  r e c o r d i n g  
t h e  g a i n  va lues .  An i n p u t  a g a i n s t  out-  
p u t  cross-plot r o u t i n e  w i l l  p r o v i d e  d a t a  
f o r  comparison t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
Fixed Gain 
Modify t h e  g a i n  and r e r u n  t h e  sta- 
t i c  check. This  checks t h e  g a i n ' s  posi- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w  loop and proper 
s c a l i n g  e f f e c t .  
Dynamic Elements, Filters, 
Integra tors 
Step i n p u t s  are a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  
i n p u t  wi th  r e s u l t i n g  o u t p u t  t i m e  h i s -  
t o r y  responses  recorded. Comparisons 
t o  independent ly  implemented elements  
are made to  show i d e n t i c a l  t i m e  h i s -  
t o r y  responses .  
Nonlinear Elements, St ick  Shaping, 
L i m i t e r s ,  Deadband 
These elements  r e q u i r e  f u l l - r a n g e  
i n p u t  sweeps wi th  o u t p u t s  recorded. 
Cross-plots of i n p u t  a g a i n s t  o u t p u t  
can  be compared to  d e s i g n  d a t a .  
Multipl iers  
M u l t i p l i e r s  are checked i n  t h e  sta- 
t i c  checks; f u l l - r a n g e  pos i t ive  and neg- 
a t i v e  va lues  should be checked. Proper  
system response t o  overflow c o n d i t i o n s  
must be tested. 
Summing Junctions 
Step 2 
I d e n t i f y  t y p e s  of f u n c t i o n a l  b locks  
t o  be t e s t e d  and t h e  type  of tests re- 
Summing j u n c t i o n s  are a lso checked 
i n  s ta t ic  tests; f u l l - r a n g e  p o s i t i v e  and 
n e g a t i v e  i n p u t s  are requi red .  
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Switching Functions 
The swi t ch  connec t ion  and t h e  func- 
t i o n s  which cause  the swi t ch ing  a c t i o n  
are t e s t e d .  Do n o t  attempt t o  togg le  
t h e  swi t ch  by f o o l i n g  a memory l o c a t i o n ;  
se t  up a c t u a l  i n p u t  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
cause  t h e  swi tch ing  a c t i o n .  
Block Interconnects 
I n  t h e  s ta t ic  checks,  t h e  o u t p u t  of 
each  block is checked f o r  proper connec- 
t i o n  t o  o t h e r  block i n p u t s .  
Scheduled D y n a m i c  Elements, Filters 
Scheduled on Air D a t a  
This  type  of  so f tware  f u n c t i o n  i s  
imposs ib l e  t o  tes t  completely.  The 
scheduled  va lue  must be t e s t e d  l i k e  
t h e  v a r i a b l e  ga ins .  S e v e r a l  va lues  
must be chosen f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e  wi th  
s tep  responses  measured. worst case 
and extreme va lues  should be used. 
R a t e  Checks, R a t e  L i m i t e r s  
R a t e  checks must be t e s t e d  j u s t  
below and j u s t  above t h e  rate check 
l e v e l .  The s i g n a l  should be passed 
u n a l t e r e d  below the l e v e l .  Above t h e  
rate check or l i m i t ,  f l a g g i n g  o r  l i m i t -  
i n g  should occur.  
Other Poss ib le  D i g i t a l  Functions - 
‘ D e l a y s  and Decrements 
Any o t h e r  unique f u n c t i o n s  m u s t  be 
examined and proper s t a t i c  and dynamic 
tests determined t o  show c o r r e c t  imple- 
mentation. Emphasis should be on worst 
case and extreme va lues  as w e l l  as show- 
i n g  p rope r  implementation. 
Step 3 
Determine des ign  requi rements  
and mod i f i ca t ions  r equ i r ed  t o  t es t  
t h e  sof tware .  
1 .  I npu t s  and o u t p u t s  of b locks  
m u s t  be made a c c e s s i b l e  f o r  e x t e r n a l  
r e c o r d i n g  and p l o t t i n g  by s t o r i n g  t h e s e  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  va lues  i n  memory f o r  o u t p u t  
t o  a r eco rde r .  
2. I n  o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  dynamic 
tests of i n t e r n a l  b locks ,  a tes t  program 
t o  produce a step i n p u t  is  requi red .  
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  needs 
( a )  S t e p  s i z e  and d u r a t i o n ,  
( b )  I n p u t  l o c a t i o n  of step,  and 
( c )  E x t e r n a l  method of s t a r t i n g  
step func t ion .  
This  step program can be pa tched  i n  
f o r  so f tware  t e s t i n g  and then  be d i s -  
a b l e d  f o r  f l i g h t .  With t h i s  f u n c t i o n  
and by d i s a b l i n g  t h e  s t o r e  i n s t r u c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  o u t p u t  of t h e  p rev ious  b lock ,  
dynamic tests can be performed. 
3 .  A g e n e r a l  purpose d i g i t a l - t o -  
ana log  c o n v e r t e r  o u t p u t  program i s  use- 
f u l  and would a l low p u t t i n g  o u t  any 
memory l o c a t i o n  on a spare d i g i t a l - t o -  
ana log  c o n v e r t e r  (DAC) channel.  In fo r -  
mation needed by t h e  program i n c l u d e s  
( a )  Locat ion  f o r  o u t p u t ,  
( b )  S c a l e  f a c t o r ,  
( c )  B i a s  c o r r e c t i o n ,  and 
( d )  DAC channel  f o r  o u t p u t .  
This  program can also be a t es t  
pa tch .  If a tes t  p a t c h  i s  n o t  used 
and this so f tware  w i l l  remain f o r  
f l i g h t ,  proper lockouts  must be in-  
c luded  and v e r i f i e d .  
Step 4 
Since  t i m e  on t h e  hardware system i s  
u s u a l l y  a t  a premium, p o s t - t e s t  a n a l y s i s  
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of  d a t a  is needed. P o s t - t e s t  a n l y s i s  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  r eco rd ings  of d a t a  be made 
and t h a t  a method f o r  p l o t t i n g  t h e  data 
be a v a i l a b l e .  Cross-p lo ts  and t i m e  h i s -  
t o r y  p l o t s  are both  needed (see tests 
f o r  f u n c t i o n s  i n  step 2 ) .  Recordings of 
d i g i t a l  d a t a  from t h e  computer 's  memory 
p rov ide  t h e  best f l e x i b i l i t y .  
Center ,  Hampton, V i r g i n i a ,  O c t .  25-27, 
1983, Beasley,  G.P., compiler, 1983. 
Price, W.T.; Grandia,  M.J . ;  Boulware, 
J . M . ;  Jones ,  J.O.; and Yousey, W . J . :  
Conf igu ra t ion  Design. AFTI/F-16 
Development and I n t e g r a t i o n  Program, 
D i g i t a l  c o n t r o l  l a w s  are o f t e n  
dependent on e x t e r n a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  such 
as l and ing  gear  up o r  down or a g iven  
a n g l e  of a t t a c k  f o r  t h e  a l p h a  limiter. 
When t e s t i n g  c o n t r o l  l a w  f u n c t i o n s ,  
t h e s e  e x t e r n a l  i n p u t  c o n d i t i o n s  should 
be set  by p l a c i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  
i n p u t  ana log  and d i g i t a l  s i g n a l s .  I n  
t h i s  way, t h e  so f tware  system i n t e r a c -  
t i o n s  can be t e s t e d .  F a l s e l y  s e t t i n g  
i n t e r n a l  f l a g s  w i l l  n o t  a l low c o n t r o l  
l a w  so f tware  to  i n t e r a c t  wi th  t h e  rest 
of t h e  so f tware  s t r u c t u r e .  
The use  of the s i m u l a t i o n  i n  a sta- 
t i c  mode, or by adding  some special 
capabili t ies i n t o  t h e  s imula t ion ,  can  
p rov ide  the necessa ry  i n p u t  cond i t ions .  
S ince  the s i m u l a t i o n  has  a l l  t h e  i n p u t s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  d r i v e  t h e  c o n t r o l  l a w s ,  
t e s t  c o n d i t i o n s  can  be set  e a s i l y  by 
u s i n g  a ca thode  r a y  tube  t e r m i n a l  t i e d  
t o  t h e  s imula to r .  
Special s i m u l a t o r  capabili t ies t o  
augment t e s t i n g  could  i n c l u d e  
1 .  R a m p  f u n c t i o n ,  t h a t  is ,  sweep 
a l p h a  from - 5 O  to  +50° i n  10 sec, 
2. S t e p  and s i n e  f u n c t i o n s ,  and 
3. Predetermined l o g i c  o r  f l i g h t  
c o n d i t i o n s  . 
Caut ion  must be used i n  any s u p p o r t  
so f tware  f o r  t e s t i n g  f l i g h t - c r i t i c a l  
systems. The s u p p o r t  so f tware  must be 
t e s t e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  so t h a t  no e r r o r s  
appear t h a t  would mask e r r o r s  i n  t h e  
c r i t i ca l  so f tware  system under test. 
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TABLE 1. - DECOUPLED CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
Fuse lage  p o i n t i n g  control 
P i t c h  po in t ing ,  deg f2.5 
Azimuth po in t ing ,  deg f3.0 
D i r e c t  force c o n t r o l  
L i f t  f o r c e  control ,  g 1 .o 
Side  f o r c e  control, g 0.5 




a F l i g h t  cond i t ion  1:  1- and 4-g maneuvering load  condi- 
b F l i g h t  cond i t ion  2: 1- and 4-g maneuvering load  condi- 
t i o n s  a t  Mach 0.6 a t  5,000 f t .  
t i o n s  a t  Mach 0.9 a t  20,000 f t .  
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TABLE 2. - RELIABILITY AND FAULT-TOLERANCE REQUIREMENTS 
R e l i a b i l i t y  requi rements  
DFCS f a i l u r e  rate r e s u l t i n g  i n  1 i n  l o 7  f l i g h t  h r ,  exc luding  p o w e r  
l o s s  of c o n t r o l  a c t u a t o r s  h y d r a u l i c s  and independent 
backup u n i t  
DFCS a b o r t  rate 1 i n  lo5  f l i g h t  h r  
F a i l - o p e r a t i o n a l  requi rements  
F i r s t  f a i l u r e  
Second f a i l u r e  of 
s imilar  dev ice  
F u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  
A t  l eas t  s a f e  f l i g h t  (Opera t iona l  S t a t e  
111, MIL-F-9490D; U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1975);  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 0.95 
of  f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  
S w i  t c  hing 
Mode swi t ch ing  Hands-on p o s i t i v e  swi t ch ing  r e q u i r e d  t o  
Air - to-a i r  mode swi t ch ing  Hands on 
r e t u r n  t o  normal mode I 
T r a n s i e n t s  
Swi tch ing  t r a n s i e n t s  Neg l ig ib l e  
F a i l u r e  t r a n s i e n t s  
Cooling requi rements  
Magnitude and d u r a t i o n  of DFCS t r a n s i e n t s  
s h a l l  n o t  i n t r o d u c e  unsa fe  t r a n s i e n t  
v e h i c l e  responses  
F l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computers Capable of s u s t a i n e d  re l iable  o p e r a t i o n  
wi thou t  r e l i a n c e  on f o r c e d  a i r  c o o l i n g  
TABLE 3 .  - DFCS COMPONENTS, REDUNDANCY, AND FAIL-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
~~ 
Funct ion  o r  component Redundancy C a p a b i l i t y  
1 .  S t a b i l i t y  and command Triple Two f a i l - o p e r a t i v e  wi th  
augmentation e l e c t r o n i c s  s u c c e s s f u l  s e l f - t e s t  
2 .  I n t e g r a t e d  s e r v o a c t u a t o r  Dual h y d r a u l i c  Fa i l -ope ra t ive ,  f a i l - s a f e  
and t r i p l e  elec- wi th  computer i n t e r f a c e  
t r i c a l  i n p u t  
3 .  DFCS h y d r a u l i c s  D u a l  Fai 1 -ope ra t ive  
4. Mode select DFCS s t a t u s  Dua 1 Fai 1- ope ra ti ve , f a  i 1-s a f e 
5. T r i m  
( A )  Switches 
(B) E l e c t r o n i c s  
Quadruple 
Triple 
6. A i r  d a t a  s e n s o r s  
( A )  S ta t ic  and impact Tr ip l e  
(B) Angle of a t t a c k  Triple 
p r e s s u r e s  
( C )  Angle of s i d e s l i p  T r i p l e  
7. C e n t r a l  a i r  data computer S i n g l e  
8. Leading-edge f l a p  
( A )  Maneuver computation Triple  
(B) Command s e r v o  
( C )  Flap d r i v e  
9. S t i c k  s e n s o r s  
Dual 
s i n g l e  
Two f a i l - o p e r a t i v e  
Two f a i l - o p e r a t i v e  wi th  
s u c c e s s f u l  s e l f - t e s t  
Fa i l -ope ra t ive ,  f a i l - s a f e  
wi th  s tandby g a i n s  
F a i l - o p e r a t i v e ,  f a i l - s a f e  
wi th  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
F a i l - o p e r a t i v e ,  f a i l - s a f e  
wi th  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
Two f a i l - o p e r a t i v e  w i t h  
s u c c e s s f u l  s e l f - t e s t  
F a i l - o p e r a t i v e  a t  h a l f  rate 
Asymmetry d e t e c t i o n  and 
shutoff 
Triple o u t p u t s  Two f a i l - o p e r a t i v e  w i t h  
w i t h  f o u r t h  a c t i v e  s tandby 
a c t i v e  s tandby 
10. P i t c h ,  r o l l ,  and yaw Triple  
ra te  s e n s o r s  
Fa i l -ope ra t ive ,  f a i l - s a f e  
wi th  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
1 1 .  Accelerometers Triple Fa i l -ope ra t ive ,  f a i l - s a f e  
w i t h  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
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TABLE 4. - VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE I N D E X  USED 
I N  SYSTEM SPECIFICATION 


































I t e m  d e f i n i t i o n  
I n t e r f a c e  diagram 
I n t e r f a c e  d e f i n i t i o n  
Sys t e m  i n t e r f a c e  
Digital-fly-by-wire 
system i n t e r f a c e  
P i l o t - v e h i c l e  i n t e r f a c e  
Major components l i s t  
Government f u r n i s h e d  
p r o p e r t y  l i s t  
Cha rac te r i s t ics 
Performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
General 
Specific 
Direct force c o n t r o l  
Weapon l i n e - p o i n t i n g  
S t a b i l i t y  and f l y i n g  
q u a l i t i e s  
N o r m a l  mode 
Departure  and s p i n  
recovery  
L i m i  t a t i o n s  
Task- ta i lored  f l i g h t  
Gain and phase margins 
Decoupled o p e r a t i o n s  
Cont ro l  l a w  mechanizat ion 
Multimode c o n t r o l  
Reconf igura t ion  
Redundancy management 
P h y s i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s  t ics 
System f u n c t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r  
F l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer 
c omp 1 e x  
DFCS power s u p p l i e s  
DFCS s e n s o r s  
A i r c r a f t  s i d e s l i p  s e n s i n g  
P i l o t  c o n t r o l l e r s  
C o n t r o l l e r  charac- 
modes 
teris t ics  
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TABLE 4. - CONTINUED 
Sec t ion  3 requirement r e f e r e n c e  V e r i f i c a t i o n  methods 
3.2.2.6-2 
































Primary c o n t r o l l e r  
Secondary c o n t r o l l e r  
T r i m  
DFCS c a u t i o n  and warning 
System weight  
Cont ro l led  s u r f a c e  ac tu-  
Independent backup 
DFCS sof tware  
R e l i a b i l i t y  
F a i l u r e  rate, loss of 
c o n t r o l  
DFCS abort rate 
M a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  
Environmental  c o n d i t i o n s  
Power requirements  
Electrical 
Hydraul ic  
T r a n s p o r t a b i l i t y  
Design and c o n s t r u c t i o n  
P a r t s ,  materials, processes 
Electromagnet ic  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
and c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
General  
Design requirements  
I n s t a l l a t i o n  and i n t e g r a t i o n  
Electrical bonding r equ i r e -  
Lightn ing  p r o t e c t i o n  
Nameplates and product  
marking 
Workmanship 
I n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y  
S a f e t y  
Sa fe ty ,  descending o r d e r  of 
Health and s a f e t y  cri teria 
T o x i c i t y  
Electrical equipment 
hazard  
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TABLE 4. - CONCLUDED 
S e c t i o n  3 requirement  r e f e r e n c e  V e r i f i c a t i o n  methods 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 
3.3.6.2.3 Personnel  hazard and 
3.3.7 Human performance and human 
3.4 Documentation X 
3.6 Precedence X 
3.6.1 Precedence of documents X 
3.6.2 Appl ica t ion  of pr ior  q u a l i t y  X 
s a f e t y  X 
e n g i n e e r i n g  X 
3.5 Logis t i c s  X 
NA - n o t  a p p l i c a b l e ;  v e r i f i c a t i o n  methods: 1 - i n s p e c t i o n ,  
2 - a n a l y s i s ,  3 - demonstrat ion,  4 - ground tes t ,  5 - f l i g h t  test. 
TABLE 5. - ANALOG AND DISCRETE INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
i 
Analog i n p u t s  I 
1 
Azimuth error 
Azimuth error ra te  
B e t a  a f t  
B e t a  d e l t a  p r e s s u r e  
B e t a  f o r e  
Data age 
Demodulated l e f t  canard p o s i t i o n  
Demodulated l e f t  f l a p e r o n  p o s i t i o n  
Demodulated l e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  
Demodulated r i g h t  canard p o s i t i o n  
Demodulated r i g h t  f l a p e r o n  p o s i t i o n  
Demodulated r i g h t  h o r i z o n t a l  
t a i l  p o s i t i o n  
Demodulated rudder  p o s i t i o n  
E l e v a t i o n  error 
E l e v a t i o n  error rate 
Impact p r e s s u r e  ( Qc 
t a i l  p o s i t i o n  
L e f t  a n g l e  of a t t a c k  
L e f t  canard p o s i t i o n  
L e f t  f l aperon  p o s i t i o n  I 
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  p o s i t i o n  
L e f t  main landing  g e a r  tachometer 
N o r m a l  accelerometer 
P i t c h  rate gyro  
P i t c h  rate gyro  speed d e t e c t  
P i t c h  s t i c k  command 
P i t c h  s t i c k  f o u r t h  t r a n s d u c e r  
Redundancy management t e s t  i n p u t  
Right  a n g l e  of a t t a c k  
Right  canard p o s i t i o n  
Right  f laperon  p o s i t i o n  
R i g h t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i  1 p o s i t i o n  
Right  main landing  g e a r  tachometer 
R o l l  r a te  a m p l i f i e d  





1 I n d i c a t e d  side-mounted angle  of a t t a c k  R o l l  ra te  gyro speed detect  La tera 1 accelerometer R o l l  s t i c k  command 
Leading edge f l a p  p o s i t i o n  Roll s t i c k  f o u r t h  t r a n s d u c e r  
Leading edge f l a p  tachometer no. 1 Rudder p e d a l  command I 
I 
1 Leading edge f l a p  tachometer no. 2 Rudder p e d a l  f o u r t h  t r a n s d u c e r  
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TABLE 5. - CONTINUED 
I 
I 
Analog i n p u t s  I 
Rudder p o s i t i o n  
Spare dc i n p u t  no. 1 
Sta t i c  p r e s s u r e  (PSI 
T h r o t t l e  c o n t r o l l e r  command 
Yaw rate gyro  
Yaw ra te  gy ro  speed d e t e c t  
Analog ou tpu t s  
Angle-of-attack side mount, instrumen- 
B e t a  d e l t a  p r e s s u r e ,  i n s t rumen ta t ion  
Demodulated p i tch  ra te  o u t p u t  
Demodulated r o l l  rate o u t p u t  
Demodulated yaw rate o u t p u t  
FLCC tempera ture ,  i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  
Leading edge f l a p  command 
Leading edge f l a p  a c t u a t o r  command 
L e f t  angle-of -a t tack  o u t p u t  
L e f t  canard  command, primary s e r v o  
L e f t  canard  command, secondary s e r v o  
L e f t  f l a p e r o n  command, primary s e r v o  
t a t i o n  
nos. 1 and 2 
v a l v e s  
v a l v e s  
v a l v e s  
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  command, pr imary  
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  command, secondary 
Right  angle-of -a t tack  o u t p u t  
Right  canard  command, primary s e r v o  
R igh t  canard  command, secondary s e r v o  
Right  f l a p e r o n  command, primary s e r v o  
Right  f l a p e r o n  command, secondary  s e r v o  
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  command, pr imary  
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  command, secondary 
s e r v o  va lves  
s e r v o  va lves  
va lves  
va lves  
va lves  
va lves  
s e r v o  va lves  
s e r v o  va lves  
L e f t  f l a p e r o n  command, secondary s e r v o  Rudder command, primary s e r v o  v a l v e s  
v a l v e s  Rudder command, secondary s e r v o  va lves  
Discrete i n p u t s  
A e r i a l  r e f u e l  door 
A l t e r n a t e  f l a p  swi t ch  
CADC good 
CCV engage s w i t c h  
Electr ical  reset 
Gun f i r i n g  l o g i c  
I d e n t i t y  d i s c r e t e  no. 1 ,  FLCC C 
I n d e n t i t y  discrete no. 2 ,  FLCC B 
I d e n t i t y  p a r i t y ,  FLCC A 
IFFC ana log  d a t a  v a l i d  
IFFC engage swi tch  
Independent backup select swi t ch  
Landing gea r  handle p o s i t i o n  
Leading edge f l a p  asymmetry brake  
LEF asymmetry brake  power 
L e f t  canard I S A  f a i l  no. 1 (PS no. 1 )  
L e f t  canard I S A  f a i l  no. 2 (PS no. 2 )  
L e f t  f l a p e r o n  I S A  f a i l  no. 1 (PS no. 1 )  
L e f t  f l a p e r o n  ISA f a i l  no. 2 (PS no. 2 )  
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  I S A  f a i l  no. 1 
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  I S A  f a i l  no. 2 
Main l and ing  gear weight on wheels 
Manual p i t c h  o v e r r i d e  engage swi t ch  
Nose l and ing  g e a r  door 
Nose l and ing  gea r  weight on wheels 
PLA ( m i l i t a r y  power) 
PLA (power i d l e )  
R igh t  canard  ISA f a i l  no. 1 (PS no. 1 )  
Right  canard  ISA f a i l  no. 2 (PS no. 2 
Righ t  f l a p e r o n  ISA f a i l  no. 1 (PS no. 1 )  
Righ t  f l a p e r o n  I S A  f a i l  no. 2 (PS no. 2)  
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  I S A  f a i l  no. 1 
(PS no. 1 )  
(PS no. 2 )  
(PS no. 1 )  
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TABLE 5. - CONCLUDED 
Discrete i n p u t s  
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  I S A  f a i l  no. 
Rudder I S A  f a i l  no. 1 (PS no. 1 )  
Rudder I S A  f a i l  N o .  2 (PS no. 2 )  
Servo reset 
Speed brake  extend 
Speed brake retract  
S t i c k  t r i m  select swi tch  
Trim l e f t  wing down p a n e l  
(PS no. 2 )  
2 Trim l e f t  wing down s t i c k  
Trim nose down p a n e l  
T r i m  nose down s t i c k  
Trim nose l e f t  p a n e l  
Trim nose r i g h t  pane l  
Trim nose up p a n e l  
T r i m  nose up s t i c k  
Trim r i g h t  wing down p a n e l  
T r i m  r i g h t  wing down s t i c k  
Discrete o u t p u t s  
Analog tes t  
CADC reset 
CADC test  
Dual DFCS f a i L  no. 1 ( h i g h )  
Dual DFCS f a i l  no. 2 ( h i g h )  
DFCS f a i l  ( h i g h )  
DFCS ready 
IBU engage 
I n p u t  discrete BIT tes t  one 
I n p u t  discrete B I T  tes t  z e r o  
ISA reset ( h i g h )  
I S A  reset ( l o w )  
Lateral  accelerometer torque  
LEF lock  no. 1 
LEF lock no. 2 
L e f t  canard c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
L e f t  canard c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
LHT c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
LHT c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
LFLAP c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
LFLAP c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
N o r m a l  accelerometer torque  
P i t c h  rate gyro torque  
P S A  tes t  
P S A  tes t  enable  
Right  f l a p  c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
Right  f l a p  c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
RHT c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
RHT c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
Right  canard c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
Right  canard c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
R o l l  rate gyro  t o r q u e  
Rudder c e n t e r i n g  ( h i g h )  
Rudder c e n t e r i n g  ( l o w )  
S t a  11 warning 
Yaw rate gyro  torque  
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TABLE 6. - TYPES OF AVIONICS INFORMATION 
Type Desc r ip t ion  From Through To 
Pilot-DFCS parameters 
Mode r e q u e s t s  
B I T  
Memory 
F a u l t  d i s p l a y  
DFCS mode 
Miscel laneous 
Allowed s e l e c t i o n  of d i f -  
f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  modes 
Allowed p i lo t  to  i n i t i a t e  
p r e f l i g h t  BIT  
Ground only o p t i o n  t o  read 
computer memories f o r  
d i a g n o s t i c  purposes  
Allowed p i l o t  t o  o b t a i n  
d e t a i l e d  informat ion  
abou t  f a i l u r e  l i g h t s  
I n d i c a t i o n  of a c t u a l  DFCS 
mode engaged 
d a t a  BIT, memory and f a u l t  d a t a  
r eques t ed  by t h e  p i l o t  
C o n t r o l  l a w  parameters 
P i t c h  and r o l l  Inpu t s  t o  a G-bias func- 
a t t i t u d e  t i o n  t h a t  a s s i s t e d  t h e  
p i l o t  du r ing  rol ls  
A i r c r a f t  v e l o c i t y  
Ins t rumenta t ion  parameters 
Parameter l o c a t i o n  I d e n t i f i e s  64 DFCS param- 
eters f o r  o u t p u t  from 
t h e  DFCS to  t h e  i n s t r u -  
mentat ion system 
Ins t rumen ta t ion  
parameters 
MPD SMS DFCS 
MPD SMS DFCS 
MPD SMS DFCS 





I N U  -- 







DFCS -- I n s  trumenta- 
t i o n  system 
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I TABLE 7. - SUMMARY OF DFCS DISPLAYS I N  THE COCKPIT 
N a m e  D e s c r i p t i o n  
Dedicated f a i l u r e  l i g h t s  
FCS f a i l  I n d i c a t e s  a f a i l u r e  i n v o l v i n g  one l e v e l  of redundancy 
Dual f a i l  A f a i l u r e  i n v o l v i n g  two l e v e l s  of redundancy 
I BU The IBU i s  engaged 
HUD i n d i c a t i o n s  
ccv Cont ro l  conf igured  v e h i c l e  - i n d i c a t e s  decoupled c o n t r o l  modes 
are a c t i v e  
G - l i m i t  I n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e l e c t e d  normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  l i m i t  i s  a c t i v e  
Mult ipurpose d i s p l a y s  
B a s e  page Allowed €or c o n t r o l  mode selection and access to the fault, data ,  
t e s t ,  preset, and a u t h o r i t y  pages 
F a u l t  page Allowed d i s p l a y  and reset of DFCS f a i l u r e s  
Data page The d a t a  page has  t h e  same f u n c t i o n s  as t h e  base page wi th  addi- 
t i o n a l  d a t a  d i s p l a y s  
Te s t page Provided a b i l i t y  t o  read  DFCS memory and i n i t i a t e  BIT, ground 
o p e r a t i o n  o n l y  
P r e s e t  page Allowed changing t h e  d e f a u l t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of p i l o t  c o n t r o l l e r s  t o  
c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s  
A u t h o r i t y  page Allowed p i l o t  t o  set  a normal a c c e l e r a t i o n  l i m i t ,  fo r  f l i g h t -  
t e s t  purposes  
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I 
TABLE 8. -MNEMONICS FOR MJ?Da 
Level  Type C l a s s  
Recon A l l  IBU 
1 s t  P i t c h  A c  t u a  tor 
2nd R o l l  Branch 
Lock Yaw o u t p u t  
A/B LHT Compute 
A RHT Inpu t  
B L FLP "Blank 'I 
Center  R FLP 









aLevel ,  type ,  and class are 
d e f i n e d  i n  t a b l e  9. 









A 1st f a i l u r e  of a p a r t i c u l a r  t ype  and class has  occurred  
A 2nd l i k e  f a i l u r e  of a p a r t i c u l a r  t ype  and class has  occurred  
Con t ro l  l a w  r econf igu ra t ion  ( r econ)  has  occurred;  w i l l  on ly  appear  i f  a 2nd 
The l ead ing  edge f l a p s  are locked 
The secondary hydrau l i c  system has  f a i l e d  
The pr imary h y d r a u l i c  system has  f a i l e d  
A 2nd l i k e  h y d r a u l i c  f a i l u r e  has  occurred  
The d i sp layed  c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e  has  been cen te red  
l i k e  f a i l u r e  of a p a r t i c u l a r  t ype  and class c a n ' t  be i s o l a t e d  
A l l  
P i t c h  P i t c h  a x i s  i n p u t s  have f a i l e d  
Roll Rol l  a x i s  i n p u t s  have f a i l e d  
Yaw Yaw a x i s  i n p u t s  have f a i l e d  
LHT L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  tai l  
RHT Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  
LFLP L e f t  t r a i l i n g  edge f l a p  
A l l  i n p u t s  o r  o u t p u t s  of a particular class are a f f e c t e d  
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A i r  d a t a  
Switch 
C l a s s  
I BU 
Actua tor  
Branch 
o u t p u t  
Compute 
I n p u t  
Right  t r a i l i n g  edge f l a p  
L e f t  canard 
Right  canard 
Rudder 
Leading edge f l a p  
Impact or s ta t ic  s e n s o r  has  f a i l ed  
A c o c k p i t  or a i r c r a f t  s w i t c h  h a s  f a i l e d  
Independent backup f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system h a s  f a i l e d  
An i n t e g r a t e d  s e r v o a c t u a t o r  (ISA) h a s  f a i l e d  
A l l  computer i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  i n  one f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer 
There h a s  been a n  o u t p u t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f a i l u r e  i n  a f l i g h t  con- 
There h a s  been a computat ional  f a i l u r e  i n  a f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer 
A s e n s o r  or  c o n t r o l l e r  h a s  f a i l e d  
have f a i l e d  
t r o l  computer 
TABLE 10. -NUMERIC CODES FOR FAULT DISPLAYS 
Device i d e n t i f  i- 
c a t i o n  number 
( D I D )  
F a i l u r e  
~~ 











1 1  
12  







FLCC ls t ,  2nd 
D-A c o n v e r t e r  l s t ,  2nd 
LHT to t a l  computed o u t p u t  l s t ,  2nd 
LHT co i l  wraparound ls t ,  2nd 
RHT t o t a l  computed o u t p u t  l s t ,  2nd 
RHT c o i l  wraparound lst,  2nd 
LFLP t o  t a l  computed o u t p u t  l s t ,  2nd 
LFLP c o i l  wraparound ls t ,  2nd 
RFLP to  t a  1 computed o u t p u t  lst, 2nd 
RFLP co i l  wraparound ls t ,  2nd 
Rudder t o t a l  computed o u t p u t  l s t ,  2nd 
Rudder c o i l  wraparound ls t ,  2nd 
LCND t o t a l  computed o u t p u t  lst ,  2nd 
LCND c o i l  wraparound lst,  2nd 
RCND t o t a l  computed o u t p u t  lst ,  2nd 
RCND c o i l  wraparound ls t ,  2nd 
LEF to t a l  computed o u t p u t  lst ,  2nd 
LEF hardware s t a t u s  l s t ,  2nd 
A-D c o n v e r t e r  l s t ,  2nd 
A 1  1 

















A 1  1 
Branch 
o u t p u t  
Compute 
o u t p u t  
Compute 
o u t p u t  
Compute 
o u t p u t  
Compute 
o u t p u t  
o u t p u t  
ou tpu t  
o u t p u t  
o u t p u t  




I n p u t  
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TABLE 10. - CONCLUDED 
Device i d e n t i f  i- 
(DID) 




























800-Hz power supply  
P i t c h  rate senso r  
( i n v e r t e r )  
Spare 
R o l l  rate s e n s o r  
Yaw rate s e n s o r  
Angle-of-attack s e n s o r  
Spare 
LEF pot wraparound 
P i t c h  s t i c k  
R o l l  s t i c k  
Rudder p e d a l  
T h r o t t l e  t w i s t  
N o r m a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  s e n s o r  
Lateral d i r e c t i o n a l  accel- 
e ra t ion  s e n s o r  
Spare  
S ta t ic  or impact 
Discrete IOC 
Discretes 
I B U  p i t c h  wraparound 
I B U  la teral  d i r e c t i o n a l  
LHT ISA p r e s s u r e  
RHT ISA p r e s s u r e  
s e n s o r  p r e s s u r e  
wraparound 
system 
s y s  tern 
s y s  tern 
s y s  t e m  
s y s  tern 
s y s  tern 
system 
LFLAP I S A  pressure 
RFLAP ISA p r e s s u r e  
Rudder ISA p r e s s u r e  
LCND ISA p r e s s u r e  
R ~ D  ISA p r e s s u r e  
l s t ,  2nd 
l s t ,  2nd 
recon  
lst ,  2nd 
recon  
lst,  2nd 
recon  
lst,  2nd 
recon  
1 s t  
l s t ,  2nd 
lst ,  2nd 
ls t ,  2nd 
l s t ,  2nd 
recon  
lst,  2nd 
recon  
ls t ,  2nd 
recon  
ls t ,  2nd 
recon  
lst ,  2nd 
ls t ,  2nd 
ls t ,  2nd 
ls t ,  2nd 
A, B, A-B, 
c e n t e r  
A, B, A-B, 
c e n t e r  
A, B, A-B, 
c e n t e r  
c e n t e r  
c e n t e r  
c e n t e r  
c e n t e r  
A, B, A-B, 
A, B, A-B, 
A ,  B, A-B, 
A, B, A-B, 
A 1  1 
P i t c h  
R o l l  
Yaw 
P i t c h  
P i t c h  
P i t c h  
R o l l  
Yaw 
P i t c h  
P i t c h  
Yaw 
Air 
d a t a  
Switch 
Switch 









Inpu t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I n p u t  
I BU 
I BU 
Actua tor  
Actua tor  
Actuator  





TABLE 1 1 .  - DISCRETE INPUTS PROCESSED BY THE DISCRETE SELECTOR-MONITOR 
Descript ion 
Group 1 :  Requires  5 msec s e t t l i n g  t i m e  
Nose landing  gear  door 
Landing gear  handle  
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  PS no. 1 
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  PS no. 2 
S t i c k  t r i m  r i g h t  wing down 
CADC v a l i d  
L e f t  f l a p  PS no. 1 
L e f t  f l a p  PS no. 2 
Rudder PS no. 1 
Rudder PS no. 2 
R i g h t  canard PS no. 1 
Gun f i r i n g  
CCV engage 
R i g h t  canard PS no. 2 
IFFC engage 
IBU select 
A l t e r n a t e  f l a p  swi tch  
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  PS no. 1 
LEF assymetry brake 
P i t c h  i n t e g r a t o r  i n h i b i t  
Right  f l a p  PS no. 1 
Right  f l a p  PS no. 2 
Speed break re t ract  
A i r  r e f u e l  door open 
LEF brake power 
PLA i d l e  
S t i c k  t r i m  l e f t  wing down 
S t i c k  t r i m  nose up 
Speed break extend 
S t i c k  t r i m  nose down 
Weight on nose landing  gear  
PLA a t  m i l i t a r y  power 
LARAP engage r e q u e s t  
LARAP disengage request 
Left h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  PS no. 2 
L e f t  canard PS no. 1 
L e f t  canard PS no. 2 
IFFC good 
Group 2: Requires 80 msec s e t t l i n g  t i m e  
E lec t r ica l  reset Panel  t r i m  nose down 
Servo reset Panel  t r i m  nose l e f t  
Pane l  t r i m  nose up Panel  t r i m  nose r i g h t  
Manual p i t c h  override engage S t i c k  t r i m  d i s c o n n e c t  
Panel  t r i m  l e f t  wing down weight  on main l a n d i n g  g e a r  
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TABLE 13. - HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF SYSTEM USED BY FAILURE MANAGER 
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ 
1 FLCC ( f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  computer) 
1 .l Dig i ta l - to-ana log  (D-A)  c o n v e r t e r  
1 .l .l L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.2 Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.3 L e f t  f l a p  c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.4 Right  f l ap  c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.5 Rudder c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.6 L e f t  canard co i l  wraparound 
1.1.7 Right  canard c o i l  wraparound 
1.1.8 Leading edge f l ap  (LEF) t o t a l  computed o u t p u t  (TCO) 
1 . 1.8 . 1 LEF hardware 
1.2 L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  TCO 
1.3 Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  TCO 
1.4 L e f t  f l ap  TCO 
1.5 Right  f l a p  TCO 
1.6 Rudder TCO 
1.7 L e f t  canard TCO 
1.8 Right  canard TCO 
2 Analog-to-digi ta l  (A-D)  c o n v e r t e r  
2.1 I n v e r t e r  (800-Hz power supply)  
2.1.1 P i t c h  rate s e n s o r  
2.1.2 R o l l  r a te  sensor (normal or a m p l i f i e d )  
2.1.3 Yaw rate sensor 
2.1.4 Angle-of-attack sensor 
2.1.5 Beta (yaw) s e n s o r  ( a t  p r e s e n t  n o t  monitored)  
2.1.6 LEF pot wraparound 
2.1.7 P i t c h  s t i c k  
2.1 .% R o l l  s t i c k  
2.1.9 Rudder pedal 
2.1 . l  0 T h r o t t l e  t w i s t  
2.2 N o r m a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  sensor 
2.3 Lateral  d i rec t iona l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  s e n s o r  
2.4 Impact p r e s s u r e  (Qc)  s e n s o r  or s t a t i c  p r e s s u r e  (P,) sensor 
3 Discrete IOC 
3.1 I n d i v i d u a l  d i s c r e t e s  ( s w i t c h e s )  
I B U  p i t c h  wraparound 
I B U  l a t e ra l  d i r e c t i o n a l  wraparound 
L e f t  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  ISA 
Right  h o r i z o n t a l  t a i l  ISA 
L e f t  f l ap  ISA 
Right  f l a p  ISA 
Rudder ISA 
L e f t  canard ISA 
Right  canard ISA 
I 
TABLE 14. - SOFTWARE MECHANIZATION FOR GOOD-CHANNEL-AVERAGE 
SELECTOR MONITOR, NO PRIOR FAILURES 
Values F a i l u r e  c o n d i t i o n s  
ABS (L-S) > E N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y  
ABS (S-R) > E N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y  
ABS (L-R) > E - N N Y Y Y Y N N Y  
LPC = f i r s t  f a i l  l imi t -1  - - - N Y - - - - - 
SPC = f i rs t  f a i l  l imit-1 - - - - - - - N Y -  
RPC = first f a i l  l imi t -1  - - - - - N Y - - -  
Required act ion 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Act ions  : 





Decrement LPC i f  LPC > 0 
SPC i f  SPC > 0 
RPC i f  RPC > 0 6. 
S e l e c t  ( L  + S + R)/3 
S e l e c t  (L + S + R ) / 3  
Decrement SPC i f  SPC > 0 
Increment LPC and TPC 
S e l e c t  (S + R)/2 
RPC i f  RPC > 0 7. 
Decrement SPC i f  SPC > 0 
Increment  LPC and TPC 
Invoke f a i l u r e  manager 
S e l e c t  based on DST M S  
RPC i f  RPC > 0 8. 
Decrement LPC i f  LPC > 0 
Increment  RPC and TPC 
SPC i f  SPC > 0 9. 
N o t e s  : 
Decrement LPC i f  LPC > 0 
SPC i f  SPC > 0 
Increment  RPC and TPC 
Invoke f a i l u r e  manager 
S e l e c t  based on DST M S  
Decrement LPC i f  LPC > 0 
RPC i f  RPC > 0 
Increment SPC and TPC 
S e l e c t  (L + R)/2 
Decrement LPC i f  LPC > 0 
RPC i f  RPC > 0 
Increment  SPC and TPC 
Invoke f a i l u r e  manager 
S e l e c t  based on DST M S  
Increment TPC 
S e l e c t  ( L  + S + R ) / 3  
I n  a l l  cases the s e l e c t e d  o u t p u t  is  0 i f  t h e  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
f l ag  (RECF) i s  set. 
L l e f t  XPC persis t ance  coun te r s ,  number of i t e ra t ions  
S self a f a i l u r e  has  been present, where X is L, 
R r i g h t  S, R,  or T 
T t o t a l  E f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  l e v e l  
ABS a b s o l u t e  value 
DST d e v i c e  s t a t u s  t a b l e  
MS monitor s ta te  
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TABLE 15. - VERIFICATION TEST PLAN SUMMARY 
S e c t i o n  
1 Purpose 
2 Applicable documents 
2.1 Government documents 
2.2 Nongovernment documents 
3 T e s t  concepts  
3.1 D e f i n i t i o n  of terms 
3.2 Descr ip t ion  of program under t e s t  
3.2.1 System operational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
3.2.2 DFCS OFP f u n c t i o n s  
3.3 T e s t  phi losophy 
4 Qualif  i c a i t o n  requirements  and cri teria 
4.1 Stand-alone t e s t i n g  
4.1.1 AMUX d a t a  i n t e r f a c e  t e s t  
4.1.2 Gain scheduler  tes t  
4.1.3 Control l a w  f requency response tes t  
4.1.4 Cont ro l  mode selection and t r a n s i t i o n  response test  
4.1.5 Analog i n p u t  S/M operation test  
4.1.6 Discrete i n p u t  S/M o p e r a t i o n  
4.1.7 ISA monitor o p e r a t i o n  t e s t  
4.1.8 LEF monitor o p e r a t i o n  t e s t  
4.1.9 Long power outage  test  
4.1.10 S h o r t  power outage test  
4.1.1 1 Memory and d u t y  c y c l e  r e s e r v e  tes t  
4.1 .12 B u i l t - i n  t es t  
4.1 .13 F lyable  hardware retest  










Locat ion and schedule  
L i m i t a t i o n s  and g e n e r a l  comments 
P r e p a r a t i o n  of i n p u t  
Conduct of tests 
Analysis  of r e s u l t s  
Summary of  equipment 
S p e c i a l  t e s t  sof tware  
Summary of p e r s o n n e l  requirements  
6 Cont ro l  and r e p o r t i n g  procedures  
6.1 Conf igura t ion  c o n t r o l  and documentation maintenance 
6.2 T e s t  f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s ,  repair  and r e t e s t i n g  
7 Requirements c ross - re ference  
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TABLE 16. - REVERIFICATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS 
T e s t  
Ver i fy  AMUX inpu t -ou tpu t  i n t e r f a c e  
-Static SASB c o n t r o l  l a w  end-to-end c a l c u l a t i o n s  a t  Mach 0.9, sea l e v e l  
- M U X  input -output  w o r d s  
V e r i f y  end-to-end c o n t r o l  l a w  f requency  response  
-Discrete s i n u s o i d a l  i n p u t s  ( 1 ,  5, and 12 Hz) f o r  a l l  c o n t r o l  modes 
-P i t ch  and yaw feedback senso r  i n p u t s  
Ver i fy  mul t ip l e  s i n g l e  f a i l - f a u l t  annunc ia t ion  
-Ver i fy  s i n g l e  f a i l  dev ice  s t a t u s  e n t r i e s  f o r  a l l  moni tor ing  p l a n e s  i n  
s t a n d a r d  normal mode (SNRM) f o r  ana log  i n p u t s ,  d i s c r e t e  i n p u t s ,  a c t u a t o r  
i n p u t s ,  I S A  and LEF o u t p u t s  
V e r i f y  f i r s t  f a i l  f requency  response  
- V e r i f i e s  SNRM f i r s t  f a i l  performance i s  same as n o - f a i l  performance 
(repeat tes t  2 f o r  SNRM) 
Ver i fy  s i n g l e  FLCC long  outage  restart performance 
- S a t i s f a c t o r y  restart  performance 
-Proper r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of dev ice  s t a t u s  t a b l e  f a u l t  h i s t o r y  from non- 
v o l i t i v e  memory u s i n g  tes t  3 f a u l t s  
Ver i fy  r e s t a r t e d  FLCC f requency  response  
-Ver i fy  FLCC performance una f fec t ed  by a long  power outage  u s i n g  t es t  2 
f o r  SNRM 
V e r i f y  m u l t i p l e  d u a l  f a i l  and g r a c e f u l  deg rada t ion  t o  one FLCC 
-Dual f a i l  d e v i c e  s t a t u s  e n t r i e s  and AMUX f a u l t  annunc ia t ion  i n  a l l  moni- 
- I n s e r t  p a r i t y  e r r o r  i n  one FLCC 
t o r i n g  p l a n e s  
Ver i fy  s i n g l e  FLCC f requency  response  test 
- V e r i f i e s  remaining FLCC from tes t  7 has  approximate ly  same performance as 
nominal t r i p l e x  system u s i n g  tes t  2 f o r  SNRM 
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TABLE 17.  - INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS 
Bui 1 t- i n  tes t  
Mode s e l e c t i o n  and d i s p l a y  t e s t  
Cont ro l  l a w  f requency response  
Step response t e s t  
F l i g h t  s c e n a r i o  test  
Analog i n p u t  s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  t o l e r a n c e  
Analog d u a l - l i k e  f a i l u r e  t o l e r a n c e  
I S A  and LEF monitor f a i l u r e  t o l e r a n c e  
Analog m u l t i p l e  u n l i k e  i n p u t  f a i l u r e  t e s t  
S t r e s s  test  
Power o u t a g e - r e s t a r t  tes t  
C o n t r o l  l a w  g a i n  margin tes t  















1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
Takeoff 
A i r -  to-ai r handl ing  
Air-to-air t r a c k i n g  
Decoupled air-to-air  
handl ing  q u a l i t i e s  
Decoupled air-to-air  
t r a c k i n g  
Air- to-surface t r a c k i n g  
(bombs 1 
Decoupled a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  
t r a c k i n g  (bombs) 
Air- to-surface t r a c k i n g  
(guns 1 
Decoupled a i r - to-sur f  ace 
t r a c k i n g  (guns )  
Power approach and landing  
q u a l i  t i e s  
Mode t r a n s i e n t s  






































TABLE 19. - COMPONENTS CONSIDERED I N  FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS TESTING 
1 .  
2 .  
3. 
4.  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8. 
9 .  
10. 






Engine f a i l u r e  
Emergency power u n i t  (EPU) f a i l u r e  
Main gene ra to r  f a i l u r e  
System A h y d r a u l i c  f a i l u r e  
Any I S A  servovalve  SV1 o r  
System B h y d r a u l i c  f a i l u r e  
Any I S A  se rvova lve  SV3 f a i l u r e  
ISA so leno id  va lve  f a i l u r e  
FLCC power supply  f a i l u r e  
C e n t r a l  p r o c e s s i n g  u n i t  
( CPU 1 f a i  l u r e  
Input -output  c o n t r o l l e r  
( IOC ) f a i l u r e  
Analog- to-d ig i ta l  (A-D) conve r t e r  
f a i l u r e  
800 Hz power f a i l u r e  
S e n s o r s - c o n t r o l l e r s  
E x t e r n a l  215 V dc  p o w e r  f a i l u r e  
Dig i ta l - to-ana log  (D-A) con- 
SV2 f a i l u r e  



















I S A  primary co i l  s i g n a l  f a i l u r e  
ISA secondary coi l  s i g n a l  f a i l u r e  
Leading-edge f l a p  command f a i l u r e  
I n p u t  d i s c r e t e  s e c t i o n  f a i l u r e  
System i n p u t  d i s c r e t e  f a i l u r e  
Wraparound i n p u t  d i s c r e t e  f a i l u r e  
Output d i s c r e t e  s e c t i o n  f a i l u r e  
ISA o u t p u t  d i s c r e t e  
F a i l u r e  annunc ia t ion  o u t p u t  d i s -  
BIT o u t p u t  discrete f a i l u r e  
D a t a  l i n k  transmitter f a i l u r e  
Data l i n k  r e c e i v e r  f a i l u r e  
Avionics m u l t i p l e x  bus f a i l u r e  
IBU f a i l u r e  
LEF command s e r v o  
Runaway t r i m  
Avionics f a i l u r e s  
D i g i t a l  va lue  of a c t u a t o r  commands 
crete f a i l u r e  
~~ ~~~~ ~~~ _____ ~~ ~ 
TABLE 20. - FAILURE MODES AND THEIR EFFECTS 
Component F a i l u r e  mode F a i l u r e  effect  
~~ 
Note: The f i r s t  e i g h t  components were n o t  cons ide red  t o  be DFCS components. 
9 .  FLCC p o w e r  Turn-of f p o w e r  
supp ly  
Branch f a i l u r e  including loss of 
one set of i n p u t s ,  one CPU, and 
one set  of o u t p u t s  p l u s  switch- 
i n g  of one set  of s e rvova lve  
c o i l s  to  t h e  secondary c o i l s  
10. C e n t r a l  proc- H a l t  CPU Branch f a i l u r e  i n c l u d i n g  loss of 
e s s i n g  u n i t  CPU and one set of o u t p u t s  p l u s  
( CPU ) swi t ch ing  of one set of servo- 
v a l v e  c o i l s  to  the second- 
a r y  coi ls  
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TABLE 20. - CONTINUED 
Component F a i l u r e  mode F a i l u r e  e f f e c t  
Input-ou t p u t  
c o n t r o l l e r  
( I O C )  
H a l t  IOC Branch f a i l u r e  i n c l u d i n g  loss of 
one s e t  of i n p u t s ,  one CPU, and 
one set  of o u t p u t s  p l u s  switch- 
i n g  of one set  of se rvovalve  
co i l s  t o  t h e  seccondary c o i l s  












Hard-over A-D i n p u t s  Ripple A-D and D-A f a i l u r e  trees A-D c o n v e r t e r  
20 V ac 800 HZ 
power 
Turn-off power by 
p u l l i n g  breaker  t o  
a branch i n v e r t e r  
Ripple t h e  i n v e r t e r  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
loss of one set of 800 Hz i n p u t s  
Sensor and con- 
t r o l l e r  i n p u t s  
Turn-off any s e n s o r  or 
p i l o t  c o n t r o l l e r  i n p u t  
L o s s  of a s i n g l e  i n p u t ;  o t h e r  t w o  
i n p u t s  are monitored t o  o b t a i n  a 
v a l i d  s i g n a l  
E x t e r n a l  f 1 5  V 
dc p o w e r  
a. Ground + I 5  V d c  from 
b. Ground -1 5 V d c  from 
one F'LCC 
one FLCC 
a. Ripple A-D f a i l u r e  tree i n  
b. R i p p l e  A-D f a i l u r e  tree i n  
one E'LCC 
one FLCC 
Hard-over D-A o u t p u t s  Ripple D-A r e s u l t i n g  i n  loss of 
one set  of o u t p u t s  p l u s  switch- 
i n g  of one set  of se rvovalve  
co i l s  t o  t h e  secondary co i l s  
D-A c o n v e r t e r  
ISA primary 
c o i l  
Open co i l  c u r r e n t  
wraparound 
C o i l  c u r r e n t  f a i l u r e ;  s w i t c h  to  
backup s e r v o a m p l i f i e r  f o r  d r i v -  
i n g  secondary c o i l  of one ISA 
ISA secondary 
coi  1 
Open backup c o i l  cur- 
r e n t  wraparound 
Backup s e r v o  amplifier f a i l u r e  
LEF command Hard-over command on 
FLCC C 
LEF o u t p u t  e l e c t r o n i c  f a i l u r e  p l u s  
swi tch ing  LEF d r i v e  to  FLCC B 
IOC i n p u t  dis-  
crete s e c t i o n  
Simultaneous f a i l u r e  of 
a l l  system and wrap- 
around discrete i n p u t s  
t o  no change 
I n d i v i d u a l  d i s c r e t e s  f a i l u r e  i n  
one FLCC each t i m e  a discrete 
i n p u t  is changed by t h e  p i l o t  
F a i l  a l l  system i n p u t  
discretes of one FLCC 
t o  undriven bus 
Discrete f a i l u r e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  loss 
of a par t ia l  set of system 
i n p u t  d i  scre tes 
System i n p u t  
d i s c r e t e s  
N o t  applicable Wraparound 
( w / A )  i n p u t  
d i s c r e t e s  
Incorpora ted  i n  compo- 
n e n t  no. 20 
TABLE 20. - CONTINUED 
~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 
Component F a i l u r e  mode F a i l u r e  e f f e c t  
23. IOC o u t p u t  d i s -  Fa i l  a l l  BIT ,  ISA and Undetected f i r s t  f a i l u r e  
Crete s e c t i o n  f a i l u r e  annunc ia t ion  
o u t p u t  d i s c r e t e s  of 
one l?LCC t o  no change 
24. I S A  o u t p u t  Incorpora ted  i n  compo- Not a p p l i c a b l e  
d i s c r e t e s  n e n t  no. 23 
25. F a i l u r e  Incorpora ted  i n  compo- N o t  applicable 
annunc ia t ion  n e n t  no. 23 
d i s c r e  tes 
26. B I T  o u t p u t  a. Landing g e a r  handle  a. L a t e r a l - d i r e c t i o n a l  I B U  f a i l -  
d i s  cre tes d i s c r e t e  B I T  in -  u r e  on l and ing  
j ec t  
i n j e c t  swi t ch ing  to  backup coi ls  
b. Analog i n p u t  B I T  b. ‘Ripple A-D f a i l u r e  tree, p l u s  
hardware i n  one FLCC 
C. IBU i n t e g r a t o r  B I T  C. P i t c h  I B U  f a i l u r e  
i n j e c t  
27. D a t a  l i n k  Open both  data l i n k  Branch f a i l u r e  i n c l u d i n g  loss of 
t ransmi  t t e  r l i n e s  from FLCC B one set  of i n p u t s ,  one CPU, and 
one set  of o u t p u t s  p l u s  switch-  
i n g  of one set  of servovalve  
co i l s  t o  t h e  secondary co i l s  
28. Data l i n k  F a i l  one r e c e i v e r  of Branch f a i l u r e  i n c l u d i n g  loss of 
r e c e i v e r  FLCC B to  s t a t u s  one s e t  of i n p u t s ,  one CPU, and 
good, d a t a  bad one set  of o u t p u t s  p l u s  switch-  
ing of one set  of se rvova lve  
c o i l s  t o  t h e  secondary co i l s  
29. AMUX 
30. I B U  
a. S t a t u s  good, d a t a  a. L o s s  of AMUX p l u s  command t o  
b. Good d a t a  on bo th  b. Loss of AMUX and p o s s i b l y  
C. Bus c o n t e n t i o n  C. I nde te rmina te ,  p o s s i b l e  
d. Accepting any ter- d. Inde termina te ,  p o s s i b l e  
bad on one bus ASB mode 
buses  one FLCC 
FLCC loss 
mina l  addres s  FLCC loss 
Incorpora ted  i n  compo- N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  
n e n t  no. 26 
31. LEF command K i l l  power to  one motor Lock one motor d r i v e  
s e r v o  
TABLE 20. - CONCLUDED 
Component F a i l u r e  mode F a i l u r e  e f f e c t  




33.  Avionic a. 
f a i l u r e s  b. 
34. D i g i t a l  value a. 
of  a c t u a t o r  
commands 
N o s  e-up 
N o s  e-down 
Right  wing down 
L e f t  wing down 
FCC f a i l  
SMS f a i l  
R a m p  on o u t p u t  of 
s i n g l e  s u r f a c e  
o u t p u t  command, 
channel  B 
Hard-over o u t p u t  of 
s u r f a c e  o u t p u t  
commands by a l l  
computers 
F a i l u r e  of s t i c k  t r i m  swi tches  
a. Force c o n t r o l  of AMUX t o  SMS 
b. Loss of MPD 
a. Simulated sof tware  error 
causes  TCO miscompare 
b. Simulated g e n e r i c  software 
error r e q u i r i n g  manual 
s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  I B U  
TABLE 21.  - REVALIDATION TESTS 
T e s t  
1 V e r i f y  DFCS and s i m u l a t i o n  i n t e r f a c e s  pass p r e f l i g h t  B I T  
2 Ver i fy  mode s e l e c t i o n  and o t h e r  base page o p t i o n s  
-MPD mode menu and CCV swi tches  -DGFT/MSOV/CCV swi tches  
-HUD miss ion  phase mode and CCV swi tch  -Optimum flap-no scheduled f l a p  
-Drag modulation-drag convent iona l  
-Cont ro l le r  i n p u t  f a i l u r e s  -Switch f a i l u r e s  
-Sensor i n p u t  f a i l u r e s  ( f i r s t  and second l i k e )  
-Prese lec ted  pedal ,  s t i c k ,  t h r o t t l e  o p t i o n s  f o r  decoupled ASG modes 
-Mode o p t i o n  c h a n g e a b i l i t y  
-Landing g e a r  up-down -Panel t r i m  
-Nose g e a r  door open-closed -S t ick  t r i m  
6 V a l i d a t e  take-off and landing  performance 
-Stores-clean ( s t a n d a r d  normal) 
-P i tch  ra te  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  ( l a n d i n g  o n l y )  
-Standby g a i n s  ( l a n d i n g  o n l y )  
-1BU ( l a n d i n g  o n l y )  
-Coupled maximum s t ick- rudder  p e d a l - t h r o t t l e  t w i s t  commands ( se lec t  modes) 
-Maximum a l t i t u d e - s p e e d  loops ( a l l  modes) 
- F l a t t u r n  d e c o u p l e d - f l a t t u r n  coupled 
3 V e r i f y  f a u l t  annuncia t ion  of DFCS i n p u t s  
4 V e r i f y  preset decoupled o p t i o n s  
5 Ver i fy  p i l o t  i n p u t  d i s c r e t e  
7 High-performance maneuvers 
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TABLE 22. - IN-FLIGHT FAILURE INDICATIONS 





















I n d i c a t i o n  of l e a d i n g  edge f l a p  
f a i l u r e  on touch and go 
System 
i n t e g r a t i o n  
Vote so f tware  
swi t ches  
Avionics f o r c e s  r a p i d  mode changes 
i n  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  system 
System i n t e -  
g r a t i o n  ( n o t  
rese t t a b l e  ) 
Avionics  and 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  
immunity 
i n c r e a s e d  
I n d i c a t i o n  of one of t h r e e  DFCS 
branches f a i l e d ;  r e s e t t a b l e  
by p i l o t  
Sys t e m  
i n t e g r a  t i o n  
Vote so f tware  
swi t ches  
I n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  one branch had 
f a i l e d  to  c a l c u l a t e  h o r i z o n t a l  
t a i l  commands c o r r e c t l y ;  reset- 
t a b l e  by p i l o t  
N o t  
repea t a b l e  
None 
Sys t e m  V o t e  so f tware  
i n t e g r a t i o n  swi t ch  
I n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  one branch had 
f a i l e d  to  c a l c u l a t e  l e f t  and 
r i g h t  canard commands; reset- 
table by p i l o t  
System 
i n t e g r a t i o n  
Air data rate 
of change 
l i m i t e d  
Yaw d e p a r t u r e  r e s u l t s  i n  f a i l u r e  
i n d i c a t i o n s  f o r  l e f t  and r i g h t  
canard a c t u a t o r s  and a i r  da t a ;  
resettable by p i l o t .  Inves t iga -  
t i o n  on a i r  d a t a  f a i l u r e  mode 
i d e n t i f i e s  s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  t h a t  
can  cause l o s s  of DFCS ana- 
log backup 
Dual branch f a i l u r e  of DFCS, air- 
c r a f t  landed wi th  s i n g l e  s t r i n g  
c o n t r o l ;  f a i l u r e  n o t  resettable 
Sys t e m  
i n t e g r a t i o n  
Vote so f tware  
swi t ch  
F a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  one branch 
had f a i l e d  to  c a l c u l a t e  i t s  com- 
mand to the f l ape rons ;  resettable 
by the  pi lot .  
Sys t e m  
i n t e g r a t i o n  
Vote so f tware  
swi tch  
Dual f a i l u r e  of an i n p u t  d i s c r e t e ,  
t r a c e d  to loose c o n t a c t s  i n  
a connector  
Hardware Y e s  
F a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  of l e f t  and 
r i g h t  canard command i n  one 
branch; r e s e t t a b l e  by p i l o t  
Discrete s o f t -  
ware swi t ch  
Sys t e m  
i n t e g r a  t i o n  
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TABLE 22. - CONCLUDED 




1 1  I n d i c a t i o n  of one of t h r e e  Sys tern V o t e  sof tware  
DFCS branches f a i l e d ;  i n t e g r a  t i o n  swi tch  
r e s e t t a b l e  by p i l o t  
12 I n d i c a t i o n  of one of t h r e e  
DFCS branches f a i l e d ;  re- 
s e t t a b l e  by p i lo t ;  occurred 
d u r i n g  a i r c r a f t  r e f u e l i n g  
Various f l i g h t s  13 F a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  an 
~ from f l i g h t  72 i n p u t  d i s c r e t e  had f a i l e d ;  
t o  f l i g h t  100 rese t tab le  by p i l o t ;  
occur red  f i v e  t i m e s  
Various f l i g h t s  14 F a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  
I a n  i n p u t  swi tch  faded,  
occur red  upon a c t i v a t i o n  
of a c o c k p i t  switch;  reset- 
table  by p i l o t ;  occurred 








None 95 15 F a i l u r e  i n d i c a t i o n  of angle- D i s s i m i  l i a r  
o f - a t t a c k  s e n s o r  a f t e r  angle-of - 
f l y i n g  through wake of a t t a c k  s e n s o r s  
a n o t h e r  a i r c ra f t ;  reset- 
table by p i l o t  
TABLE 23. - B I T  DETECTED FAILURES OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
Number D e s c r i p t i o n  
1 BIT d e t e c t e d  a f a u l t y  r e l a y  used i n  swi tch ing  commands to  t h e  l e a d i n g  
2 BIT detected f a i l u r e s  of semiconductor random access memory a t  approximately 
3 BIT d e t e c t e d  f a i l u r e  of a semiconductor d i s c r e t e  d r i v e  used i n  l o g i c  t h a t  
4 BIT detected a f a i l u r e  of a h y d r a u l i c  a c t u a t o r  
5 B I T  d e t e c t e d  a p a r i t y  error and would n o t  f i n i s h  BIT test; t h e  p a r i t y  
e r r o r  i n d i c a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  from a sof tware  error i n  t h e  B I T  test  for  
p a r i t y  errors 
edge f l a p s  
40°F 
d e t e c t s  second f a i l u r e s  of t h e  computers 
TABLE 24. - UNRESOLVED B I T  FAILURE INDICATIONS 
Number Desc r ip t ion  
1 One of the t h r e e  computers f a i l e d  du r ing  BIT; s u s p e c t  cause was loss of 
2 B I T  f a i l e d  numerous times whi le  t e s t i n g  va r ious  DFCS components; EM1 w a s  
power t o  channe 1 
be l i eved  t o  be t h e  cause 
TABLE 25. - B I T  FAILURES DUE TO SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Number Desc r ip t ion  
~ 
1 After tests t o  check b a t t e r y  p o w e r  t o  t h e  DFCS, BIT  would d e t e c t  f a i l u r e s  of 
a l l  i n p u t  s e n s o r s  
2 B I T  so f tware  w a s  unable  to  use back-up a v i o n i c s  bus i n  t h e  e v e n t  of a f a i l -  
u re ;  r e s u l t e d  i n  p i l o t  unable  t o  monitor or o p e r a t e  BIT; system locked up 
3 Accidenta l  2nd a c t i v a t i o n  of B I T  f a i l e d  because of an unknown t iming  con- 
s t r a i n t  f o r  BIT  ope ra t ions  
4 B I T  d e t e c t s  l ead ing  edge f l a p  lock  and i n p u t  f a i l u r e s  because of 
improper procedures  
5 B I T  i n d i c a t e d  f a i l u r e s  because of no i se  induced from running a c t u a t o r  tests, 
numerous accounts  
6 A procedure e r r o r  causes  BIT  t o  be run wi th  f a i l u r e s  p r e s e n t ;  r e s u l t e d  i n  
B I T  locking  up 
7 B I T  f a i l s  to  d e t e c t  a f a u l t  i n  t h e  IBU a f t e r  a mod i f i ca t ion  to  t h e  IBU w a s  
made; hardware mod i f i ca t ion  d i d  n o t  have corresponding change i n  BIT t es t  
TABLE 26. -ANOMALIES WITH MEMORY MODE OPERATION 
1 .  One of t h r e e  computers f a i l e d  because of e n t e r i n g  memory mode wi th  c o n t r o l  i n -  
2. Engine s t a r t  i n  the memory mode caused complete DFCS f a i l u r e  and hard-over ca- 
p u t s ;  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  upon e x i t  of memory mode causes i n t e r c h a n n e l  d i f f e r e n c e s  
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Figure 1. The AFTI F16 airplane. 
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Figure 2. Digital flight control system architecture. 
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Figure 3 .  R e l i a b i l i t y  requirements 
f o r c e  redundancy. 
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Figure 4 .  Independent back-up u n i t  i n t e r f a c e  t o  t h e  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  con t ro l  system. 
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Figure 6. Interchannel difference for 
1000 percent/sec ramp. 
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Figure 1 0 .  Right-hand c o n t r o l l e r .  
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Figure 11 .  Control modes and c o n t r o l l e r  commands. 
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(a )  V e r t i c a l  t r a n s l a t i o n :  ver- 
t i c a l  velocity control a t  cons tan t  
p i t c h  a t t i t u d e .  
V y\ , 
(b) D i r e c t  l i f t :  v e r t i c a l  
f l i g h t p a t h  control a t  cons tan t  
angle  of a t t a c k .  
( d )  La te ra l  t r a n s l a t i o n :  l a t e r a l  
velocity c o n t r o l  a t  cons tant  yaw 
a t t i t u d e  . 
(e) D i r e c t  s i d e f o r c e :  direc- 
t ional  f l i g h t p a t h  control a t  zero 
s i d e s l i p  ang le .  
7288 
(c) P i t c h  p o i n t i n g :  p i t c h  a t t i -  
t u d e  control a t  cons tan t  f l i g h t -  
p a t h  angle .  
(f) Yaw p o i n t i n g :  d i r e c t i o n a l  
a t t i t u d e  control a t  cons tan t  
f 1 i g h t p a t h  ang le .  
Figure 12. Decoupled control d e s c r i p t i o n s .  
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Figure 1 4 .  
tes t  pages .  
Multipurpose d i s p l a y s  o f  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  control  system base  and 
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INU inertial navigation unit 
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Figure 16. Actuator in ter face  t o  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  control  system. 
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Figure 19. Cross-channel monitoring uses 
information sent on digital links. 
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Figure 22. 
input c i r c u i t r y  f a u l t s .  
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Figure 2 4 .  Bombing mode f l i g h t  envelope 
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Figure 25. Longitudinal f e e d  forward 
gain N1 requ i r ing  double i n t e r p o l a t i o n .  
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Figure 26. Digital flight control 
system software structure. 
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Figure 2 8 .  Software des ign p r o c e s s .  Figure 29 .  Top-down so f tware  s t r u c t u r e .  
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Figure 31. System-software qualification and design iterations. 
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Figure 33. 
and testing . 













Figure 3 4 .  History o f  Software 
v e r i f i c a t i o n .  
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Figure 35. H i s t o r y  o f  system 
v a l i d a t i o n .  
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Figure 36 .  Support equipment f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
t t t  




I RM test 
I 
FLCC A 
to FLCC B 
4 - I signal 
d i s p I a y I 
I Manual control 
7312 






















Programmable Stores Fire control 
management computer - display generator (PDG) 
7313 
set (SMS) (FCC) 
Figure 37. Validation support equipment. 
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Figure 3 8 .  Phase 1 stress test cond i t ions .  
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Figure 4 1 .  Setup for structural 
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Figure 4 3 .  Configuration control p r o c e s s .  
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F i g u r e  4 5 .  
s w i t c h  used i n  the control l a w s .  
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Figure 46. Overview of electrical system over- 
voltage shutdown. 
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Figure 47. N o r m a l  acceleration and 
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Figure 48. How an air data failure 
causes errors in surface commands. 
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Figure 50. Software re l ease  sumnary. 
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Figure 52.  Summary o f  cond i t ions  causing f l i g h t  44  anomaly. 
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and i n t e g r a t e d  a v i o n i c s  des ign .  The approach t o  q u a l i f y i n g  t h e  so f tware  
and system des igns  i s  d i scussed ,  and t h e  e f f e c t s  of des ign  c h o i c e s  on 
system q u a l i f i c a t i o n  a r e  h i g h l i g h t e d .  
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